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PREFACE
The study of memory has been called the ultimate “study in social psychology.” (Bartlett,
1932). The ability to store, retrieve, and apply previously learned information is vital to human
functioning; without it, navigating the myriad physical, cultural, and social contexts in which
humans operate would be overwhelming (Schacter & Addis, 2009). A form of memory that is
especially critical is autobiographical memory—the memories of one’s personal past. One’s past
experiences can serve as important reminders of what to do or not to do, or they can shape
predictions about the future (Schacter & Addis, 2009). Thus, understanding the many purposes
for which human have developed and use autobiographical memory is an important line of
research.
Although autobiographical memory has long been known to support the human action of
reminiscence—i.e., the act of recollecting a previously experienced event (e.g., Ballard, 1913;
Bartlett, 1932)—to suppose that “re-experiencing” (Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998) the past is
autobiographical memory’s primary purpose is to take a one-dimensional view. Recent theory
and evidence from the cognitive, evolutionary, developmental, and neuroscience domains
contend that one’s personal storehouse of knowledge and experiences are invaluable aids for
predicting, navigating, and coping with unknown future situations (Atance & O’Neill, 2005;
Barsalou, 1988, 2003; Okuda, Fujii, Ohtake, Tsukiura, Tanji, Suzuki, et al., 2003; Wheeler,
Stuss, & Tulving, 1997) or even reframing personal past events (Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson,
1995). Thus, it is unlikely that the human ability to “re-live” past events is for the sole purpose of
reminiscence. Rather, it has been argued that memories of an autobiographical nature inform
such capacities as autonoetic consciousness—the human ability for self-awareness (e.g.,
Baddeley, Eysenck, & Anderson, 2009; Tulving, 1984, 1985, 2005; Wheeler et al., 1997) that
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permits one to mentally place one’s self within a recollected past event, an envisioned future
scenario, or in counterfactual situations (e.g., Atance and O'Neill, 2001; Baddeley et al., 2009;
Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), as well as
mental time travel—the mental projection of one’s self through conceptual time (Suddendorf &
Busby, 2003; Tulving, 2002a1; Wheeler et al., 1997). Together, these capacities provide a sense
of self-continuity across time, and ensure that actual past experience is distinguishable from
beliefs, imaginings, and dreams (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Klein, Cosmides,
Tooby, & Chance, 2001).
To project one’s self back in time for the purpose of reminiscing, or “re-experiencing,” a
past event requires only that the rememberer activate and recollect a stored autobiographical
episode (e.g., Ballard, 1913; Bartlett, 1932). However, when one wishes to travel forward in
time, one cannot simply “re-experience” the past as is the case with reminiscence. Instead,
autobiographical memory content2 must be imaginatively changed such that a future scenario
that has not yet occurred—and thus for which direct autobiographical memory content has not
yet been stored—can be “pre-experienced” with details appropriate and relevant to future
purposes (Schacter & Addis, 2007; Shanton & Goldman, 2010; Szpunar, 2010). The projecting
of one’s self forward in time by imaginatively changing autobiographical memory content is
referred to as prospection (Schacter & Addis, 2007). Similarly, the tendency to go back in time
to imaginatively modify or augment a stored autobiographical episode for the purpose of
supposing how things could have turned out differently than what actually occurred—i.e., to

1

Tulving (2002a) proposed the term chronesthesia for the conscious awareness of subjective time possessed by
humans. The current paper will refer to this phenomenon as mental time travel.
2
The current paper uses the phrase “memory content” to denote the information, or internal representation (Dudai,
2007), that is stored in the brain during encoding. This conceptual understanding, rather than the biophysiological
properties of memory content—e.g., “memory trace” or “engram (e.g., Dudai, 2004)—is used throughout.
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“reframe”3 the past—is referred to as counterfactual thinking (Roese & Olson, 1995).
How humans actually engage in mental time travel is largely unknown. It has been
suggested that mental time travel is not only motivated by current goals, but is shaped and
constrained by the past (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Johnson & Sherman, 1990).
What is known from brain evidence is that such “experiential” cognitions as self-projection (e.g.,
Buckner & Carroll, 2006), autobiographical memory retrieval (e.g., Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, &
Schacter, 2008), prospection (e.g., Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; De Brigard, Addis,
Ford, Schacter, & Giovanello, 2013; De Brigard, Spreng, Mitchell, & Schacter, 2015; Schacter,
2012; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Zheng, Luo, & Yu, 2014), counterfactual thinking (e.g., Addis et
al., 2009; De Brigard et al., 2013; De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; De Brigard et al., 2015;
Schacter, Benoit, De Brigard, & Szpunar, in press; Van Hoeck, Ma, Ampe, Vandekerckhove, &
Van Overwalle, 2013), and perspective taking (Dodell-Feder, DiLisi, & Hooker, 2014; Knox,
2010; Perry, Hendler, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), all share neural circuitry in the default network
(e.g., Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014). This suggests that capacities underlain by
the default network evolved together to produce an efficient, synergistic system. However, no
single theory has emerged to explain how exactly these functionalities work together and why.
One reason for this may be that the cognitive mechanism that enables autobiographical
memory content to be used for mental time travel and counterfactual thinking has not been
definitively identified. However, one possible explanation comes by way of simulation theory.
Simulation theory by Goldman (2006) was originally developed to explain the social behavior of
perspective taking—the inferring of others’ thoughts and feelings. But in light of a growing body

3

Although the counterfactual thinking literature prefers the term “reconstruct” when describing the alteration of
actual memory content (e.g., Roese & Olson, 1995), the current paper uses the term “reframe” so as not to confuse
the modifying of actual memory content with the “reconstruction” that occurs to memory content during memory
consolidation (e.g., Schacter, 1989).
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of brain evidence showing that the brain areas associated with autobiographical memory
retrieval, perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking are neurally connected,
Shanton and Goldman (2010) revised simulation theory to explain both perspective taking and
mental time travel. Thus simulation, per this revision, has two corresponding forms. When the
goal prompting mental simulation is perspective taking—i.e., when the goal of simulation is
other-directed4— the form of simulation employed is interpersonal. When the goal prompting
simulation is mental time travel—i.e., when the goal is self-directed—the form of simulation
employed is intrapersonal.
Whether one’s goal is to perspective take (via interpersonal simulation) or to travel
through time (via intrapersonal simulation), simulation theory posits that the simulation process
is triggered upon the activation and retrieval of relevant stored information from “background
information” (Goldman, 2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010) that could include content retrieved
from storage in long-term memory. Long-term memory is a broadly defined, taxonomically
superordinate memory form comprising memory content that has been stored for a long period—
possibly over the course of one’s life (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). Per simulation theory’s
simulation process model, memory content retrieved in response to a perspective taking or
mental time travel goal serves as “input” for interpersonal or intrapersonal simulation,
respectively. Yet, despite the wealth of brain evidence linking autobiographical memory retrieval
to the actions of perspective taking (e.g., Dodell-Feder et al., 2014; Knox, 2010; Perry et al.,
2011), prospection (e.g., Addis et al., 2009; De Brigard et al., 2013; De Brigard et al., 2015;
Schacter, 2012; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Zheng et al., 2014), and counterfactual thinking (e.g.,
Addis et al., 2009; De Brigard et al., 2013; De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; De Brigard et al.,
4

Perspective taking can be from a first-person perspective (1PP)—i.e., one’s own perspective—or a third-person
perspective (3PP)—i.e., from another’s perspective. Unless otherwise indicated, this paper is concerned with the
3PP that occurs between a perceiver and a target other.
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2015; Schacter et al., in press; Van Hoeck et al., 2013), research asserting the use of
autobiographical memory specifically, rather than long-term memory generally, for such
purposes is, at least at present, less widespread.
If simulation is the mechanism by which autobiographical memory is used for
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, then it should reasonably follow
that mental time travel is a function of autobiographical memory. Such a conclusion would be
important to the line of research concerned with autobiographical memory functions, which
seeks the everyday purposes for which autobiographical memory is used (Baddeley, 1988). A
recent study by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation) did find evidence that autobiographical
memory is used for the purpose of perspective taking. And although no study of autobiographical
memory functions to date has reported direct evidence of the functions mental time travel,
prospection, or counterfactual thinking, it has long been assumed that autobiographical memory
facilitates such actions as predicting future outcomes (e.g., Williams, Conway, & Cohen, 2008),
and coping with past events (e.g., Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005; Roese, 1997). As
such, the idea that perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking could be
functions of autobiographical memory is plausible enough to warrant further investigation.
To explore whether perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking are
functions of autobiographical memory, the current paper comprises four chapters. Chapter 1 is an
independent paper proposing the Expanded Simulation Model—an adaptation of the cognitive
process models proposed originally by Goldman (2006), and later by Shanton and Goldman
(2010). The Expanded Simulation Model is meant to provides a framework by which the
existence of the autobiographical memory functions of perspective taking, prospection, and
counterfactual thinking are theoretically substantiated. Chapter 1 argues that autobiographical
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memory specifically, rather than long-term memory generally, is a store from which background
information is activated and retrieved in response to a perspective taking, prospection, or
counterfactual thinking goal5. Chapters 2 and 3 present empirical findings from Study 1 and
Study 2, respectively, both of which aimed to substantiate the theoretical claims of Chapter 1.
Study 1 was a validation study of a self-report instrument—the Autobiographical Memory
Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale—that was developed to measure the extent to which
individuals use autobiographical memory for the hypothesized functions of perspective taking,
prospection, and counterfactual thinking. Study 2 was an empirical study that used the AMFS to
discern the role of autobiographical memory in interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation, and to
determine whether perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking could be
considered functions of autobiographical memory. Chapter 4 explores the broader impacts of the
ideas and findings presented in Chapters 1, 2, and 3.

5

Of course, it could be argued that stored memory content that is not strictly autobiographical could serve as input
for interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation. The current paper acknowledges this possibility, but will not attempt
to describe or explain such possibilities. The current paper is concerned only with whether or not the claim that
autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than long-term memory content generally, can be used for
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking is plausible.
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CHAPTER 1 MENTAL SIMULATION AS THE MECHANISM BY WHICH
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL
MEMORY
INFORMS
INTERPERSONAL
AND
INTRAPERSONAL SIMULATION: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
1.1 Introduction and Background
Researchers of autobiographical memory functions—the purposes for which we use
memories of our personal past (Baddeley, 1988)—have long theorized three broad uses: Social
(the use of autobiographical memory to foster relationships and social bonding), Self (the use of
autobiographical memory to maintain self-identity and self-continuity), and Directive (the use of
autobiographical memory to aid emotion regulation, behavioral control, problem solving), (e.g.,
Baddeley, 1988; Bruce, 1989; Neisser, 1982; Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005). Once the
Social, Self, and Directive functions were empirically validated (Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck &
Alea, 2011), the concern became whether the long-standing focus on the three-function model
was inadvertently discouraging the search for other possible functions. Researchers therefore
began seeking evidence for an expanded set of functions (e.g., Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009; Ranson
& Fitzgerald, in preparation; Webster, 1995, 1997).
A recent study exploring an expanded set of autobiographical memory functions found
evidence for a function of “perspective taking” (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation).
Perspective taking occurs when an individual mentally puts oneself into another’s shoes in order
to infer the other’s thoughts and feelings (e.g., Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Ickes, 2003).
Perspective taking is thought to be essential to social harmony and altruism (Ickes, 2003). Early
humans competent in reading and predicting others’ mental states are thought to have had the
adaptive and selectional advantage (Barresi & Moore, 1996; Decety & Hamm, 2009; Goldman,
2006). Some have postulated that human intelligence itself arose from the need to discern others’
intentions and attitudes (Barresi & Moore, 1996; Reader & Laland, 2002; van Schaik &
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Burkhart, 2011; Whiten & van Schaik, 2007; Wilson, 1991). This likely explains why
perspective taking occurs spontaneously during social interactions, but also why perspective
taking occurs in times of solitude, when private thoughts can turn to recollections of past social
situations, or imagined predictions about future interactions (Ickes, 2003; Winner, 2000).
Perspective taking is thus an everyday behavior and a vital social skill (Ickes, 2003; Winner,
2000). Such factors give weight to substantiating the use of autobiographical memory to
facilitate it.
To date, only one study, by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation), has reported an
autobiographical memory function of perspective taking. As for why the function of perspective
taking emerged in this study but was undetected by others may have to do with the design of the
self-report instrument used by Ranson and Fitzgerald to measure autobiographical memory use.
The Ranson and Fitzgerald instrument employed the social context of joint reminiscence, which
was meant to prompt respondents to consider the frequency with which they recall, share, and
discuss personal and shared past events with others. As such, instruments lacking a similar social
context may not be sensitive enough to detect all the potential functions associated with the use
of autobiographical memory for social behaviors and/or interactions—of which perspective
taking is an example.
However, the instrument used by Ranson and Fitzgerald was adapted from an existing
autobiographical memory functions instrument that did not yield evidence of a perspective taking
function. The original instrument, the Child-Caregiver Reminiscence Scale (CRS) (Kulkofsky &
Koh, 2009), was designed in response to related research indicating that the development of the
autobiographical memory system, as well as socialization of autobiographical memory content
and use, occurs in early life (Nelson & Fivush, 2002, 2004). The CRS asks parents of young
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children aged three to seven years to rate the frequency with which they engaged in various
reminiscence behaviors with their child. Of interest to Ranson and Fitzgerald was whether the
expanded set of autobiographical memory functions found by the CRS to emerge during early
childhood were sustained through adulthood. Thus, that the perspective taking function was
unique to adults is more likely do to differences in cognitive capacities than in instrument design.
The young children to whom the CRS is administered have not yet developed—the
understanding that others have mental states—e.g., beliefs intents, desires, perspectives—
different from one’s own (Beck, Riggs, & Burns, 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003) As theory of
mind does not develop until around the age of four years (Goldman, 2006), and ToM is essential
to perspective taking (McHugh & Stewart, 2012), the children targeted by the CRS would not
have yet developed the ability to use autobiographical memory for this purpose. And although
the social context of joint reminiscence may have enhanced the ability of the self-report
instrument used by Ranson and Fitzgerald to detect the perspective taking function, it is more
likely that, absent a cohesive theory recommending its existence, researchers simply did not
think to look for it.
A crucial first step in theoretically substantiating the existence of the autobiographical
memory function of perspective taking is to identify and delineate the mechanism through which
autobiographical memory might inform perspective taking. One possible mechanism is mental
simulation as proposed by simulation theory. Simulation theory was developed by Goldman
(2006) to explain how individuals infer other minds. Simulation theory posits that to “simulate”
for the purpose of perspective taking is to create imagined or pretend states in one’s own mind
that corresponds to those of the target. Such “pretend” states are informed by “background
information,” which can include content from past experiences that is activated and retrieved
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from long-term memory storage in response to a perspective-taking goal. Such background
information can serve as “input” for simulation processing—i.e., the mingling of memory
content with imagination to produce a simulated outcome, such as a target other’s inferred
thoughts and feelings.
Although simulation theory by Goldman (2006) offers the mechanism of mental
simulation as the means by which memory can be used for perspective taking, simulation theory
does not explicitly state that the background information drawn from long-term memory stores is
autobiographical in form. However, simulation theory does not preclude such an interpretation
either. Rather, the fact that “background information” is only superficially defined by simulation
theory makes it possible for the current paper to exploit this deficiency and . One, taxonomically
speaking, autobiographical memory is a form of long-term memory (Tulving, 1972). That is, the
long-term memory comprises various memory “systems” that reflect the type of information
stored.
One such system is the autobiographical memory system, which comprises both episodic
autobiographical memory (personal past events experienced at particular times and places) and
semantic autobiographical memory (general knowledge and fact-based information) (Conway,
2001). Because simulation theory postulates only that mental simulation employs memory
content drawn from the long-term memory system—but does not explicitly exclude any longterm
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autobiographical memory as the source of simulation input. Two, a growing body of brain
evidence indicates that the neural pathways underlying the functions of autobiographical
memory retrieval (e.g., Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008) and perspective taking
(Dodell-Feder, DiLisi, & Hooker, 2014; Knox, 2010; Perry, Hendler, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011)
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are shared. Such findings suggest that these brain areas co-evolved to ensure a functional
mutualism. And three, simulation theory was recently augmented to account for both perspective
taking and mental time travel—the mental projection of one’s self through conceptual time
(Suddendorf & Busby, 2003; Tulving, 2002a6; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). The revised
simulation theory by Shanton and Goldman (2010) addresses the use of memory in mental time
travel; specifically; the “re-experiencing” of a personal past event—i.e., the vivid imagining of a
prior event in order to subjectively re-live it (e.g., Reber, 2013; Tulving & Markowitsch,
1998)7—and the “pre-experiencing” of past experience in order to imaginatively envision future
scenario. However, in order to “re-experience” or “pre-experience” a memory, the relevant
content must be activated and retrieved from memory storage. That Shanton and Goldman
specify the “re-experience” and “pre-experience” of personal past events implies the specific
activation and retrieval of autobiographical memory content. Additionally, Shanton and
Goldman’s characterization of simulated mental time travel as involving “episodic memory”
likewise implies the involvement of the episodic memory system—where episodic memory
content is stored for later potential activation and retrieval. A subsystem of the episodic memory
system is the autobiographical episodic memory system, where autobiographical episodic
memory content is stored (Conway, 2001). Thus, just as simulation theory broadly defined longterm memory, so has it defined the involvement of “episodic memory.” As such, simulation
6

Tulving (2002a) proposed the term chronesthesia for the conscious awareness of subjective time possessed by
humans. The current paper will refer to this phenomenon as mental time travel.
7
The distinctions between the terms “episodic memory system,” “episodic memory content,” and “episodic
memory”—specifically the connotation of the latter by Shanton and Goldman (2010)—is critical to a full
understanding of the arguments of the current paper. The “episodic memory system” comprises memories of past
events, a subset of which involve the self—i.e., are “personal”—and which are thus by definition autobiographical
(Williams et al., 2008) “Episodic memory content” is the stored details of an event, including the people, places,
object, and its general and specific contexts. A subset of episodic memory content is “personal,” and is thus
autobiographical. Shanton and Goldman (2010) use the term “episodic memory” when referring to the subjective
“re-experiencing” of stored episodic memory content that has been recalled for re-living. The current paper is
ultimately interested in whether autobiographical content specifically, rather than long-term memory content
generally, is used for simulation-based perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking.
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theory does not preclude the specification of autobiographical memory content as a form of
long-term memory “background information” that could be used in simulation-based perspective
taking and mental time travel. Given that this idea is conceptually plausible, but to date,
unexplored, further investigation is warranted.
1.2 Goals and Hypotheses
The overarching objective of the current paper is to theoretically substantiate the
existence of the autobiographical memory function of perspective taking per the evidence
reported by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation). By extension, a secondary objective is to
theoretically argue for the existence of the autobiographical memory functions of prospection
and counterfactual thinking. To accomplish these objectives, the following four goals and seven
hypotheses are extended.
Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 in Support of Goal 1.1
Goal 1.1 is to substantiate the functional link between autobiographical memory and
perspective taking. To support, Hypothesis 1.1 states that the mechanism by which long-term
memory content is used for the purpose of perspective taking is mental simulation as defined by
simulation theory (Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Shanton, in press; Shanton & Goldman, 2010).
Although simulation theory (Goldman, 2006) may be the mechanism by which memory
content informs perspective taking, simulation theory only explicitly identifies content from
long-term memory, rather than content from autobiographical memory, as simulation “input.”
Hypothesis 1.2 states that autobiographical memory content in particular—rather than long-term
memory in general—can be used as simulation output for simulation-based perspective taking.
To support, the long-term memory “background information” component of simulation theory’s
process model will be “unpacked” to show how autobiographical memory content could be
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preferentially activated and retrieved for this purpose. If it can be shown that autobiographical
memory could be a specific form of long-term memory content used for perspective taking, then
Hypotheses 1.3 and 1.4 in Support of Goal 1.2
Goal 1.2 is to “unpack” the long-term memory component of the simulation process to
illustrate how autobiographical memory content might be activated and retrieved for simulationbased perspective taking. Exploring possible levels of organization “within” the long-term
memory component is necessary because simulation theory does not address two operations vital
to the extraction and deployment of memory content for simulation purposes. The first is the
operation responsible for the activation and retrieval of memory content for simulation use. The
second is how the need to imaginatively simulate extracted memory content—or not—is
determined. Regarding the first omission, Hypothesis 1.3 states that the “search and retrieval”
procedure that operates “within” the long-term memory component could be explained by the
self-memory system (SMS) as detailed in Conway (2005) and Conway and Pleydell-Pearce
(2000). The SMS will be adapted to comply with the simulation process model operations
postulated by simulation theory.
To address the second omission, Hypothesis 1.4 states simulation occurs in response to
heightened neural activation of predominantly episodic memory content as predicted by the
source activation confusion (SAC) model per Reder, Donavos, & Erickson (2002) and Reder,
Park, and Kieffaber (2009). When used to support the “search and retrieval” of autobiographical
memory content specifically as delineated by the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & PleydellPearce, 2000), the SAC can explain how, at the neural level, autobiographical episodic memory
content specifically, rather than episodic long-term memory content generally, can be used for
simulation-based perspective taking. The SAC is a computational model that asserts that memory
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content is stored in nodes within a neural network, the elements of which are activated according
to functional equations. As such, the SAC also offers a protocol that illustrates how the retrieval
of some memory would lead to simulation, whereas the retrieval of other memory content would
not. The SAC will be adapted to conform to both the SMS and the simulation process model per
simulation theory.
Hypotheses 1.5 and 1.6 in Support of Goal 1.3
Goal 1.3 is to show that the current paper’s adaptation of the simulation process model—
the Expanded Simulation Model—which has been augmented in the current paper to include the
SMS and SAC, has the potential to explain other psychological phenomena. Consistent with a
recent revision of simulation theory by Shanton and Goldman (2010), Hypothesis 1.5 states that,
in addition to perspective taking, the Expanded Simulation Model can also be used to explain
mental time travel. To support, the current paper will operationalize mental time travel in three
ways: the “re-experiencing” of (predominantly episodic) autobiographical memory content for
the purpose of reminiscing (e.g., Casey, 2009); the “pre-experiencing” of (predominantly
episodic) autobiographical memory content for the purpose of prospection (imagining future
scenarios) (Schacter & Addis, 2007); and the “reframing” of (predominantly episodic)
autobiographical memory content for the purpose of counterfactual thinking (mentally
reconstructing memories of past events to include new details and/or outcomes) (Epstude &
Roese, 2008; Gavanski & Wells, 1989).
If the Expanded Simulation model can plausibly account for how autobiographical
memory is used for perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, such will justify
proceeding to Hypothesis 1.6. Hypothesis 1.6 states that, because perspective taking,
prospection, and counterfactual thinking are purposes for which autobiographical memory is
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used, then perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking are functions of
autobiographical memory.
Hypothesis 1.7 in Support of Goal 1.4
Shanton and Goldman (2010) argue that, although simulation theory can explain both
perspective taking and mental time travel, these outcomes are behaviorally distinct and driven by
different goals. Shanton and Goldman therefore proposed that the simulation processes
underlying perspective taking and mental time travel were also distinct, resulting in two
hypothesized simulation forms. When the goal is to perspective take, which Shanton and
Goldman describe as an other-directed goal, the ensuing simulation form is interpersonal
simulation. When the goal is to mental time travel, which Shanton and Goldman characterize as
self-directed, the ensuring simulation form is intrapersonal simulation. Goal 1.4 is to frame the
Expanded Simulation Model accordingly. Hypothesis 1.7 states that, the autobiographical
memory function of perspective taking reflects interpersonal simulation, whereas the
autobiographical memory functions of prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect
intrapersonal simulation. Table 1 summarizes Chapter 1’s seven hypotheses.
1.3 Expanding the Simulation Model
The next five sections will summarize the following. First, simulation theory will be
presented and critiqued. Second, the characteristics, theories, and empirical findings with respect
to simulation processes and long-term memory will be reviewed. The third section will present
evidence that supports autobiographical memory content as the long-term memory content most
applicable to simulation-based perspective taking. The fourth section will describe the SMS, then
adapt it to explain the inner workings of the long-term memory component. The fifth section will
present the features of the SAC, then propose how it can be integrated into the simulation
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process model. The SAC will then be mapped onto the SMS to more specifically illustrate the
neural activation patterns within the long-term memory component that could explain how
simulation is or is not initiated.
Simulation Theory
A simulator can be thought of as a mechanism that constructs a variety of conditions and
outcomes tailored to situational constraints and goals (Barsalou, 2003). The ability to simulate is
considered essential to human evolutionary fitness: Being able to imagine “non-present”
situations informs decisions and actions when encountering novel environments and
circumstances (Barsalou, 2003, p. 515). Therefore, to simulate proficiently is a skill. It is the
ability to successfully integrate contextualized and dynamic “background” (remembered)
information with imagination to result in appropriate actions or reactions (Barsalou, 2003, p.
521).
Simulation theory by Goldman (2006) posits that simulation is the mechanism through
which perspective taking is accomplished. Simulation as a means of understanding other minds
quickly gained traction since it was first proposed by Gordon (1986), and then Heal (1986), and
again later by Harris (1989), and Goldman (1989, 1992). Around this same time, rival
“observational” approaches arose in response to critics of simulation theory’s “experiential”
approach. There are currently two leading observational views: “theory-theory” and “rationalityteleology theory.” Theory-theory (e.g., Carruthers, 1996; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992) is a folk
psychology holding that people hypothesize about and logically deduce other minds
(Churchland, 1991). Although to engage in theory-theory is to mentally manipulate knowledge,
these manipulations are thought not to involve simulation (Goldman & Shanton, in press).
Rationality-teleology theory, or just rationality theory, is also a folk psychology that assumes
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that people are “rational” agents whose observed behaviors can be rationally explained (e.g.,
Dennett, 1987). Rationality theory asserts that people infer others’ mental states through
simulation, but instead deduce other minds based on social facts and other knowledge (Dennett,
1987; Goldman & Shanton, in press). One of the criticisms of both theory-theory and rationality
theory is that to engage in either necessitates considerable conscious mental effort (Goldman,
2006). Given that perspective taking is assumed to occur frequently in everyday life, the amount
of psychological and metabolic resources needed to carry out multiple successive thoughtful
deductions is untenable (Ickes, 2003). Another concern is how and when the “rules and laws”
that guide such deductions are initially learned, which neither theory has attempted to fully
explain (Goldman & Shanton, in press). Also, a main premise shared by both theory-theory and
rationality theory is that self-experience is extraneous to understanding other minds (Goldman &
Stanton, in press). This assumption is challenged by experimental findings from the
developmental literature (Goldman & Shanton, in press). For example, although studies show
that young children can and do conduct simple attributional deductions in line with both theorytheory and rationality theory (e.g., Goldman, 2006; Nichols & Stich, 2003; Perner, 1996), other
findings suggest the use of simulation. That is, children who have acquired first-person
experience in producing a goal behavior are more likely to attribute those same goals to others
than are children who have not acquired that first-person experience (Sommerville & Woodward,
2005). Put another way, children who have developed the skill to “re-experience,” or reflect
upon, a past episode in which he or she met a past goal are more likely to attribute those same
goals to others than are children who cannot yet reflect on their past episodes. Children who have
developed the ability to take a first-person perspective are also more proficient in theory of mind
tasks (Goldman, 2006). However, even though young children are acquiring the skills necessary
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for simulation—specifically, to self-reflect on past episodes—those younger than four years of
age are not yet proficient perspective takers (Fuchs, 2012; Selman, 2003). While this is due to
some extent to children’s nascent neural development, it has been proposed that it is also due to
deficits in language skills (Fuchs, 2012). Per this hypothesis, for children to become skilled at
inferring other minds first requires that they engage in real-life interactions—particularly social
conversation (Fuchs, 2012).
The neural pathways associated with both simulation (e.g., Buckner, et al., 2008; Spreng
& Mar, 2012), autobiographical memory retrieval (e.g., Buckner et al., 2008), and perspective
taking (Knox, 2010; Perry et al., 2011) are found in the brain’s “default mode network.” The
default mode network is a system of brain regions responsible for dynamic mental simulations
that also involve memory and imagination (Buckner et al., 2008; Goldman & Shanton, in press;
Shanton & Goldman, 2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009). Neuroimaging
studies in which subjects are asked to engage in reminiscing (“re-experiencing” the past),
prospection (“pre-experiencing” the future), counterfactual thinking (“reframing” the past with
new details), or perspective taking (“recalling” past experiences relevant to inferring an other’s
mental states), show greater activation across default mode network structures compared to
baseline, at which time general daydreaming or “mind-wandering” is assumed to occur (Buckner
et al., 2008). But while the default network appears to be the locus of these related
functionalities, the recall of event-specific information also activates sensory-response brain
areas, especially the visual cortex. Decety and Grèzes (2006) recorded brain activation patterns
of participants who were first exposed to an actual visual experience, then were tasked with
recollecting a past event. In both cases, the resulting activation patterns in the visual cortex were
identical. These findings give weight to the idea that simulating a past event results in a
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subjective, but nonetheless experientially realistic, re-living of that event (Goldman, 2006;
Decety & Grèzes, 2006; Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2004; Shanton & Goldman, 2010).
To align with recent brain imaging findings, simulation theory posits two experiential
forms of simulation-based perspective taking: “low-level mind reading” and “high-level mind
reading.” Low-level mind reading (see Figure 1) is a bottom-up process automatically activated
when a target triggers an observer’s mirror neuron system, or the human equivalent thereof8
(Shanton & Goldman, 2010). This preferential activation of motor-perceptual areas reflects the
sort of responsivity widely characterized as “emotional” empathy⎯i.e., emotional concern and
personal distress (Davis, 1980, 1983; Decety & Grèzes, 2006; Goldman, 2006). Low-level mind
reading thus reflects a mechanism by which to infer others’ emotional states, employing stored
knowledge, but no incorporation of imagination (Goldman, 2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010).
Because the objective of the current paper is to expound autobiographical memory’s role in
perspective taking, low-level mind reading will not be further discussed.
In contrast, simulation theory’s high-level mind reading (Goldman, 2006) aligns with the
Davis (1980, 1983) multidimensional empathy model’s “cognitive” forms of empathy: fantasy
(the transposing of one’s self imaginatively into the mental states of a fictional character) and
perspective taking (the ability to adopt the mental state of another). Like low-level mind reading,
high-level mind reading occurs in response to another or others (Goldman, 2006). However,
high-level mind reading is a “top down,” rather than “bottom up” process that also involves such
executive functions as working memory, planning, and decision-making (Buckner & Carroll,
2006; Decety & Grèzes, 2006; Goldman, 2006). High-level mind reading begins when a
perspective-taking goal prompts the retrieval of relevant “background information” in the form
8

Although some support for human mirror neurons has been reported (e.g., Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni,
& Fried, 2010), evidence for human mirror neuron system is almost exclusively generalized from primate study
findings.
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of long-term memory content9 (Goldman, 2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). The extracted
memory content can be thought of as “input” for imaginative simulation10—the process by which
memory content is “re-experienced” as a “genuine” (of the self) state, then as a “simulated” (“of
the self on behalf of another) state. From there, a decision about the fitness of the simulated state
is made, resulting in the attribution (or not) of the simulated state to the other. The completion of
this attribution is the behavioral outcome of perspective taking. (Shanton & Goldman, 2010).
The simulation process model for high-level mind reading is depicted in Figure 2.
To illustrate11, let us suppose that Zelda feels that Ziggy has been distant in their
relationship lately, but, out of concern that Ziggy might consider her to be overreacting, decides
not to bring it up for discussion. Instead, she searches her personal past for episodes in which she
herself has felt distant in her relationship with Ziggy or others. Having activated the relevant
memory content in response to her goal (to understand why Ziggy might be distant based on her
own experiences), the memory is “re-experienced.” As Zelda imaginatively considers both her
memory and current information about Ziggy’s behavior, Zelda then considers whether any of
the reasons for which she felt distant and why could also be the source of Ziggy’s distance. She
realizes that she has most often felt distant in her social relationships when stressed at work. By
mingling this information of the self imaginatively with information about Ziggy’s behavior,

9

Figure 2 depicts the retrieval of content from long-term memory as the initial component in the simulation process
as proposed by Shanton & Goldman (2010). Because initiation of the simulation process originates from the
individual about to simulate, this first component is categorized as a “genuine mental state.” In contrast, a
“simulated mental state” is one that mingles information from the genuine mental state with imagination.
10
Although the process components that follow the long-term memory component are collectively referred to as
simulation proper by Goldman (2006) and Shanton & Goldman (2010), for clarity, this paper will use the term
imaginative simulation to make clear that the simulation process components that follow the long-term memory
component incorporate imagination. This is in contrast to the simulation proper that occurs during low-level mind
reading (see Figure 1), which does not make use of imagination.
11
Note that the narrative example suggests a seriality of events and that are not likely to occur in reality. Rather,
one might retrieve, then reject, multiple past events before proceeding to the attribution stage. Thus the example is
meant only to illustrate one of several possible cognitions that could occur at the various stages of the simulation
process.
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Zelda has simulated and then attributed a mental state—that he is stressed about work and
therefore distant—to Ziggy.
Simulation theory by Goldman (2006) provides a suitable model in support of Hypothesis
1⎯that the mechanism underlying perspective taking is mental simulation. However, simulation
theory only superficially defines the role of long-term memory content in the simulation process.
Thus, in order to support Hypothesis 1.2—that autobiographical memory content, a sub-form of
long-term memory content, is more specifically used for perspective taking—the long-term
memory “component” must be “unpacked” and explained. The following section reviews the
characteristics of long-term memory that are relevant to its use in simulation-based perspective
taking.
Long-Term Memory Component
Memory content characterized as “long-term” is assumed to be stored for long periods of
time (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). Almost from its beginning as a topic of study, long-term
memory has been conceptualized as comprising multiple autonomous systems (Willingham &
Goedert, 2001). Early studies of long-term memory focused on defining taxonomical subsystems
that supported experimental findings. One of the earliest multisystem theories explained why
amnesiacs’ motor memory remained intact while memories of facts and events were lost
(Willingham & Goedert, 2001). The result was the dichotomization of long-term memory into
“declarative” and “nondeclarative” systems (Cohen & Squire, 1980; Squire & Zola-Morgan,
1991). Declarative memory was said to be located in the medial temporal lobe, the damage of
which explained the loss of knowledge-based and episodic memories (Willingham & Goedert,
2001). Nondeclarative memory, or “skills” memory, was content stored independent of the
medial temporal lobe, which explained why memories for procedural skills, emotion
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conditioning, and priming effects were retained (Willingham & Goedert, 2001). Declarative
memory was later also classified as explicit memory to reflect its use of conscious attention (Graf
& Schacter, 1985). Nondeclarative memory’s unconscious automaticity led to its further
classification as implicit memory (Graf & Schacter, 1985).
The effects of amnesia prompted other memory researchers to explain the experiential
properties of declarative memory (Tulving, Schacter, McLachlan, & Moscovich, 1988). The
primary ways in which a memory can be differentially “re-experienced” recommended the
“semantic” and “episodic” subsystems (Tulving, 1972, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2002b). Although
precise definitions have varied over the years, in general, semantic memory content includes
decontextualized factual knowledge. Episodic memory content includes contextualized
information that, when remembered, leads to the “re-experiencing” of that memory content.
Thus, episodic memory prompts the “mental reliving,” or recollection of an event, whereas the
fact-based nature of semantic autobiographical memory content leads instead to the
identification, or recognition of that content (Reder et al., 2009). Recent research suggests that,
although semantic autobiographical memory content reflects general, objective information
about one’s past and one’s self, if its neural associations with episodic content is strong enough,
its recall can simultaneously elicit the activation of more specific episodic autobiographical
memory content (Abrams, Picard, Navarro, & Piolino, 2014).
Neuroimaging evidence also supports these distinctions. For example, in a study by Rajah
and McIntosh (2005), subjects who were tasked to retrieve either semantic or episodic memory
content showed differential patterns of activation depending on which task they were
performing. However, the interregional correlations between those functional areas were not
significantly different. This supports the generally accepted account that semantic and episodic
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memory systems are not so much discrete as they are the end-points of a semantic-episodic
“continuum,” which allows them to function interdependently (Burianova, McIntosh, & Grady,
2010; Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2012; Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010; Kihlstrom, 1984; Tulving
et al., 1988; Tulving, 2001). The interdependence of semantic and episodic memory explains
why memories have semantic and episodic content “overlap” (Gilboa, 2004). For example,
traditional taxonomies would deem the concept of “coffee cup”—absent any temporal,
attributional, or contextual constraints—to be purely semantic information. However, that such
retrieved content would be fully decontextualized is unlikely (Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010). If
asked to recall a “coffee cup,” a number of episodic properties would likely be elicited. Reasons
why corresponding episodic information would be incorporated in the recall include recency
(e.g., recalling the cup used that morning), saliency (e.g., recalling the cup dropped and shattered
that morning), and availability (e.g., recalling a cup that is always sitting on your desk)
(Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010). Such findings suggest that the semantic-episodic boundaries are
blurred.
In terms of what form of long-term memory might be activated in response to
perspective-taking goals, both theory and research, albeit mostly indirect, implicate a reliance on
declarative memory (Spreng et al., 2009). This is largely because declarative memories can be
brought into conscious awareness (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997), where the reliving of such
memory content can be imaginatively applied to the inferring of other minds (Hassabis, Spreng,
Rusu, Robbins, Mar, & Schacter, 2013). The assumed use of declarative versus nondeclarative
memory is also something of a default, given that no known findings to date implicate the use of
nondeclarative memory in perspective taking. That is, with the exception of studies that indicate
links between perspective taking and implicit attitudes—e.g. that perspective taking can
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attenuate explicit expressions of implicit racial bias (Todd, Bodenhausen, Richeson, & Galinsky,
2011). However, such findings provide little evidence for the use of nondeclarative memory
content to perspective taking for three reasons. One, researchers disagree as to whether implicit
attitudes should be even characterized as nondeclarative (Roediger, Nairne, Neath, & Surprenant,
2003). Two, the use of perspective taking as a means of exerting “top-down” control over
implicit attitudes gives greater weight to the argument that perspective taking involves
consciousness awareness, which suggests a greater dependency on declarative long-term
memory. And three, the research that does attempt to understand the relation between
perspective taking and memory focuses almost exclusively on the involvement of episodic and
semantic memory forms, both of which are sub-forms of declarative memory (e.g., Rajah &
McIntosh, 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).
Having summarized the leading views on the sub-forms of long-term memory, some of
which are with respect to perspective taking specifically, the next section presents and critiques
findings from theoretical and empirical research that are used to support Hypothesis 1.2⎯that
autobiographical memory content in particular—rather than long-term memory in general—can
be used as simulation output for simulation-based perspective taking.
Autobiographical Memory as a the Long-Term Memory Form
Early researchers recognized the role that memories about the self played in defining the
self (Tulving, 1972). These self memories, or autobiographical memories, when considered in
aggregate, serve as “resources” of and about the self (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000;
Robinson, 1986). Because autobiographical memory content can be retrieved for conscious reexperience, it is a sub-function of declarative memory, and thus long-term memory.
Developmental studies show that the autobiographical memory system emerges in early
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childhood concurrent with the development of self, language, and other memory forms (Nelson
& Fivush, 2004). Evolutionarily, the capacity for autobiographical memory provided an adaptive
advantage (Spreng et al., 2009). Just as selection pressures promoted the evolution of abilities
that fostered prosocial behaviors—e.g., perspective taking (e.g., Barresi & Moore, 1996; Decety
& Hamm, 2009; Goldman, 2006)—the ability to recall one’s personal interactions with others
could also be used to cultivate social accord.
Conceptualized initially as something of a “storehouse” for life narratives (Fivush,
Habermas, Waters, & Zaman, 2011), early theories presumed that autobiographical memory
content was wholly episodic in nature (Tulving, 1983, 1993). However, as the complexities and
composition of the self became better understood, it was recognized that autobiographical
memories feature the same semantic-episodic overlap that general declarative memories do
(Burianova et al., 2010; Tulving, 2001). The modern take on autobiographical memory is less
about the taxonomical definitions of semantic versus episodic content, and more about the
phenomenal experience of remembering (Baddeley, 2001; Brewer, 1996; Tulving, 2001).
Although autobiographical memory has been comprehensively studied with respect to
self, it has been less so with respect to social behaviors (Spreng, 2013). However, interest in this
area has grown, as has the body of evidence linking the use of autobiographical memory to
perspectivity—the ability to take both observational and experiential perspectives of the world
(Fuchs, 2012). For example, a variety of brain studies implicate a shared neuroanatomy located
within the default network as underlying the capacities of autobiographical memory retrieval and
first- and third-person perspectivity (Buckner & Carroll, 2006; Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng &
Grady, 2010; Rabin, Gilboa, Stuss, Mar, & Rosenbaum, 2010). Additionally, those same neural
pathways are also linked to the ability to mentally integrate the personal (subjective) and
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interpersonal (objective) information—i.e., the mental simulation of perspectivity (Spreng &
Mar, 2012). A recent neuroimaging study by Perry et al., (2011) found compelling evidence that
the hippocampus—a default network memory structure linked to the use, encoding, and
consolidation of autobiographical memory—is involved in emotional attributions regarding both
the self and others. After recalling a personal past event, subjects were asked to ascribe to
themselves an ensuing mental state. Subjects were then asked to attribute mental states to first a
similar other, then a dissimilar other, both of whom subjects were told also experienced that
same event. Results showed greater hippocampus activation when subjects inferred the mental
states of a similar other than when inferring the mind of a target who was dissimilar. This not
only suggests that perspective takers integrate their internal self-knowledge and personal past
experiences with knowledge of others onto others, but that a perceived similarity between the
self and the other elicits an even greater reliance on autobiographical memory content to inform
the mental attribution than if the perspective taker perceives a dissimilarity between him or
herself and the target.
Evidence that autobiographical memory and perspective taking share the same neural
architecture supports other phenomenological links between self and other. Autobiographical
memories can be recalled from a “first-person” or “third-person” perspective. A first person or
“field” perspective reflects the viewpoint of the individual who experiences an event, whereas .
A third-person or “observer” perspective reflects the viewpoint of the individual who observes
the event (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). It is known that rememberers can fluidly move between
first- and third-person perspectives within the same recollection either spontaneously or when
experimentally compelled (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; McIsaac & Eich, 2002; Decety & Grèzes,
2006). A brain imaging study by Decety and Hamm (2009) showed that when individuals
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assume others’ perspectives, the neural circuitry underlying both third- and first-person
experiences are simultaneously activated. But despite the structural overlap that facilitates this
functional mutuality, the two pathways are nonetheless distinct. These findings help to explain
how the self “detaches” from simulated states in order to project them onto another (Shanton &
Goldman, 2010). If the neural circuitry were one and the same for both first- and third- person
experiences, perspective takers would be unable to “quarantine”—i.e., differentiate—their own
mental states in order to process those of another (Decety & Hamm, 2009; Shanton & Goldman,
2010). The neural link between first- and third-person perspectivity capacities, however, also
suggests that these substrates co-developed (Decety & Hamm, 2009). Such reciprocal
functionality allows one to re-experience self-knowledge and past events for the purpose of
predicting the states and behaviors of social others (Perry et al., 2011). Evidence from a variety
of related literatures shows that a collaborative neural circuitry underlies autobiographical
memory retrieval (e.g., Buckner et al., 2008), self-projection (e.g., Buckner & Carroll, 2006),
subjective awareness (e.g., Demertzi, Soddu, Faymonville, Bahri, Gosseries, et al.,

2011),

simulation (e.g., Buckner, et al., 2008; Spreng & Mar, 2012), and perspective taking (e.g.,
Dodell-Feder et al., 2014; Knox, 2010; Perry et al., 2011). Thus this network of brain regions,
which support the recollection of personal past experiences, also facilitates imaginatively
simulating the experiences of other people (Hassabis et al., 2013).
The evidence summarized in this section implicating the use of autobiographical memory
for perspective taking supports Hypothesis 1.2, that autobiographical memory content
particularly, rather than long-term memory content generally, can be used for perspective taking.
The current paper has also met Goal 1.1, which was to demonstrate the suitability of mental
simulation as the mechanism by which autobiographical memory content could be used for
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perspective taking. To address Goal 1.2, the next section “unpacks” the long-term memory
component of the simulation process model to illustrate how autobiographical memory content
might be activated and retrieved for simulation-based perspective taking. Also presented is
evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.3, which states that the “search and retrieval” procedure
responsible for activating and extracting autobiographical memory content in response to a
perspective-taking goal could be explained by an adapted version of the self-memory system
(Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
Self-Memory System
For a mechanism to effectively link input to output, its processes must be interlocking
and synergistic (Klein et al., 2001). Simulation theory by Goldman (2006) and Shanton and
Goldman (2010) proposes that long-term memory content is imaginatively simulated to produce
an attribution of another’s mental states. However, simulation theory provides no explanation as
to how memory content is selected and retrieved in order to serve as simulation input. In support
of Hypothesis 1.3, the current paper proposes that the extraction of relevant autobiographical
memory content for simulation purposes can be illustrated with the self-memory system (SMS)
(Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
The SMS is a conceptual model that was proposed by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce
(2000), and later Conway (2005) as a means of elucidating how autobiographical memories
maintain the self. The SMS is comprised of two subsystems⎯the “working self” and the
“autobiographical knowledge base.” The working self is also a subsystem of working
memory⎯the memory system responsible for maintaining transitory mental information until
manipulated, consolidated, and/or discarded (Baddeley, 1988). The working self maintains one’s
repertoire of self-concepts that ensue from experience. The autobiographical knowledge base
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stores content encoded as “autobiographical” and makes this content available in support of selfrelated goals. The working self and autobiographical knowledge base are independent, but
reciprocal mechanisms. The working self prompts the autobiographical knowledge base to make
available those memories associated with a goal-driven, active self-concept. The content of the
autobiographical knowledge base in turn informs the self-concepts regarding the working self.
This inherent interdependence of the SMS components allows for the self to be both experiencer
of experience and the product of the remembered aspects of experience, making the self a
composite of autobiographical memories (Williams, Conway, & Cohen, 2008). Figure 3
illustrates the SMS with respect to traditional long-term, declarative, and autobiographical
memory systems.
The subjective evaluation of experience is thought to be the mechanism by which general
semantic and episodic information is transformed into autobiographical content (Klein, German,
Cosmides, & Gabriel, 2004). Per Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000), once transformed, the SMS
manages the autobiographical content’s storage and retrieval. Autobiographical memory
information is organized in the autobiographical knowledge base according to one of three levels
of specificity: “lifetime periods,” “general events,” and “event-specific knowledge”. Lifetime
periods are abstract, thematic, and temporal (e.g., high school years; time worked at “X”
company). Lifetime period content is evaluative information that informs various broad selfconcepts (e.g., “woman,” “student,” “instructor”) (Williams et al., 2008). General events are
more specific than lifetime periods but still more thematic than detailed (e.g., “learning to drive a
stick shift car”). Event-specific knowledge is highly detailed and time specific (e.g., “that sunny
afternoon last August when Ziggy tried to teach me how to drive a stick-shift and I could not get
the car out of first gear”).
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Although levels of specificity is the scheme by which autobiographical content is stored,
autobiographical information is retrieved in response to goals (Conway, 2005). Goals have been
shown in a number of experimental studies to be excellent memory cues (Barsalou, 1988).
According to Conway (2005), goals that cue the retrieval of autobiographical memory content
are managed by the goal hierarchy of the working self. Per the SMS, an active goal triggers the
goal hierarchy, which prompts the working self to activate a self-concept that in some way
corresponds to that goal. The activation of the self-concept triggers the autobiographical
knowledge base to make available for retrieval content consistent with the active self-concept
(Williams et al., 2008). Such content may consist of semantic self-knowledge, episodic
experiences, or hybrid mixtures of both (Conway, 2005; Williams et al., 2008). For example if an
individual has the goal of being a socially acceptable “friend,” the goal hierarchy will activate
the individual’s “friend” self-concept. This will then prompt pertinent semantic and episodic
content linked to the “friend” self-concept. In theory, complex goals can elicit multiple selfconcepts, each linked to autobiographical content featuring different levels of specificity and
myriad semantic-episodic blends (Williams et al., 2008).
Related research suggests that the self-concept activated by a perspective-taking goal
might be the product of those experiences that the perspective taker presumes are being
experienced by the target other; that is, the perspective taker’s perceived similarity to the target
other will inform self-concept selection. For example, Ickes (2003) reported that men were more
accurate perspective takers when the target other was a friend of at least a year and was
perceived to possess a similar level (low, moderate, or high) of trait sociability. Likewise, Perry
et al. (2011) found that individuals making emotional attributions of others’ mental states had
greater hippocampal activation when perspective taker perceived the target other as being similar
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to him- or herself, and less activation when the target was perceived as dissimilar. It therefore
follows that the more similar a perspective taker perceives him- or herself to be to the target
other, the more that perspective taker relies on autobiographical memory content to inform
attributions. This appears to be the case when the perspective taker perceives the target other to
be similar to themselves characteristically—as was found by Ickes and Perry et al.—or even
experientially (Gaesser & Schacter, 2014). Although external factors like social context and
knowledge about the other certainly inform perspective-taking goals (Ickes, 2003), simulationbased perspective taking relies preferentially on autobiographical memory content to inform
inferences about others’ minds.
Thus, in support of Hypothesis 1.3, the current paper argues that the SMS (Conway,
2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) provides a possible account of what occurs “”within the
long-term memory component to both activate and retrieve relevant autobiographical memory
content in fulfillment of a perspective-taking goal. Thus, Goal 1.2—the “unpacking” of the longterm memory component to reveal the SMS—has been met. Hypothesis 1.3 is further supported
by having demonstrated that the SMS explains how autobiographical memory of various form
and detail is preferentially retrieved in service of a perspective-taking goal. The next section
further “unpacks” the long-term memory component to reveal the memory activation protocol
driving simulation activation or inhibition.
Source Activation Confusion Model
Although never explicitly asserted, simulation theory implies that the retrieval of longterm memory “background information” initiates simulation. The high-level mind reading model
(see Figure 2) shows that the simulation process requires content from long-term memory, which
is imaginatively reframed such that one’s own “re-experience” of that content is, to some degree,
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then attributed to the target other (Shanton & Goldman, 2010). Because the current paper argues
that the most plausible form of long-term memory content used for perspective taking is
autobiographical memory content, the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000),
which explains both how and why autobiographical memory content could be activated and
retrieved, was used to support this contention. However, the SMS was not designed to explain
the “search and retrieve” procedure that might occur at the neural level: Missing are the
cognitive “commands” that could prompt the instigation of simulation upon the extraction of
autobiographical memory content. Such commands could be provided by a computational
cognitive mode.
The purpose of computational cognitive modeling is to expound the details of conceptual
cognitive models via algorithmic descriptions (Sun, 2008). These algorithmic descriptions
typically include such elements as variables, mathematical equations, and power functions (e.g.,
f(x) = xa) (Sun, 2008). Imputing a set of computer-like rules onto a conceptual model enables the
quantification of the conditions and constraints that govern the model’s operation (Sun, 2008).
Computational models are meant to figuratively describe these operations at the neural level
(Reder et al., 2009).
Candidate computational models for the current paper needed to be able to explain how
the extraction of autobiographical memories relevant to a perspective-taking goal could be
extracted by the SMS to instigate (or not instigate) the simulation process. An effective exemplar
for this purpose is the source activation confusion (SAC) model as proposed in Reder et al.
(2002) and Reder et al. (2009). The SAC is a nodal network model of memory encoding and
retrieval. Originally designed to explain the interdependence between explicit and implicit
memory systems, it has also been used to model a variety of memory phenomena driven by
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neural activation (e.g., Buchler & Reder, 2007; Cary & Reder, 2003; Diana, Peterson, & Reder,
2004; Diana & Reder, 2005; Reder, Angstadt, Cary, Erickson, & Ayers, 2002; Reder et al., 2002;
Reder, Oates, Dickison, Anderson, Gyulai, Quinlan, & et al., 2007; Reder, Nhouyvanisvong,
Schunn, Ayers, Angstadt, & Hiraki, 2000; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Reder & Schunn, 1996;
Schunn, Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, Richards, & Stroffolino, 1997). Especially important to the
current paper is the SAC’s ability to account for the functional interdependence known to occur
between semantic and episodic memory systems.
Reder et al. (2002) and Reder et al., (2009) posit that, based on the subjective experience
at the time of encoding, memory content is neurally instantiated in either a concept (semantic)
node or an episode node. Each concept node contains the features and qualities—i.e., content—
of a single concept (e.g., “dog”), whereas each episode node contains content about a single
event (e.g., “purchasing Rover from the pound”). Every episode node is connected to both
“general” or “specific” context nodes. General context nodes contain generic, gist-like
information common to multiple events (e.g., “school,” “home”). General context nodes are
bound to multiple episodes. The array of bindings attached to any single episode nodes is
referred to as that episode node’s contextual fan. Specific context nodes embody high detail and
emotional valence; but because their content is unique to a single event, they are bound only to
its corresponding episode node. Concept and episode nodes can also be bound such that
semantic-episodic overlap can occur. However, no direct connections occur between concept and
context nodes, even if the content of the concept node is relevant to the content housed in a
connected episode node. Rather, episode nodes serve as intermediaries through which concepts
and contexts are linked. Although concept and context nodes have no direct connections, they
can influence the activation of one another by way of spreading activation through the
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intermediary episode nodes—but only if the spreading activation is strong enough to facilitate
such.
Reder et al. (2002) and Reder et al. (2009) posit that the activation of a network’s nodes
and bindings can be predicted by three equations meant to computationalize the SAC’s primary
processes. Equation 1 (B = BW + cNΣti−dN) reflects the activation strength or activation decay
from the baseline activation of the implicated nodes and bindings. According the SAC, B =
baseline activation, BW = base-level activation of the node; cN = strength of node; dN = decay of
activation of node (by constant); and ti = time since the ith presentation. Equation 1 states that
nodal activation is the summation of both the strength of the direct activation and the strength of
the node’s baseline level. Factors that can impact baseline activation include the repetition of an
experience or a recall of the memory over time.
Equation 2 (Ss,r = cLΣti−dL) reflects the binding strength or binding decay of the
connections between nodes over time. Per the SAC, Ss,r = strength of link from node s to node r;
ti is time since ith association between the two nodes; cL = strength of link; and dL = decay of
link strength. Similar to what occurs with the activation of nodes, binding strength increases with
repeated experiential exposure, but decays from disuse as a function of time. Equation 2 asserts
that, even if nodal baseline and direct activation levels are high, binding strength can promote or
inhibit subordinate activation. The strength of the network’s spreading activation is dictated by
Equation 3 (ΔAr = Σ(As × Ss,r/ΣSs,I). Per the SAC, ΔAr = change in activation of the
receiving node; As = activation of each source node s; Ss,r = strength of the link between nodes r
and s; and ΣSs,I = sum of strengths of all links emanating from the node s (the fan). Thus the
more radiating bindings a general context node has, the more its attendant episode nodes will
“compete” for subordinate activation. For example, if the general context is “school,” multiple
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and varied episodes such as, “having taken the stats test last week,” having lunch with classmate
Zelda yesterday,” and “riding the bus to campus” are linked. Per spreading activation (Equation
3), episode nodes that have higher baseline activation levels (per Equation 1) and/or stronger
bindings (per Equation 2), will be preferentially activated.
The SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder et al., 2009) equations permit predictions about what
memory content will be activated, and thus whether or not a memory will be “re-experienced.”
Per Reder et al. (2009), the SAC posits that nodal activation elicits one of two assessment
processes leading to either “recognition” or “recollection.” When a goal necessitates the
activation of factual, knowledge-based, conceptual (semantic) content, a concept node is
preferentially activated, which results in the assessment process of recognition. The recognition
assessment process leads to such outcomes as identification, knowing, or believing. Because the
nature of a concept node’s content is informational, recognition does not lead to “reexperience”—for example, one cannot “re-experience” a friend’s name.
However, when a goal requires that memory content be “re-experienced” for its event and
contextual properties—for example, to “re-experience one’s own mental states during the
arranging of a funeral in order to understand a target other’s grief during a similar event—an
episode node is preferentially activated. The assessment process that ensues from the activation
of an episode node is called recollection. The recollection assessment process results in the
outcomes related to remembering—or what the current paper has termed elsewhere as
reminiscence. The computational rules of the SAC ensure that the triggering of an assessment
processes is a result of either direct, or predominant, activation of the relevant node type. That is,
if the activation of a concept node containing a friend’s name information has, as a result of
experience (for example, having recently helped the friend through a crisis), also caused the
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development of strong bindings to particular episode nodes, the activation of the “name” concept
node could prompt activation of the episode node. If a goal then became a need to understand the
friend’s mental states, the activated episode node could result in recollection. In this way, the
SAC model and equations account for the occurrence of semantic-episodic overlap. Figure 4
depicts the elemental components of the SAC’s nodal network.
In addition to the SAC explaining the semantic-episodic overlap known to occur with
respect to the “re-experience” of autobiographical memory content (Burianova et al., 2010;
Gilboa, 2004; Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2012; Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010; Kihlstrom, 1984;
Tulving, 2001; Tulving et al., 1988), the current paper argues that the SAC’s assessment
processes align with the need for imaginative simulation in order to fulfill a goal—or not.
Simulation theory by Goldman (2006) and Shanton and Goldman (2010) for perspective taking
posits that extracted memory content serves as “input” for the “re-experiencing” of a “genuine”
(of the self) state, which is then as a “simulated” (“of the self on behalf of another) state. When
the goal is identification—e.g., remembering someone’s name—the nature of the relevant
memory content is semantic. Thus the concept node housing the relevant semantic memory
content is activated, which prompts the assessment process of recognition. The current paper
argues that recognition does not necessitate the use of imagination because semantic information
cannot be “re-experienced”—thus such goals do not utilize imaginative simulation. Rather, the
extraction of the semantic information results in such non-experiential behavioral outcomes as
identification, knowing, or believing. Figure 5 illustrates the simulation process model (into
which the SMS and SAC have been incorporated) when an identification goal triggers the
assessment process of recognition.
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Contrarily, when a goal is to use one’s past experiences in the service of understanding
another’s mental states, the memory content needed is episodic, which is required in order to “reexperience” a past experience. Because episodic memory content is housed in an episode node
(and its corresponding context nodes), the assessment process that ensues, according to the SAC,
is recollection. The current paper posits that recollection in response to a perspective-taking goal
does require simulation, thus employing imaginative simulation. Figure 6 illustrates the
simulation process model (with the SMS and SAC components) when a perspective-taking goal
triggers the assessment process of recollection. The current paper specifies the recollection
process further by arguing that, when perspective taking is the goal, the specific form of episodic
long-term memory content subject to the recollection assessment process—and thus the memory
content that undergoes simulation—is autobiographical. As argued in the previous section, the
search and retrieval of autobiographical memory content in response to a perspective-taking goal
follows the procedures outlined by the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
Although no other known study has adapted the SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder et al.,
2009) for a purpose similar to that of the current paper, indirect evidence from related lines of
research advocates its integration into the simulation theory process model (Goldman, 2006;
Shanton & Goldman, 2010) for perspective taking. For example, a recent observational study by
Gaesser and Schacter (2014) investigated the cognitive mechanisms underlying prosocial
tendencies, perspective taking, semantic retrieval, episodic remembering, and episodic
simulation (constructive imagining). Results showed a link between the willingness to infer the
thoughts and feelings of others and episodic remembering and simulation, but not to semantic
retrieval. Although this study did not examine the role of memory in the facilitation of
perspective taking explicitly, it aligns with brain data showing these same cognitions are
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underlain by shared neural systems (Buckner et al., 2008; Decety & Hamm, 2009; Saxe &
Kanwisher, 2003; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). Additionally, in a study by Saxe and Kanwisher
(2003), participants were tasked to infer a target other’s thoughts and feelings. Brain scans of the
participants showed concurrent neural activation in the overlapping pathways associated with
episodic memory retrieval and theory of mind. However, during a task in which participants
were asked to retrieve strictly semantic memory content, the pathway associated with memory
retrieval was again activated, but the pathway associated with theory of mind was not. Although
these studies do not rule out the use of semantic episodic memory content in fulfillment of a
perspective-taking goal, findings do suggests a predominance episodic memory content.
Thus in support of Hypothesis 1.4—that simulation occurs in response to heightened
neural activation of predominantly episodic memory content as predicted by the SAC—the
augmentation of the simulation process model with the incorporation of the SAC can be used to
explain how episodic memory content is activated and retrieved in response to a goal
necessitating the “re-experience” of a personal past event. When used to support the “search and
retrieval” of autobiographical memory content specifically as delineated by the SMS (Conway,
2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), the SAC can explain how, at the neural level,
autobiographical episodic memory content specifically, rather than episodic long-term memory
content generally, can be used for simulation-based perspective taking.
1.4 Expanded Simulation Model
Figure 6 illustrates the integration of simulation theory’s simulation process model, the
SMS, and the SAC, which together yields the current paper’s proposed Expanded Simulation
Model of perspective taking. (see Figure 6). The Expanded Simulation Model was developed for
the current paper to demonstrate how autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than
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long-term memory content generally, could be used for perspective taking. In so doing, the
Expanded Simulation Model provides a potential theoretical framework for the autobiographical
memory function of perspective taking, for which empirical evidence was reported by Ranson
and Fitzgerald (in preparation). The development of the Expanded Simulation Model was
necessary because, although indirect evidence implicating the use of autobiographical memory
for perspective taking has been reported in a variety of related literatures, to date, no direct
theoretical model predicting the existence of the autobiographical memory function of
perspective taking has been extended. The Expanded Simulation Model proposes that the
mechanism by which autobiographical memory is used for perspective taking is mental
simulation as presented by simulation theory (Goldman, 2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010).
A recent revision to simulation theory for perspective taking by Shanton and Goldman
(2010) posited that simulation could also serve as the mechanism by which long-term memory
content is used for mental time travel. If, by extension, the Expanded Simulation Model could be
adapted to show how autobiographical memory content could be used for mental time travel,
then the Expanded Simulation Model would provide theoretical justification for the existence of
the autobiographical memory function of mental time travel. The following sections explore the
utility of the Expanded Simulation Model by using it to explain how autobiographical memory
content could be used for simulation-based mental time travel.
Using the Expanded Simulation Model to Explain Other Simulation Phenomena
Shanton and Goldman (2010) recently proposed a revision to simulation theory to include
not only the “re-experience” of long-term memory content for the purpose of perspective-taking,
but to posit that the “re-experiencing” of long-term episodic memory content was itself was a
form of mental time travel. That is, when one simulates episodic memory content in order to “re-
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experience” that content, one is essentially traveling back through conceptual time to
subjectively re-live that memory. Contingently, in keeping with theory and findings from various
literatures regarding mental time travel (e.g., Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2009;
Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008), Shanton and Goldman also posited that simulation is the
mechanism by which long-term episodic memory content is “pre-experienced.” That is, when
one uses episodic memory content in order to imagine a future scenario, one is subjectively
projecting oneself forward through conceptual time.
As such, simulation theory appears to explicitly support three simulation-based
behavioral outcomes: reminiscence (to “re-experience” long-term episodic memory content in
order to give the remember the sense that the past events are veridical accounts of the original
experience) (Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998), perspective taking (to “re-experience” long-term
episodic memory content in order to imaginatively reframe it to reflect another’s perspective),
and prospection (to “pre-experience” long-term episodic memory content for the purpose of
imagining future scenarios) (e.g., Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter et al., 2008). However, the
current paper posits that a fourth behavioral outcome occurs as a result of imaginatively
simulating episodic long-term memory content: counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual thinking
is the act of imaginatively “reframing” past episodes such that the conditions and outcomes of
the simulated counterfactual are contrary to those that actually occurred (Gavanski & Wells,
1989; Roese & Olson, 1995).
In addition to proposing a fourth behavioral outcome of the simulation of long-term
episodic memory content, Hypothesis 1.5 of the current paper states that autobiographical
episodic memory content specifically, rather than long-term episodic memory content generally,
can also be used when the goal is to mentally travel back through time to reminisce and generate
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counterfactuals, and forward through time when engaging in prospection. Thus the incorporation
of the procedures outlined by the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and
the SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder et al., 2009) for the simulation process of perspective taking
can be likewise incorporated when the simulation process results in reminiscence, prospection,
and counterfactual thinking.
Further, just as evidence of the use of autobiographical memory content for perspective
taking supports the existence of an autobiographical memory function of perspective taking,
Hypothesis 1.6 states that, should autobiographical memory content be shown to inform
prospection and counterfactual thinking, then such would be evidence for the existence of the
autobiographical memory function of prospection and the autobiographical memory function of
counterfactual thinking. Because research on autobiographical memory functions has, to date,
focused largely on the various reminiscence behaviors believed to be reflected in
autobiographical memory functions (e.g., Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Alea, 2001; Kulkofsky &
Koh, 2009; Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation; Webster, 1995, 1997), the current paper is not
concerned with yielding evidence for an autobiographical memory function of reminiscence.
The contention that mental time travel involves the mental simulation of autobiographical
memory content is well supported by brain evidence. For example, neuroimaging studies show
that the default network is activated during autobiographical episodic memory retrieval
(reminiscence) tasks (e.g., Buckner et al., 2008; Ino, Nakai, Azuma, Kimura, & Fukuyama,
2011), as well as during prospection tasks (Schacter & Addis, 2009) and counterfactual thinking
tasks (e.g., De Brigard, Addis, Ford, Schacter, & Giovanello, 2013; Epstude & Roese, 2008).
The default network has also been broadly implicated in such directly related “experiential”
cognitions as perspective taking (e.g., Dodell-Feder et al., 2014; Hassabis et al., 2013),
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perspectivity (e.g., Spreng & Mar, 2012), self-projection (e.g., Buckner & Carroll, 2006);
subjective awareness (e.g., Demertzi et al., 2011), and mental simulation (e.g., Buckner &
Carroll, 2006; Spreng et al., 2009).
Figure 7 illustrates a possible simulation process model for mental time travel
(reminiscence, prospection,

and counterfactual thinking) adapted from simulation theory’s

process for high-level mind reading (perspective taking). The proposed simulation process model
for mental time travel assumes that the simulation process would behave similarly to that of
perspective taking, with the two primary differences. The first would be the goal—for example,
to imagine a future scenario rather than infer another’s mental states. The second would be the
behavioral outcome—for example, prospection. This assumption is plausible given related
research. For example, studies on autobiographical planning⎯the planning and anticipation of
personally relevant future goals⎯show that autobiographical memory is vital to this task (Baird,
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011). Multiple studies exploring the neural substrates involved in
future thinking have found extensive evidence for default network activation consistent with that
for autobiographical memory (Buckner, 2009; D’Argembeau, Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2009;
Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007;
Tulving, 2005). In fact, no argument countering the use of autobiographical memory for
prospection could be found. With respect to counterfactual thinking, a recent study by De
Brigard et al. (2013) tasked participants to generate counterfactuals while undergoing functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Results showed that the more realistic the counterfactual,
the more likely that the areas of the brain associated with autobiographical memory were coactivated with brain areas associated with counterfactual thinking. This suggests that, the less
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realistic the counterfactual, the more that the counterfactual depended upon, and was thus a
product of, imaginative simulation.
With respect to the “unpacking” of the Expanded Simulation Model’s long-term memory
component to show the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and the SAC
(Reder et al., 2009), the current paper contends that the procedures responsible for activating and
retrieving autobiographical memory content relevant to a perspective- taking goal would be
applicable when the goal is mental time travel. If the goal is prospection, the activation of the
goal prompts the activation of the self-concept most applicable to reimagining a particular future
scenario. The autobiographical memory content form (episodic and semantic), and level of
specificity (lifetime period, general event, and event-specific knowledge) made available by the
autobiographical knowledge base would be that which is associated with both the activated selfconcept and in fulfillment of the prospection goal. The retrieved content thus becomes the input
for the simulation of an imagined future scenario. The SAC then provides the equations
necessary to predict what form of autobiographical memory content would be preferentially
activated for prospection or counterfactual thinking at the neural level in response to the
prospection goal (Reder et al., 2009).
To illustrate: If the goal necessitated the remembering of “future facts” (e.g., what a
woman’s last name might become after marriage), or “counterfactual facts” (e.g., what a
woman’s last name would have been if she had married James Dean), the relevant concept
(semantic) node would be preferentially activated. The assessment process that ensued would be
recognition. Because semantic information cannot be “re-experienced,” simulation would not
ensue; rather, the behavioral outcome would be identification. If, however, “pre-experiencing” a
future event (e.g., my friend’s upcoming wedding), the autobiographical memory content
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required would be episodic, thus the prospection goal would activate the episode node(s) within
which experiences of other attended weddings would be predominately activated. This would
prompt the assessment process of recollection, which requires simulation. Figure 8 shows the
complete Expanded Simulation Model, which comprises the SMS and SAC, and shows the
shared and independent pathways of the simulation process that result in the simulation-based
behavioral outcomes of perspective taking, reminiscence, prospection, and counterfactual
thinking.
Just as evidence from the literature supports the Expanded Simulation Model, the
Expanded Simulation Model could be used to explain other phenomena. For example, it is
known that the phenomenological richness of memory outputs is a function of time. That is,
greater detail is reported in recollections of the autobiographical past events when the distance
between that past event and the present is short (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). This
same effect is seen with prospection in that distant future scenarios feature lower degrees of
specificity and valence than do imaginings about near-future events (D’Argembeau & Van der
Linden, 2004). The principles of the SMS in the context of the Expanded Simulation Model
predict that specific events and their details are forgotten over time unless they remain relevant
to a goal and/or its associated self-concept (Conway, 2005). Unless repeatedly re-experienced,
details of past events will be lost, even if the general or lifetime period details remain (Conway,
2005). As autobiographical memory content informs both the imaginative “re-experiencing” and
“pre-experiencing” of events, the attenuated level of specificity of the distant memories
themselves, which would then become simulation input, would be reflected in the simulated
inferred outcomes of mental time travel. The SAC dictates that the episode node in which the
event content is stored is activated predominately, followed by attendant context nodes. If
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activation is sufficient, linked concept nodes will be subordinately activated. If the bindings
between the activated episode node and its attendant concept and context nodes have decayed
from disuse over time, the autobiographical knowledge base will have fewer detail-containing
nodes to make available for retrieval.
The current paper has therefore shown how the Expanded Simulation Model might be
used to explain not only perspective taking, but also three forms of mental time travel—
reminiscence12, prospection, and counterfactual thinking. This then supports Hypothesis 1.6—
that, because prospection and counterfactual utilize content from autobiographical memory,
prospection and counterfactual thinking are functions of autobiographical memory.
Finally, the current paper contends that the Expanded Simulation Model supports the
Shanton and Goldman (2010) assertion that perspective taking and mental time travel are served
by two distinct forms of simulation. That is, because the goal of perspective taking is otherdirected, the form of simulation used in service of that goal is interpersonal simulation.
Contrarily, because the goal of mental time travel is self-directed, the form of simulation used to
meet that such goals is intrapersonal simulation. By extension, because the current paper has
demonstrated the theoretical plausibility of the autobiographical memory functions of
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, the Expanded Simulation Model
therefore supports Hypothesis 1.7: that the autobiographical memory function of perspective
taking reflects interpersonal simulation, whereas the autobiographical memory functions of
prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect intrapersonal simulation. Figure 8 illustrates the
interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation pathways within the complete Expanded Simulation
Model. Table 1 provides a summary of Chapter 1’s seven hypotheses.
12

As stated earlier, because reminiscence behaviors have been established elsewhere as being functions of
autobiographical memory, the current paper is not concerned with hypothesizing the existence of an
autobiographical memory function of reminiscence. Its inclusion is only to make clear it was not overlooked.
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1.5 Discussion
In Support of Goals and Hypotheses
The primary objective of the current paper was to theoretically substantiate the existence
of the autobiographical memory function of perspective taking, for which empirical evidence
was reported by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation). To accomplish, four goals and seven
hypotheses were extended in support of that objective. In support of Hypothesis 1.1, the
mechanism by which autobiographical memory content could be used for the purpose of
perspective taking was posited to be mental simulation according to simulation theory (Goldman,
2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). Because simulation theory stipulates only that long-term
memory content is the “input” for the simulation process, the current paper argued that episodic
autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than long-term memory content generally,
can be used for perspective taking.
The current paper proposed that the simulation process model by Goldman (2006) and
Shanton and Goldman (2010) be integrated with two conceptual models in order to explain the
use of autobiographical memory content for perspective taking at finer levels of organization.
Hypotheses 1.3 was supported through the incorporation of the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) offered a possible explanation for how episodic autobiographical memory
content could be activated and retrieved in response to a perspective-taking goal. The
incorporation of the SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder et al., 2009) computational model supported
Hypothesis 1.4 by providing a potential account of how the activation of episodic
autobiographical memory content occurs at the neural level.
The result was the proposed Expanded Simulation Model, which was then used to explain
the current paper’s Hypothesis 1.5, that use of episodic autobiographical memory content for
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mental time travel—operationalized herein as prospection and counterfactual thinking—in
keeping with recent revisions to simulation theory by Shanton and Goldman. This argument
supported the current paper’s Hypothesis 1.6, that, in addition to perspective taking, prospection
and counterfactual thinking are also functions of autobiographical memory. Finally, in alignment
with Shanton and Goldman’s contention that perspective taking involves interpersonal
simulation, whereas mental time travel involves intrapersonal simulation, the current paper
demonstrated how the Expanded Simulation Model accounts for this dual-path simulation
process hypothesis. This supported Hypothesis 1.7, which states that the autobiographical
memory function of perspective taking reflects interpersonal simulation, and that the
autobiographical memory functions of prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect
intrapersonal simulation.
Novel Findings and Future Directions
That the Expanded Simulation Model supports the existence of the autobiographical
memory function of perspective taking (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation) is important for a
number of reasons. Perspective taking is known to be a critical social skill from both
evolutionary (Barsalou, 2003; Barresi & Moore, 1996; Decety & Hamm, 2009) and everyday
perspectives (Goldman, 2006; Ickes, 2003; Winner, 2000). Therefore, having a clear
understanding of the specific form of memory content used as simulation input may guide efforts
to determine the factors that lead to successful versus unsuccessful perspective taking. It may
also inform theoretical investigation into the extent to which these capacities co-evolved.
The Expanded Simulation Model is also important in that it addresses possible remedies
to some key deficiencies of simulation theory by Goldman (2006) and Shanton and Goldman
(2010). For example, to provide better descriptive and explanatory power to the superficially
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defined “background information” component of simulation theory’s simulation process model,
the current paper proposed the integration of two conceptual models. The current paper then
supported the incorporation of these models with examples from such related literatures as
neuroimaging, cognitive neuroscience, and cognitive, social, and developmental psychology. As
a result, the current paper has offered novel applications of the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and the SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder et al., 2009), which may also
inspire other researchers to seek innovative ways to adapt and use these conceptual models.
The extension of simulation theory by Shanton and Goldman (2010) to explain mental
time travel made possible the current paper’s theoretical substantiation of new everyday uses of
autobiographical memory by way of the Expanded Simulation Model. This suggests there may
be other simulation-based phenomena—whether informed by autobiographical memory content
specifically or not—for which the Expanded Simulation Model might serve as a theoretical
framework.
The current paper could also encourage quests for new autobiographical memory
functions. The CRS-A, which was the instrument with which the autobiographical memory
function of perspective taking was found, situates its items within the social context of joint
reminiscence. It is therefore possible that the detection of the perspective taking function
necessitated such a context. That the scale from which the CRS-A was adapted—the CRS
(Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009)—also employed the joint reminiscence context, but did not detect the
perspective taking function. This is likely due to developmental differences between the target
population for the CRS (young children) versus the target population of the CRS-A (adults), the
former of which have yet acquired the ability to infer others’ mental states (e.g., Beck et al.,
2011; Fuchs, 2012; McHugh & Stewart, 2012; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Selman, 2003). Thus
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future studies should develop functions scales that differentially operationalize perspective
taking—e.g., without the joint reminiscence context—in order to discern the influence of
situating items within a social, or other, settings.
There are also related lines of research that the Expanded Simulation Model might
inform. One example is empathic accuracy—the proficiency with which one infers another’s
thoughts and feelings (Ickes, 2003). Of interest might be whether the frequency with which
individuals use autobiographical memory content for perspective taking predicts empathic
accuracy. If yes, such results would suggest that the more individuals rely on their own past
experiences to infer other minds, the better their chances of successful perspective taking.
However, if results showed that people were more empathically accurate when using
autobiographical memory for the purpose of perspective taking less frequently, such would
imply that too much reliance on past experience precludes the ability to consider a target other’s
unique circumstances, personality, and response to situations experienced by the perspective
taker.
Future research might also consider the cultural effects of simulation. For example, it is
known that the development of autobiographical memory is socialized differentially across
cultures (Nelson & Fivush, 2002). It is also known that sharing memories with others is a prime
social activity that varies among cultures (Nelson, 1988; Wang, 2013). Thus differences in the
capacity or proficiency to perspective take may be influenced by memory processes and content,
each of which varies across cultural contexts.
Limitations
Although the primary objective, goals, and hypotheses of the current paper were met,
gaps in the relevant literatures limited the support available for the Expanded Simulation Model,
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potentially impacting both the validity of the model and the viability of the conclusions drawn
from it. For one, besides the evidence for the perspective taking function reported by Ranson and
Fitzgerald (in preparation), no other direct theoretical or empirical evidence corroborating the
perspective taking function’s existence has been reported. Likewise, although some research
characterizes the broad Directive autobiographical memory function as concerning the directing
of present and future thoughts and actions (Williams et al., 2008)—a definition that foreshadows
the existence of the autobiographical memory function of prospection—no study to date has
established prospection as a self-contained function. And while some existing autobiographical
memory functions scales measure the use of autobiographical memory for the explicit functions
of emotion regulation and behavioral control (e.g., Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009; Ranson &
Fitzgerald, in preparation), none specifically address the use of autobiographical memory for the
emotion coping strategy of counterfactual thinking. As such, evidence used to support the
Expanded Simulation Model, and thus the autobiographical memory functions of perspective
taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, is indirect.
Secondly, given the extent to which indirect evidence was necessarily used to support the
Expanded Simulation Model, some conceptual leaps were necessary. In particular, simulation
theory posits that simulation is triggered by the retrieval of memory input, but does not explain
how this occurs. This seems a rather considerable omission, given that not all content retrieved
from long-term memory is appropriate for simulation, nor is all appropriate content necessarily
subjected to simulation. Thus the current paper attempted to address this explanatory deficiency
with the activation protocols of the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and
SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder et al., 2009), primarily by implicating the activation of episodic
autobiographical memory content—in response to a perspective taking or mental time travel
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goal—as the simulation trigger. However, both the SMS and SAC models are themselves largely
supported by indirect evidence, and had not been previously used to describe the finer levels of
organization within a superordinate system as was done in the current paper. Thus the argument
could be made that adaptation of either model for novel applications might attenuate the
explanatory power of either model’s supporting evidence.
Another possible criticism could be that, while the SMS supports a constructivist
approach (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), the SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder
et al., 2009), which the current paper incorporates into the SMS, does not. That is, the SMS is
founded on the idea that past episodes and their contextual details are organized as coherent
narratives that result from the co-constructions of past events (Holland & Kensinger, 2010)—
first in early childhood with primary caregivers (Fivush & Reese, 1992; Fivush, Haden, & Reese,
1996; Nelson & Fivush, 2002, 2004), then later through reflection and social interaction
(Habermas & Bluck, 2000). However, although the SAC does not explicitly address episodic
memory “co-construction,” no evidence in support of the SMS or SAC suggested a manifest
incompatibility. But the current paper’s incorporation of the SMS and SAC into paradigms like
the Expanded Simulation Model should prompt developers to consider other frameworks within
which these models might be used, and expand their adaptability accordingly.
Finally, the Expanded Simulation Model is but a single theoretical argument for the
existence of the perspective taking function; alternative explanations are possible. making
empirical replication vital.
1.6 Next Steps
Having demonstrated the theoretical plausibility of the Expanded Simulation Model, the
next step is to test its empirical integrity. Chapter 2 of the current paper details the first of two
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studies designed to empirically validate Chapter 1’s Hypotheses 1.2 and 1.5—that
autobiographical memory content in particular, rather than long-term memory content in general,
can be used for perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking. Study 1 was a
validity study in which a 10-item self-report Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation
(AMFS) scale was developed and validated. Study 2 (Chapter 3) will utilize the validated AMFS
scale to glean more conclusive evidence for the use of autobiographical memory content for the
interpersonal simulation phenomenon of perspective taking, and the intrapersonal simulation
phenomena of prospection (“pre-experiencing” the future with elements from autobiographical
memory content) and counterfactual thinking (“re-constructing” the past with elements from
autobiographical memory content). Evidence in support of Chapter 1’s Hypotheses 1.2 and 1.5
will be regarded as substantiating Chapter 1’s Hypothesis 1.6—that perspective taking,
prospection, and counterfactual thinking are therefore functions of autobiographical memory—
and Chapter 1’s Hypothesis 1.7—that the autobiographical memory function of perspective
taking reflects interpersonal simulation, and that the autobiographical memory functions of
prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect intrapersonal simulation.
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CHAPTER 2 EMPIRICALLY SUBSTANTIATING THE EXPANDED SIMULATION
MODEL: VALIDATION OF THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY FUNCTIONS OF
SIMULATION (AMFS) SCALE
2.1 Introduction & Background
The autobiographical memory system in humans is thought to have evolved in order to
provide an adaptive advantage—i.e., individuals adept at retrieving and applying prior
experience to novel situations should have a better chance of survival (Atance & O’Neill, 2001,
2005; Barsalou, 1988, 2003; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Suddendorf & Busby, 2003). However,
given that the direct investigation of autobiographical memory’s evolutionary basis is
empirically untenable (Kihlstrom, 2009), one of the foci of autobiographical memory research
became the identification of the theoretical reasons, or functions, for which autobiographical
memory is used in everyday life (e.g., Baddeley, 1988).
Beginning in the 1980s, a theoretical model was proposed that featured three broad
functions: Social, Self, and Directive (e.g., Baddeley, 1988; Bruce, 1989; Neisser, 1982). The
Social function was said to reflect the use of autobiographical memory to promote and maintain
social bonds, and to provide content for conversation (Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Alea, 2011).
The use of autobiographical memory for self-knowledge, self-continuity, and self-identity was
reflected by the Self function (Bluck et al., 2005). Finally, the Directive function was thought to
concern the use of past experience for the purpose of teaching, informing, guiding future
thoughts and behaviors, and shaping attitudes and beliefs (Bluck et al., 2005).
Because of its utility, the three-function model was widely accepted for several years
despite its lack of empirical verification (Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Alea, 2011). It was not
until 2005 that an instrument was developed to validate the model: The Thinking About Life
Experiences (TALE) scale. The TALE is a self-report questionnaire featuring items informed by
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the theoretical autobiographical memory literature (Bluck et al., 2005). Although validation of
the TALE confirmed the existence of the Social, Self, and Directive functions, concerns were
raised that the long-time focus on the three-function model may have precluded the search for
additional functions that lay beyond the scope of established theory.
Research seeking an expanded set of functions began soon after. Investigators considered
such frameworks as life stage and contexts, within which previously overlooked functions might
emerge. One example is the Reminiscence Functions Scale (RFS): a seven-function instrument
that measures reminiscence behaviors relevant to adults—especially those in the later stages of
life (Webster, 1995, 1997). Another example is the Child-Caregiver Reminiscence Scale (CRS),
which Kulkofsky and Koh (2009) developed to capture the functions vital to autobiographical
memory system development. The CRS was therefore designed to elicit the social context of
joint reminiscence—i.e., the sharing of “past talk” with another or others. Kulkofsky and Koh
argued that, by situating the CRS in the a context reflective of that within which autobiographical
memory is socialized in early life—around the ages of 3–4 years (Nelson & Fivush, 2004)—and
expanded set of developmentally relevant functions could be discerned. Results of the CRS
validation study revealed its own set of seven functions, six of which mapped as sub-functions
onto the TALE’s broad Social, Self, and Directive functions.
In a recent study by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation), the CRS was adapted for use
with adults to determine whether the seven CRS functions associated with early development
held into later life. The resultant Child-Caregiver Reminiscence Scale for Adults (CRS-A), which
retained the CRS’s social context of joint-reminiscence, replicated six of the seven CRS
functions and displayed only slight structural differences (see Figure 9). However, it also yielded
evidence for the previously undetected autobiographical memory function of perspective taking.
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Because no other study had reported such a function, nor had its discovery been predicted by any
single theory, the Expanded Simulation Model was developed to theoretically substantiate it. The
Expanded Simulation Model, which was adapted from the simulation process model of
perspective taking according to simulation theory (Goldman, 2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010),
offers a paradigm for how autobiographical memory content could be the specific long-term
memory form of “background information” that serves as simulation input in response to a
perspective taking goal. Because the Expanded Simulation Model therefore illustrates the use of
autobiographical memory in service of perspective taking, perspective taking can be thought of
as a function of autobiographical memory. Contingently, it was argued that the Expanded
Simulation Model could also explain the use of autobiographical memory for mental time
travel—specifically, prospection and counterfactual thinking—which suggests that prospection
and counterfactual thinking are also functions of autobiographical memory. The case for the
viability of the Expanded Simulation Model was presented in Chapter 1.
Chapter 2 concerns the current paper’s Study 1, the first of a program of studies aimed at
empirically validating Chapter 1’s Expanded Simulation Model. The purpose of Study 1 was to
develop an instrument for measuring the use of autobiographical memory for perspective taking,
prospection, and counterfactual thinking. The instrument will then be used in Study 2 (Chapter 3)
to yield evidence in support of four of Chapter 1’s hypotheses (1.2, 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7). The
following section details Study 1’s objectives and goals.
2.2 Objectives and Goals
Primary Objective
Autobiographical memory functions are, by definition, the purposes for which
autobiographical memory is needed or used (e.g., Baddeley, 1988, Bruce, 1989; Neisser, 1982).
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Per the Expanded Simulation Model, which was adapted for the current paper from simulation
theory by Goldman (2006) and Shanton and Goldman (2010), simulation that occurs in response
to a perspective taking or mental time travel goal uses “background information” drawn from
long-term memory stores. The simulation process gives rise to the rememberer’s “re-experience”
of that content. As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, when memory content is “re-experienced”
for its own sake, the behavioral outcome is reminiscence. When memory content is used to plan,
predict, or imagine a future scenario, the behavioral outcome that results from the “preexperience” of that content is prospection. And when memory content is “re-experienced” and
“reframed” with different details than what actually occurred, the behavioral outcome is
counterfactual thinking. from autobiographical memory content is contained in the long-term
memory component to be preferentially activated, retrieved, and applied when engaging in
interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation. If it can be shown that the specific form of long-term
memory used as simulation’s “background information” is autobiographical, then perspective
taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking would be functions of autobiographical memory.
The primary objective of Study 1 was to construct and validate an instrument for measuring the
use of autobiographical memory for those functions.
In keeping with the established tradition of empirically substantiating autobiographical
memory functions via self-report scales (Bluck et al., 2005; Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009; Ranson &
Fitzgerald, in preparation; Webster, 1995, 1997, 1998), the overarching objective of Study 1 was
to validate a self-report instrument designed to measure the frequency with which individuals use
autobiographical memory to inform the three simulation-based behavioral outcomes of
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking. The result was the 10-item
Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale.
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The format of the AMFS was modeled on the CRS-A (Ranson and Fitzgerald, in
preparation). However, the social context of joint reminiscence—which was employed for both
the CRS-A and the scale from which the CRS-A was adapted, the CRS (Kulkofsky & Koh,
2009)—was omitted from the AMFS. One reason was for instructional coherence. The joint
reminiscence context is elicited in the CRS-A (and CRS) by instructing respondents to consider
the extent to which they engage in “past-talk” with others when estimating the frequency with
which they use autobiographical memory for various purposes. The elicitation of this context is
reasonable for perspective taking—an inherently social behavior that occurs in response to the
other-directed goals (Shanton & Goldman, 2010). However, although mental time travel can
occur in the presence of and in response to “past-talk,” it occurs in response to self-directed goals
(Shanton & Goldman, 2010), and is not necessarily a social behavior. Thus, instructions asking
respondents to consider “past-talk” when estimating the frequency with which they use
autobiographical memory for prospection and counterfactual thinking seemed incompatible with
the construct, and therefore potentially confusing to respondents. Another reason was that,
although the joint reminiscence context was important to the objective of the CRS—which was
to determine whether the functions found by Kulkofsky and Koh (2009) as essential to
autobiographical memory system emergence in early childhood were retained and used in
adulthood—no previous findings were available with which to compare the adult use of
prospection and counterfactual thinking versus use during early life. This is not to say that the
manner in which autobiographical memory is socialized in early childhood does not influence
individual differences in prospection and counterfactual thinking. Rather, such differences would
be neither measureable nor discernable by the AMFS. Likewise, because it has not yet been
empirically established that prospection and counterfactual thinking are functions of

52
autobiographical memory, to attempt to assess individual differences in the socialization of
autobiographical memory for such purposes would be premature. Thus the current paper saw no
need for eliciting the joint reminiscence context.
A series of statistical procedures were performed on the AMFS to validate its structure
and assess its reliability. Given that no previous research on which to inform specific outcomes
exists, Study 1 was largely exploratory. As such, four goals were set in lieu of hypotheses.
Goals
Goal 2.1 was to use exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to verify the three-function
structure of the AMFS. It was expected that all 10 items of the AMFS would load onto their
respective factors to demonstrate structural validity, and that the factors would meet or exceed an
acceptable level of reliability. Although two of the four items included in the Perspective
TakingAMFS13 factor were taken from the CRS-A (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), it was
expected that the two CRS-A items and the two new items generated for the AMFS would “hang
together” on a single factor14.
Goal 2.2 was to use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with a structural equation
modeling approach to verify the structure found in the EFA. It was expected that the structure
would hold and that indices would verify sufficient fit.

13

From this point forward and unless otherwise noted, the current paper will use the convention of tacking “AMFS”
in subscript notation to every use of “Perspective Taking” that references the AMFS Perspective Taking function or
subscale. Likewise, when referencing the Perspective Taking function or subscale of the AMFJR, the subscript
“AMFJR” will be used.
14
The validation of the CRS-A yielded evidence that the Perspective TakingAMFJR function mapped on to the broad
Social function measured by the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011). It will be an objective of Study 2 is to examine
whether the Perspective TakingAMFS function also maps onto the TALE’s Social function, or if this association is
dependent on the social context of joint reminiscence.
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Goal 2.3 was to show construct validity by way of associations15 between the three
autobiographical memory functions and the two dimensions of the Emotion Regulation
Questionnaire (ERQ) (Gross & John, 2003). Convergent validity was tested using the ERQ’s
Cognitive Reappraisal dimension, which reflects how individuals “change” their thinking about
emotion events by imagining different outcomes, details, and scenarios. Like perspective taking,
prospection, and counterfactual thinking, cognitive reappraisal is characterized as a simulationbased behavior (Lindeman & Abraham, 2008). This functional similarity between the three
AMFS factors and the Cognitive Reappraisal dimension made it a suitable correlate for testing
the convergent validity of the AMFS. However, despite this overlap, the AMFS and the ERQ
nonetheless measure different constructs: The AMFS is concerned with the use of
autobiographical memory whereas the ERQ is concerned with emotion coping strategies. As
such, it was expected that the correlation coefficients between the three AMFS factors and
Cognitive Reappraisal would be, although positive and significant, low to moderate in
magnitude. Results supporting this expectation would suggest that, although the two scales’
items had mental simulation in common, the two scales were in other important ways
characteristically distinct. It was also expected that the second of the ERQ’s two dimensions,
Expressive Suppression—which reflects the degree to which people change their outward
behavior in response to emotional events—would provide evidence of discriminant validity.
Because Expressive Suppression is not a simulation-based behavior—at least not to the extent
that Cognitive Reappraisal is thought to be—correlations between it and the three AMFS factors
should be weak and nonsignificant.

15

Although construct validity (comprised of convergent and discriminant validity) would ideally be conducted
using and SEM approach to MTMM procedures (Campbell & Fiske, 1959), Study 1’s small sample size made such
analyses untenable. Therefore, assessing correlation coefficients between the factors being validated and
theoretically similar constructs is considered an acceptable alternative (Carlson & Herdman, 2012).
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In addition to the evaluation of construct validity, a provisional multiple regression
analysis was run to test the functional relation between the two ERQ dimensions and the
functions measured by the AMFS. One of two outcomes was considered likely. The first was that
only one of the AMFS functions would account for variance in Cognitive Reappraisal,
supporting the contention that the AMFS functions and Cognitive Reappraisal dimension all
reflect simulation-based behaviors. The second possible outcome aligns with Shanton and
Goldman’s (2010) contention that perspective taking, being other-directed, reflects interpersonal
simulation, whereas prospection and counterfactual thinking, being self-directed, reflect
intrapersonal simulation. Support for this claim would be reflected by Perspective Taking
(interpersonal simulation) accounting for a significant amount of variance in Cognitive
Reappraisal, while either Prospection (interpersonal simulation) or Counterfactual Thinking
(intrapersonal simulation)—but not both—would account for a significant amount of variance in
Cognitive Reappraisal. Because this analysis is provisional (i.e., extraneous to scale validation),
results will be re-verified in Study 2.
Goal 2.4 was to look for potential associations between the AMFS factors and
personality dimensions as measured with the six-trait, 60-item HEXACO personality inventory
(Ashford & Lee, 2007). The HEXACO is unique in that, along with the traditional Big Five
dimensions (Extraversion, Openness to New Experience, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and
Emotionality/Neuroticism), the self-report instrument measures the dimension of HonestyHumility. People high on the Honesty-Humility trait tend to be humble, averse to manipulating
others, non-materialistic, and non-status seeking. Contrarily, individuals low in the HonestyHumility trait have a tendency toward manipulation, entitlement, dishonesty, and deception. Of
interest to the current paper was whether the Honesty-Humility dimension would shed light on

55
whether the use of autobiographical memory for counterfactual thinking led to counterfactuals
that were upward (i.e., engender positive outcomes like relief and satisfaction), or downward
(i.e., engender negative outcomes such as bias, blame, and dysfunction) (e.g., Roese, 1997).
However, no known study of autobiographical memory functions has employed the HEXACO,
thus it was important to test its practicality (e.g., could respondents complete it in the estimated
allotted time), as well as its suitability as an alternative to the standard Big Five indices.
Testing for associations between personality and autobiographical memory functions in
general, and the AMFS functions in particular, is also important given that much of the evidence
with respect to personality and autobiographical memory functions is inconsistent (Rasmussen &
Berntsen, 2010), Thus, efforts to verify known relations and to search for new ones are
warranted. And although some research exists concerning personality and the behaviors of
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, it is unclear if these effects will
replicate with respect to the use of autobiographical memory for those behaviors.
Because the Study 1 analyses conducted using the HEXACO were both extraneous to the
validation of the AMFS, and were run using the same data with which the AMFS was validated,
all analyses using the HEXACO are provisional, necessitating replication before conclusions are
drawn16. Thus any findings yielded from these analyses in Study 1 will be investigated more
fully in Study 2.
Goal 2.5 was to get a sense of whether individuals grasp the idea that autobiographical
memory can be used for perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual to the extent that
they can then reasonably estimate the frequency with which they use it for such behaviors.
Respondents were presented with a series of mental time travel completion tasks that involved
16

It is considered inappropriate to use the same data employed for scale validation to then measure and draw
conclusions about individuals (Boslaugh, 2007).

56
the recollection, written synopsis, and phenomenological descriptions of a past event
(reminiscence condition), an imagined future scenario (prospection condition), and reframing of
an actual past event (counterfactual thinking condition) (see the Instruments section for details).
The intention of this task was to test an implicit assumption common to all autobiographical
memory functions self-report scales: That respondents grasp the idea that they use
autobiographical memory for various behaviors to the extent that they can then estimate the
frequency with which they use autobiographical memory for those behaviors. However, it is also
possible that respondents are simply estimating the frequency with which they engage in the
behaviors themselves. While the mental time travel conditions task could not definitively rule
out the latter, it was thought that completion of the mental time travel conditions tasks would be
evidence that respondents 1) understood the ways in which autobiographical memory might be
used for reminiscence, prospection, and counterfactual thinking; and 2) could therefore
reasonably estimate their use of autobiographical memory in the service of such behaviors when
completing the AMFS. Because the nature of Goal 2.5 was exploratory, and because the data
collected for the mental time travel conditions qualitative, no formal analyses were conducted.
2.3 Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited through Amazon.com’s on-demand recruitment and survey
management service, Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (www.MTurk.com). Through MTurk, eligible
participants accessed the Study 1 online questionnaire, which was developed using Qualtrics
(2015, Provo, UT) research software. A total of 144 participants enrolled in Study 1. However, a
review of survey metrics after the first 34 participants had completed the survey showed that it
was taking participant an average of 45 minutes to complete the survey. Because the
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questionnaire’s introduction had stated an estimated survey completion time of approximately 30
minutes, the survey was suspended until the introduction could be revised to reflect the increased
time estimate and to increase the compensation for completed surveys to $2.00 per respondent17.
Because there was a concern that the change in compensation could draw a systematically
different kind of participant, data for the first 34 participants was not used. Of the remaining 110
participants (F = 60, 54.5%), most were young to middle-aged adults (M = 39.06 years, SD =
12.96), who ranged in age from 18 to 67 years. The ethnicity/race frequencies and proportions
were as follows: Sixty-four participants identified as Caucasian (58.2%); 29 as AfricanAmerican/Black (26.4%); seven as American Indian/Alaskan Native (6.4%); three as Other
(2.7%); two as Asian (1.8%); two as Multiracial (1.8%); one as Arab/Middle Eastern (0.9%); and
one as Hawaiian/Pacific Islander (0.9%). One participant (0.9%) chose “prefer not to answer.”
No participants identified as Hispanic. A summary of the Study 1 demographics can be found in
Table 2.
Instruments
The Study 1 online questionnaire consisted of the following six “blocks” of survey items:
demographics, self-descriptions of current self, mental time travel components (reminiscence,
counterfactual thinking, and prospection), the AMFS scale, the Emotion Regulation
Questionnaire (ERQ), and the HEXACO-60 personality index.
Block 1: Demographic Items. Respondents were asked to answer three demographic
items consistent with previous work in autobiographical memory functions (Bluck & Alea, 2011;
Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009; Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation). The items and their options
(presented in drop-down menus) were gender (male, female, prefer not to answer); age (18 to
17

At the time the Study 1 survey was administered, MTurk metrics indicated that the average compensation across
all studies was $1.00 for up to 30 minutes of participant time, and $2.00 for between 30 minutes and 1 hour
(www.MTurk.com).
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65+, prefer not to answer); and ethnicity/race (African-American/Black, American Indian/Alaska
Native, Arab/Middle Eastern, Asian, Caucasian, Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic,
Multiracial, Other, prefer not to answer).
Block 2: Self-Descriptors of Current Self. Following the completion of the
demographics block, respondents were presented with the following instruction: “Take a moment
to consider what traits and characteristics describe who you are at this point in your life. For
example, are you ambitious? A good friend? Shy? Think of 5 one- or two word descriptions that
best reflect these characteristics and enter them in the spaces below.” The space below featured
five open fields preceded by the statement, ‘I _______________.’ Each field allowed a total of
60 characters. The item was adapted from the paradigms used by Wang (2001) and Shao, Yao,
Ceci, and Wang (2010), both of which were adapted from the Kuhn and McPartland (1954)
Twenty Statements Test (TST).
The purpose of the self-descriptor component was two-fold. One, it was intended to
acclimate the respondents to the conceptual time that corresponded to the mental time travel
condition (i.e., the past for the reminiscence and counterfactual thinking conditions; the future
for the prospection condition) by anchoring the respondent in the self-concept that corresponded
with that point in time (Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Conway, 2005). Two, it was thought that
the act of listing semantic autobiographical information about the self would facilitate activation
of the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and SAC (Reder et al., 2009) as
proposed in Chapter 1. As a result, the self-descriptors could serve as primes to the activation
and retrieval of the episodic memory content needed to complete the mental time travel
conditions.
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Block 3: Mental Time Travel Conditions. All respondents completed three mental time
travel tasks in the order listed below. The language for all three conditions was adapted from the
paradigm established by D’Argembeau & Van der Linden (2004). The purpose of the mental
time travel conditions was to glean whether respondents understood the concept of applying
autobiographical memory content for the purposes of “re-experiencing” a past episode,
“reframing” a past episode with new details, and “pre-experiencing” an imagined future event. If
so, the properties that respondents identified as elements of their autobiographical memories
should align with their descriptive narratives of the mental time travel event.
Condition 1: Reminiscence (“Re-Experiencing” One’s Personal Past). Respondents
were presented with the following introduction: “This next section of questions is about how
people ‘re-experience’ personal past events recalled from memory. Take a few moments to recall
any POSITIVE18 event from your personal past that you have thought about at least once since it
occurred, and which has had some consequence to your life since. This event should have lasted
at least a few minutes but not more than a day. As you mentally re-experience the event, try to
recall as much detail as possible. Think about such characteristics as where it occurred, the
course of events as they happened, the people and objects present and your interactions with
them, and how you felt during the event. When you're ready, click the NEXT button to continue.”
Upon clicking the NEXT button, respondents were presented with the following two tasks.
Narrative Description of Re-Experienced Past Event. Respondents were next presented
with the statement, “In the space below, please give a brief description of the positive personal
18

The reason for requesting that respondents consider a POSITIVE past event was in response to evidence that the
recollection of negative memories can upset psychological wellbeing (Takarangi & Strange, 2010). As such, there
was a risk that asking participants to recall a negative memory, or allow participants the option to recall a negative
memory, could encourage some participants to ruminate and/or experience cognitive impairment as negative affect
increased (Takarangi & Strange, 2010). Such psychological upsets could then impede respondents’ ability to
complete subsequent memory tasks and/or their ability to estimate the frequency with which they engage in AMF
behaviors.
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past event that you re-experienced for this study.” This statement was followed by an open field
in which respondents were asked to enter a 2- to 4-sentence (up to 500 characters) description of
the recalled event.
Self-Descriptors of Past Self. Respondents were presented with the following: “Take a
moment to consider what traits and characteristics you remember yourself to have shown at the
time of the event. Come up with 5 one- or two word descriptions that best reflect who you were
at the time of this past event and enter them in the spaces below.” The format of this item is
otherwise identical to that of the current self-description section. As before, the objective of this
item is to activate the self-memory system and verify that respondents have a self-awareness of
themselves at a time other than the present.
Condition 2: Counterfactual Thinking (“Reconstructing” One’s Personal Past).
The purpose of this condition was to examine whether respondents were able to grasp the idea of
and answer questions about the ways in which they mentally change the details about actual past
events. Specifically, of interest was whether individuals can understand and then narratively
describe which actual memory events were reimagined, and in what particular ways. Participants
were tasked first with recalling and describing an actual past event that they had “reframed” as
having different details and/or a different outcome, then recalling, describing, and listing the
details that were changed during reframing. The corresponding self-descriptors were included to
determine if respondents could describe characteristics of the self in each counterfactual thinking
task. For example, if the actual memory concerned the rememberer failing a math test, and the
narrative either explicitly or suggestively indicated that this event was perceived as negative, the
self-descriptors should have reflected characteristics consistent with both the memory and the
rememberer’s perception of it—e.g., “I feel stupid,” “I am ashamed,” etc. If, contrarily, the
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“reframed,” counterfactual was of having studied and then passing that test, which the
descriptive narrative implied was a positive outcome, then the corresponding self-descriptors
should have been likewise consistent—e.g., “I am happy,” “I am smart,” etc.
Participants were presented with the following section introduction: “It’s also common
for people to ‘reconstruct’19 a past event. For example, sometimes people recall an unpleasant
past event and imagine saying or doing something differently to produce a different outcome.
Sometimes people will reconstruct such events to create a pleasant memory and incorporate
imagined details that would have led to a poor outcome. Reconstructed memories are a
combination of actual details from a personal past event and completely imagined details. Take a
moment to recall a personal past event that you have reconstructed in some way. Recall a
reconstructed memory that reflects an event that was personally meaningful to you or that
continues to stand out in your mind. When you are ready, click the NEXT button to continue.”
Note that, for the counterfactual thinking condition, respondents were not explicitly asked to
recall a positive memory, as was the case for the reminiscence condition, for two reasons. One,
the literature on counterfactual thinking reports that individuals tend to reconstruct negative
memories more frequently than they do positive memories (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese &
Olson, 1995). Two, counterfactual thinking research shows that, during reconstruction, negative
memories are often given a positive spin, whereby counterfactual thinking serves as a coping
mechanism (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese & Olson, 1995). Hence it was thought that
respondents may struggle to recall a positive past event that was reframed. Further, because
negative past events are often ameliorated during reframing (Roese & Olson, 1995), it was
thought that the risk of causing psychological upset was lower for the counterfactual thinking
19

Although the current paper is using “reframing” rather than “reconstructing” to describe the changing of
autobiographical memory content for counterfactuals, the Study 1 survey instructions used “reconstruct.”
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task than for the reminiscence task (which, as an online survey item provided no subsequent
means of assuaging any potentially negative affect).
Narrative Description of Actual and Reconstructed Past Events. Respondents were
presented with the statement, “In the space below, please give a brief synopsis of the ACTUAL
past event.” This statement was followed by an open field into which 2- to 4-sentence (up to 500
characters) descriptions were to be entered. Respondents were then shown the statement, “In the
space below, please describe the characteristics of past event after RECONSTRUCTING the past
event.” This statement was also followed by an open field for entering a 2- to 4-sentence (up to
500 characters) description.
Self-Descriptors of Past Self for Actual and Reconstructed Past Events. For this section,
respondents were asked to provide self-descriptions of their self with respect to both the
ACTUAL past event and the RECONSTRUCTED past event. For the former, respondents saw
the statement, “First, consider what traits and characteristics you remember yourself to have had
at the time of the ACTUAL event. Come up with 5 one- or two-word descriptions that best
reflect who you were during the ACTUAL event and enter them in the spaces below.” For the
latter, respondents were given the instruction, “Now, consider what traits and characteristics you
remember yourself to have had in the RECONSTRUCTED version of this memory. Come up
with 5 one- or two-word descriptions that best reflect who you were during the
RECONSTRUCTED event and enter them in the spaces below.” Each statement was followed
by five spaces within which to complete the statement, ‘I ____________.’
Condition 3: Prospection (“Pre-Experiencing” One’s Potential Future Events).
Respondents were presented with the following instruction, “This next section concerns how
people ‘pre-experience’ a personal future by imagining possible future events. Take a few
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moments to imagine with as much detail as possible a future event or scenario that you have not
previously experienced but which could realistically occur. This imagined event should be one
that could last at least a few minutes but not more than a day. As you mentally imagine this
future event, pay attention to such characteristics as where it will occur, the course of events that
will happen, the people and objects present and your interactions with them, and how you
imagine you will feel during the future event. An example of an imagined future scenario: ‘Zelda
wants to hold a yard sale in her back yard next summer. She imagines how she’ll organize her
lush, sunny, back yard: She sees herself putting kitchenware and knick-knacks on the blue picnic
table that sits on her patio. She pictures hanging items of clothing on a rope that she’ll string
between her two large oak trees at the back edge of the yard. She also imagines pleasantly
interacting with neighbors as well as strangers. Zelda also imagines what might happen if it were
raining on the day of the yard sale. She thinks about how she might organize her garage in case
the weather forecast predicts rain. Overall, she believes the sale could be a fun event for
everyone, and feels happy as she looks forward to it.’ When you are ready, click the NEXT
button to continue.”
Note that here, as with the counterfactual thinking condition, respondents were not
instructed to generate an imagined future scenario of a specific emotional valence. It was thought
that omitting this instruction would allow respondents to imagine either a positive or negative
future as desired. However, because research shows that people tend to predict that their lives
will inevitably take a positive turn (De Brigard et al., 2015), it was expected that most future
imaginings would be optimistic, and the risk of upsetting respondents was low.
Narrative Description of Re-Experienced Past Event. Respondents were presented with
the statement, “Use the space below to briefly describe the imagined future event.” The

64
statement was followed by an open field into which a 2- to 4-sentence (up to 500 characters)
description could be entered.
Self-Descriptors of Future Self. Respondents were asked to “Consider who you are in this
future scenario; enter the 5 most relevant one- or two-word descriptions and enter them in the
spaces below.”
Elements from the Past that Inform the Future. Respondents were presented with the
following: “Regarding the imagined future scenario you just pre-experienced, take a moment to
consider which aspects of it are based on information or elements from actual past events. For
example, say your imagined future scenario was about the yard sale that your friend wants the
two of you to plan for next summer. You envision, for example, that, this time, you're going to
do things differently. You first envision you and your friend meeting at your favorite coffee shop
to discuss details. You see yourself suggesting to the friend that the sale be held at the friend's
home this time. You mentally picture the bright blue picnic table that sits in your friend's back
yard as a sales station. You compose a script of what you'll say, being careful to avoid what you
did last time. You see yourself being more assertive but fair. You feel certain that, if this scenario
plays out the way you imagine it, you'll feel much better than you did last year. Past information
that informs your ‘pre-experiencing’ of the future event might include such things as details from
last year's yard sale; your friend's yard; your friend's bright blue picnic table; your friend's
behavior last year; your behavior last year; your feelings last year; other situations in the past
which you've asserted yourself and felt good for doing so. In the spaces below, please list up to
12 characteristics, elements, or aspects of your IMAGINED FUTURE SCENARIO that are
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based on characteristics, elements, or aspects of one or more actual past event20. Try to be as
detailed as possible.”
Block 4: Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) Scale. The
AMFS scale is comprised of 10 items intended to measure the three hypothesized
autobiographical memory function of Perspective Taking (interpersonal simulation), the two
mental time travel functions (intrapersonal simulation) of Prospection and Counterfactual
Thinking. If validated, the AMFS could be used as a complement to the previously validated
CRS-A scale (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), the functions of which represent the
autobiographical memory functions that emerge in the social context of joint reminiscence. The
Prospection and Counterfactual Thinking factors each include three items, whereas the
Perspective Taking function comprises four items: the two items Perspective Taking items from
the CRS-A, plus two new items. Table 3 lists the AMFS items and their respective factors. The
two Perspective Taking items from the previously validated CRS-A are denoted by asterisks.
To lessen the risk skewed response data, which is a common problem with Likert-type
scales (Jamieson, 2004; Sheng & Sheng, 2012), and which can lead to misleading factor analysis
results (French-Lazovik & Gibson, 1984), the AMFS featured a 6-point Liker-type rating scheme
with labels at the anchors only (i.e., 1 = almost never; 6 = almost always) (Dawes, 2008; FrenchLazovik & Gibson, 1984). This was a change from the CRS-A, which featured a 7-point Likert
scale modeled after that used by Kulkofsky and Koh (2009), and the labeling of which was based
on recommendations by Bass, Cascio, & O’Connor (1974).
Upon entering the AMFS block, respondents were presented with the instruction, “The
following section features a series of statements about the reasons why you might think about the
20

Note that that the survey setup prohibited respondents from navigating back to previously completed sections. As
such, respondents were not able to refer back to their narrative descriptions while listing the event’s properties.
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past. On a scale of 1 to 6 (1 = Almost Never, 6 = Almost Always), please rate how frequently
you engage in each of the following recollection-related behaviors and activities.” All items
within the AMFS block were randomly ordered.
Block 5: Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ). The Emotion Regulation
Questionnaire (ERQ) (Gross & John, 2003) is a 10-item scale that assesses individual differences
in the use of two emotion regulation strategies. The Cognitive Reappraisal dimension evaluates
individuals’ strategies with respect to the internal emotional experience, while the Expressive
Suppression dimension captures strategies that are externalized as talk, gestures, and behaviors
(Gross & John, 2003). Because the Cognitive Reappraisal dimension is thought to involve
mental simulation (Lindeman & Abraham, 2008), whereas the Expressive Suppression
dimension does not, these two dimensions were used to evaluate convergent and discriminant
construct validity, respectively. The most recent validation study of the ERQ yielded a
Cronbach’s alpha for the Cognitive Reappraisal dimension of .79, and an alpha of .73 for
Expressive Suppression.
Respondents were presented with the following instruction: “We would like to ask you
some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how you control (that is, regulate and
manage) your emotions. The questions below involve two distinct aspects of your emotional life.
One is your emotional experience, or what you feel like inside. The other is your emotional
expression, or how you show your emotions in the way you talk, gesture, or behave. Although
some of the following questions may seem similar to one another, they differ in important ways.”
Respondents were then asked to rate how strongly they agreed (or disagreed) with each statement
on a 6-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree). The 10 items of the ERQ can be
found in Table 4.
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Block 6: HEXACO-60 Personality Inventory. The HEXACO-60 Personality Inventory
(Ashton & Lee, 2009), a shortened version of the full 100-item HEXACO-PI (Lee & Ashton,
2004),

assesses

the

six

HEXACO

personality

dimensions

of

Honesty-Humility,

Emotionality/Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to
Experience21. Results of the HEXACO-60 validation study yielded Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities
ranging from .73 to .80 for adults. The dimensions of the HEXACO-60 were found to be
strongly correlated with their counterparts in the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992). The six
dimensions of the HEXACO are further subdivided into four facets each, although facets were
not examined for Study 1 due to the provisional nature of the Study 1 inferential analyses.
Respondents were presented with the instruction, “The following section addresses
various personality traits. On a 1 to 6 scale, please rate the extent to which you agree (or
disagree) with each statement as it describes your personality.” For the online administration of
the Study 1 instruments, the HEXACO-60 featured an attention check (see Procedures for
details). The 60 items plus attention check can be found in Table 5.
Procedures
Study 1 items (see Instruments section, above) were featured in a single online
questionnaire-type survey developed using the Qualtrics Research Survey Suite (Qualtrics, Co.,
2015, Provo, UT). The Qualtrics survey was distributed via Amazon.com’s participant
recruitment and compensation service, Mechanical Turk or “MTurk” (www.MTurk.com).
MTurk was chosen for the following five reasons. One, research shows that its samples tend to
be more culturally diverse, feature equivalent proportions of men and women, and are comprised
of a wider age range than those recruited through conventional university resources (Buhrmester,
21

The 100-item HEXACO-PI, which will be used for Study 2, also includes the interstitial facet scale of Altruism
(with the inverse Antagonism), the items of which are included in Table 17.
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Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Two, MTurk gives researchers the opportunity to compensate
participants, whereas survey systems managed by universities and other educational institutions
often do not. Participants earn a monetary credit equal to the compensation amount that is posted
to their Amazon.com account. This service removes the burden of acquiring, issuing, and
managing an alternative form of payment (e.g., checks, gift certificates) from the researcher.
Additionally, researchers do not need to have participant names, contact information, or tax
identification details on file, ensuring that participation in an MTurk survey is fully anonymous.
Three, MTurk guarantees quality data by allowing researchers to decline compensating any
participant who is suspected of providing fraudulent or poor quality responses. All MTurk
participants must, before enrolling in any study, sign a “Worker’s Agreement” (see Appendix A),
which stipulates that researchers have the right to refuse compensating any participant whose
responses do not meet MTurk’s quality requirements. Four, the researcher can indicate in
advance the number and characteristics of participants desired. Only completed surveys are
counted toward this total. Once the designated total has been reached, the survey closes
automatically, thus freeing the researcher from the need to closely monitor activity. And five,
MTurk’s 400,000-plus pool of potential participants, of whom 50,000–100,000 are available at
any one time (Ross, Irani, Silberman, Zaldivar, & Tomlinson, 2010), makes for extremely quick
data collection.
Study 1 approval was obtained from the conducting university’s Institutional Review
Board (IRB protocols 15050114057–8, 6/17/16). The instrument blocks were combined into a
single online questionnaire that appeared on the MTurk website as the “Everyday Memory
Study.” The listing was accompanied by a link that, when clicked, led to a brief introduction
about the study, instructions on how to submit the compensation code to be displayed at the end
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of the completed survey, and a link to the Qualtrics survey (see Appendix B). Upon clicking the
Qualtrics survey link, participants were presented with an Information Sheet22 (see Appendix C).
After reading and agreeing to the terms of the Information Sheet, participants were instructed to
click the CONTINUE button if he or she wanted to enroll in the study and begin the survey.
Participants were informed that clicking the CONTINUE button also served as their electronic
signature. Participants who chose not to participate could click the EXIT button. No data were
collected for participants who chose to exit the survey at that time.
Participants who chose to proceed were next presented with the Study 1 items, beginning
with the demographics block (see Instruments section for details). Items were all forced choice to
ensure no missing data. However, participants who did not wish to provide demographic
information were offered the option, “prefer not to answer.” For subsequent item blocks,
participants who did not wish to provide responses could exit the study at any time by clicking
the EXIT button embedded at the bottom of every online survey page.
An “attention check” item was included in each the AMFS and HEXACO survey blocks
(see Tables 3 and 5 for details). Participation in the survey was terminated for any participant
who failed to answer an attention check item as instructed. As was disclosed in the Information
Sheet, participants who failed an attention check were not eligible for compensation.
Upon survey completion, each participant received a unique, five-digit Qualtrics-issued
compensation code (see Appendix D). Participants were instructed to enter the code in the field
provided in their MTurk survey screen. Submission of the code prompted a notification to the
researcher that compensation had been requested. A list of participants (identified only by an
MTurk generated “Worker ID” number) with their compensation codes was posted to the
22

At the conducting university, online surveys provide Information Sheets rather than Informed Consent, as the
latter is meant to be signed in person by the participant.
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researcher’s MTurk account. The researcher then initiated compensation by checking an
“Approve” box next to each listed participant. If the researcher chose to “Not Approve” a
participant, the researcher was required to provide a full explanation as to why compensation
was being denied, which was then forwarded to the participant. If approved, MTurk would apply
the compensation to the participant’s Amazon.com account within 24 hours. All submitted
surveys were approved. A total of 144 participants enrolled in the study. The first 34 received a
credit to their Amazon.com account of $1.00 (US dollars) while the final 110 received a $2.00
credit. A 10% fee was assessed on total compensation issued by MTurk to bring the total cost of
Study 1 to $279.40.
Data Analysis
Data screening, descriptive statistics, and inferential analyses were conducted using SPSS
version 22 (IBM Corp, 2014). An exploratory factor analysis (EFA)23 using principal axis
factoring (PAF) was run to validate the AMFS scale. Because the data were Likert-type, ordinal
alpha reliability analyses were performed. The PAF and reliability analyses were run using RFactor for Ordinal Data (Basto & Pereira, 2012a)24, an interface program for SPSS and the
open-source statistical software program R (R Core Team, 2015). The R-Factor procedures used
for Study 1 were per Basto & Pereira (2012b) and Courtney (2013). Results of the EPAF were
subjected to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with robust unweighted least squares (RULS)
estimation25 using LISREL v9.2 (Jöreskog, & Sörbom, 2015).

23

A PAF was chosen for the validation of the AMFS over another popular scale validation method, principal
components analysis (PCA). The objective of the PCA is to account for as much variance as possible with as few
factors, or components, as possible (Warner, 2012). Contrarily, the PAF evaluates the shared variance in a set of X
measurements (items) underlain by a set of latent variables, or factors, which reflect the hypothesized constructs
underlying the items (Warner, 2012).
24
Details on the use of R-Factor for ordinal factor analysis have been covered in full in Ranson & Fitzgerald (in
preparation).
25
Per Forero, Maydeu-Olivares, and Gallardo-Pujol (2009), the typical default method of maximum likelihood
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Given Study 1’s small sample size, which precluded multitrait-multimethod (MTMM)
construct validity analysis, correlation analyses were run between the AMFR’s factors and the
ERQ’s Cognitive Reappraisal dimension (for convergent construct validity) and Expressive
Suppression dimension (for discriminant construct validity). Additionally, multiple regression
was used to test the functional relation between the AMFS and ERQ. Simple regression analyses
were run to test whether personality predicts the three simulation-based autobiographical
memory functions. Type I error risk was limited to 5% (α = .05); thus, results yielding p ≤ .05
were considered statistically significant.
Power Analysis. Because funding for Study 1 data was limited, popular guidelines were
consulted to ensure that the planned collection of 100–150 cases would adequately power the
EFA, CFA, and inferential statistics. Two common guidelines—the determination of minimum
N, and the determination of the minimum N to p ratio (where p is the number of items), were
employed. First, the “100 rule,” which recommends that samples be no less than 100 (Gorsuch,
1983; Kline, 1979), was used, as was the widely used ratio rule of five cases per item (Bryant &
Yarnold, 1995; Everitt, 1975). Study 1’s N = 110 met both guidelines (as 5 cases × 10 items = 50
cases)26.
Of the 110 completed surveys, eight were missing data on the HEXACO. Therefore, all
analyses using the HEXACO data were N = 102. An achieved power analysis using G*Power
(Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) indicated that, for a sample of that size using α = .05, Power
= .80, and R2 ≥ .07, regression analyses were sufficiently powered.
(ML) assumes normality and continuous data, so is inappropriate when evaluating ordinal and/or nonnormal data.
The optimal estimation method for ordinal and/or nonnormal data that underlie a polychoric correlation matrix is
robust ULS (RULS) (Morata-Ramírez & Holgado-Tello, 2013).
26
Note that the main objective of Study 1 was to validate the items generated to measure the hypothesized
Perspective TakingAMFS, Prospection, and Counterfactual Thinking functions of autobiographical memory for later
incorporation into an augmented CRS-A. However, because the CRS-A, which has already been validated, features
41 items alone, the minimum sample size needed to sufficiently power the validation of an augmented CRS-A (N =
at least 255 per the N:p rule) was prohibitively expensive for Study 1.
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2.4 Results
Self-Descriptions and Mental Time Travel Conditions
The self-descriptions and mental time travel conditions were reviewed for indications that
participants understood the instructions, could mentalize and articulate examples of each of the
requested mental time travel scenarios, and could relate to the idea a self that was consistent with
the actual and reconstructed memory descriptions. No respondent appeared to have difficulty
with this task; in fact, most elaborated as much as possible given the space allowed. No analyses
were run on this data. Examples of five participants’ responses to each of the three mental time
travel conditions are listed in Table 6.
Data Screening
AMFS data were screened prior to scale validation procedures using SPSS v22 (IBM
Corp, 2014). Results of the univariate (UV) normality analyses showed that 9 out of 1027 items
(90%) demonstrated negative UV skew, with 3 of 10 (30%) significantly negatively UV skewed
at the .05 level (Z ≥ |1.96|) or greater. A total of 9 out of 1028 items (90%) demonstrated negative
UV kurtosis (platykurtosis), two (20%) of which were significantly so. As expected, results of
the multivariate normality29 tests showed significant MV skew (Z = 45.43, p < .001) and MV
kurtosis (Z = 96.55, p < .001). This nonnormality, along with the ordinal nature of the scale
items, recommended the use of polychoric30 correlation matrices for the EPAFs. Factor means
(standard deviations) were, for Perspective TakingAMFS, 3.97 (1.08); for Prospection, 4.05 (1.06),
27

The exception, as seen in Table 3, is the Counterfactual Thinking item number 8: “I spend time imagining
specific past events with different details or outcomes than what actually occurred,” ZSkew = 0.96, n.s.
28
The exception here is the Prospection item number 6: “I think about my own past experiences when I believe that
doing so can help guide my future,” ZKurtosis = 0.43, n.s.
29
Multivariate (MV) normality is an assumption of MV analyses, of which principal axis factoring is an example.
MV normality is specified by means and covariances (Lubke & Muthèn, 2004), the computation of which requires
continuous data. However, the inability of ordinal data to pass tests of MV normality justifies the use of MV
techniques designed specifically for ordinal data.
30
Polychoric correlation is a technique designed specifically for ordinal-level variables.
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and for Counterfactual Thinking, 3.70 (1.33). AMFS item descriptives, including item and factor
means and standard deviations, can be found in Table 7.
Item Generation
Potential items for the AMFS were written to reflect the general and specific properties of
the construct under investigation: simulation-based autobiographical memory functions of
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking. Because the construct is relatively
straightforward, and somewhat constrained in terms of the various characteristics that comprise
each function, it was thought that three to four good items per function would suffice. For
perspective taking, two items from the previously validated CRS-A (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in
preparation) were included, as well as two new items. Resources for the generation of the two
new Perspective TakingAMFS items were the Davis (1980, 1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(IRI), a self-report instrument that measures empathy on four dimensions, including perspective
taking, and the empathic accuracy paradigm by Ickes (2003). For the Prospection items,
literature on the phenomena of future thinking, as well as research on the Directive function of
autobiographical memory—which has been hypothesized to include the use of autobiographical
memory for future planning and prediction (e.g., Williams et al., 2008)—was consulted, as was
the TALE (Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Alea, 2011), which includes Directive items concerning
the use of autobiographical memory for such purposes as future planning and guiding decisions
about which path to take. As there was no scale-like Counterfactual Thinking self-report
available, the literature regarding the definitions, characteristics, and phenomena of
counterfactual thinking (e.g., Leithy, Brown, & Robbins, 2006; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; Roese
& Olson, 1993; Sanna, 1996) informed the Counterfactual Thinking items.
Exploratory Principal Axis Factoring (EPAF) Analyses
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In support of Goal 2.1, EFAs using the principal axis factoring (PAF) procedure were
conducted. All 10 potential items generated for the AMFS were found to fit the model,
suggesting that all 10 items were “good,” and that no additional items were needed.
Although the assumption in behavioral science research is that multidimensional
constructs are best represented by oblique structures, the data may bear evidence for
orthogonality (Hancock & Mueller, 2010). Therefore, although the conceptual structure of the
multidimensional AMFS suggests that factors be allowed to correlate (as all three functions are
simulation-based), it is recommended that the true nature of the structure be tested first before
choosing an oblique or orthogonal rotation method (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Thus two
EPAFs were run: The first to test the oblique nature of the AMFS, and the second to investigate
orthogonality.
EPAF1: Testing for an Oblique Structure
Per the procedure recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 646) 31, EPAF1 was
run to test the strength of the correlations between the three hypothesized factors using the
oblique rotation method geomin Q-Q (Yates, 1987). Geomin was designed for use with, and has
been shown to be especially suitable for, structures that are complex32 (Browne, 2001). Because
structural complexity is to be expected with behavioral science EFA data (Hancock & Mueller,
2010), cross-loadings were expected here as well.
Results of the factor correlations (see Table 8) showed that only one of three correlations
(between Perspective TakingAMFS and Counterfactual Thinking, r = .56, r2 = 31.02%), were ≥ .32
31

Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 646) contend that, from a statistical standpoint, the use of orthogonal versus
oblique rotation should depend on the degree to which factors are correlated. Correlations ≥ .32 indicate that at least
10% of the variance between factors is shared to recommends the use of oblique rotation. Factor correlations < .32
suggest that the solution is orthogonal. Per Tabachnick and Fidell’s recommendation, the PAF should be run using
oblique rotation and forcing the hypothesized number of conceptual factors in order to obtain the factor correlations.
32
In this context, “complex” refers to structures that feature a high degree of “cross-loadings”; i.e., loadings whose
sums across factors are > 1 (Browne, 2001).
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(i.e., overlapping variance > 10%) to suggest slightly more orthogonality than overlap. However,
other results of EPAF1 supported the hypothesized model.
A series of extraction diagnostics33 were run to verify the hypothesized three functions.
Results of the Fit to Comparison test and Kaiser rule indicated that the 10 items as a set belonged
to three factors. Results of the acceleration factor (AC), optimal coordinates (OC), parallel
analysis (PA), scree plot, and Velicer’s minimum average partial (MAP)34 were inconclusive, as
each recommended two to three factors (see Figure 10). However, several other results supported
the three-factor solution. The total variance explained by three factors was an acceptable 60.75%.
However, the variance accounted for with only two factors was 53.97%—thus the three-factor
model resulted in a nearly 7% improvement in variance explained. Because overextraction tends
to result in less error than does underextraction (Wood, Tataryn, & Gorsuch, 1996), EPAF1
proceeded on the assumption of three factors.
Model fitness was demonstrated via several goodness-of-fit indices. The root mean
square residual (RMSR) was, at .037, well below the more stringent cutoff of .05 to indicate a
low amount of squared error in the model35. The root mean partial correlation controlling factors
(RMSP)36 was, at .11, good, as smaller values indicate better fit (Basto & Pereira, 2012b). The
goodness of fit index (GFI)37 and the adjusted GFI (AGFI)38, both of which tend to be large

33

Details of the formulas that inform each of R-Factor’s extraction diagnostics can be found in Basteo and Pereira
(2012b).
34
For more information, see Velicer & Fava (1998).
35
The RMSR reflects the squared difference (squared error) between the original covariance matrix and the
covariance matrix generated from the factor loadings. By convention, an RMSR of < .08 is considered acceptable,
while a RMSR < .05 is considered excellent.
36
The RMSP is computed on the partial correlations between variables; i.e., after the effects of all factors have been
removed. The RMSP reflects how much of the variance each pair of variables share that is not explained by the
extracted factors (Basto & Pereira, 2012b).
37
The goodness of fit (GFI) index reflects the proportion of observed covariances explained by covariances implied
by the model. It deals with error in reproducing the variance-covariance matrix (Westland, 2015).
38
The AFGI is a GFI adjusted by degrees of freedom (Westland, 2015).
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within their bounds of 0 to 1, should meet or exceed a value of .95. Results of EPAF1 showed
that both were > .99 to indicate excellent fit. As the GFI and AGFI are also highly sensitive to
large samples (Kenny, 2015), Study 1’s modest N of 110 suggests that these high values reflect
excellent model fit rather than inflation due to sample size. Other indications of model fitness:
Communalities39 were all ≥ .40, with 63.64% > .50, which is acceptable for the social sciences
(Osborne & Costello, 2005). The Keyser Meyer Olkin (KMO)40, at .75 was slightly below the
ideal cutoff of .80 to indicate sampling adequacy (Cerny & Kaiser, 1977). However, the per-item
measures of sampling adequacy (MSA)41 were all > 0.60, well over the minimum cutoff of .40 to
indicate that factor analysis can proceed without dropping items (Basto & Pereira, 2012b). The
EPAF1 per-item communalities and MSA values are featured with other item descriptives in
Table 7.
Table 9 summarizes the geomin Q-Q pattern matrix loadings. Because Study 1’s sample
size was ≈ 100, loadings of .30 or higher were considered salient (Osborne & Costello, 2004)
and statistically significant (Kline, 2002, p. 52). Complexity was defined as loadings ≥ .40 on
two or more factors (Osborne & Costello, 2004). Results showed that all 10 items loaded
saliently and significantly on their hypothesized factors, with no salient cross-loads (≥ .40).
Figure 11 illustrates the obtained factor structure, which was then evaluated for reliability.
Because Study 1 data were both Likert-type and nonnormal, ordinal reliability alphas42
39

Communalities reflect the amount of variance in the item that is explained by its extracted factor(s).
The KMO measure (Cerny & Kaiser, 1977) reflects the degree to which items share factor variance, and is
therefore computed based on partial correlations. The more overlap that exists, the smaller the partial correlations,
thus the closer the KMO is to 1. By convention, adequacy is obtained when KMO ≥ .80; i.e., that the items are fit to
remain in the model. The KMO can also be an indication that the sample is underpowered.
41
The MSA values are the per-item KMO measures (Cerny & Kaiser, 1977). Values ≥ .40 indicate item adequacy.
42
The Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) measure of internal consistency (reliability) is inappropriate
for data that is continuous and/or skewed, both of which are features of Likert data (Jamieson, 2004; Sheng &
Sheng, 2012). Ordinal reliability alpha (Zumbo, Gadermann, & Zeisser, 2007) have been shown to provide better
estimates of theoretical reliability than coefficient alpha when data are Likert-type, as the latter yields negatively
biased reliability estimates under these conditions. Thus, although the lower bound of ordinal alpha is, like
40
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were run. Ordinal alpha for all three factors were > .70 (Perspective TakingAMFS = .85;
Prospection = .76; and Counterfactual Thinking = .84) to indicate that the items per factor
demonstrated sufficient internal consistency. The EPAF1 ordinal reliability α values can be
found on the diagonals of Table 8.
EPAF2: Testing for an Orthogonal Structure
That two of the three AMFS factor correlations when using oblique rotation had < 10%
overlap suggests that the AMFS structure may be orthogonal (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Thus
EPAF2 was conducted to investigate this possibility. Additionally, because orthogonal rotation
produces more cross-loads than do oblique methods (Hancock & Mueller, 2010), a second
objective to EPAF2 was to test the stability of the AMFS structure when factors were not
allowed to correlate.
Table 10 displays the results of EPAF2, which employed the popular orthogonal rotation
varimax43. As was found with the EPAF1 oblique model, no cross-loads were > .40, resulting in
all items loading saliently and significantly on their hypothesized factors. Loadings values were
similar to those in EPAF144. rotation. Likewise, the EPAF2 ordinal reliabilities were identical to
those of EPAF1: Perspective TakingAMFS = .85; Prospection = .76; and Counterfactual Thinking
= .84. The EPAF2 varimax rotated structure is illustrated in Figure 12.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)
In support of Goal 2.2, an SEM CFA was run to verify the EFA structure. The CFA was

coefficient alpha, .70, ordinal alpha values will likely be higher than Cronbach’s for the same data (Basto & Pereira,
2012b). The formula for ordinal reliabilities can be found in Appendix E.
43
Varimax rotation (Kaiser, 1958) was designed to simplify structure interpretation by finding a solution featuring
many small loadings and few large loadings, as items should ultimately have large loadings with a single factor
(Basto & Pereira, 2012b).
44
The largest difference between any EPAF1 and EPAF2 loading was a negligible .07 on the Counterfactual
Thinking item 8, “I spend time imagining specific past events with different details or outcomes than what actually
occurred.”
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conducted using robust ULS estimation (RULS) in LISREL v9.2 (Jöreskog, & Sörbom, 2015).
CFA factors were allowed to correlate in keeping with the oblique rotation validated in EPAF1.
Scale was set at 1.0 in the psi matrix per convention (Raykov & Marcoulides, 2006). Data were
treated as ordinal. To accommodate the nonnormality present in the data, the C3 (SatorraBentler) model chi-square was used. Because LISREL computes fit indices on the Maximum
Likelihood Ratio (C1) chi-square (Hu & Bentler, 1999), the absolute and relative fit indices of
interest to Study 1—the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), Tucker-Lewis nonnormed fit index (NNFI), and the comparative fit index (CFI)—were computed by hand using
the formulas detailed in Appendix E.
Data screening confirmed aspects of the distribution found in EPAF1. The data displayed
nonsignificant negative univariate skew (ZSkew = –0.57, p = .572) and significant platykurtosis
(ZKurtosis = –5.15, p < .001). The test of MV normality showed that both skew (ZSkew = 6.25, p <
.001) and kurtosis (ZKurtosis = 143.47, p < .001) were significant, as was the skewness and kurtosis
chi-square (χ2 = 70.25, p < .001) to further recommend use the C3 model (Forero et al., 2009).
The condition number (CN) 45 of 5.41 was well below cutoff of 15 to indicate no
multicollinearity. Of the 110 total response sets, 109 (99.1%) represented unique patterns.
Mardia’s Index of Relative Multivariate Kurtosis was, at 1.20, below the Z-cutoff of 1.96 (for α
= .05, two-tailed distribution) (Mardia, 1970).
Per the C3 (Satorra-Bentler) test statistic, χ2(32) = 47.40, p = .039. That the C3 was
significant at the .05 level is less likely due to poor model fit than the sample being slightly

45

The condition number (CN) was originally used as evidence of multicollinearity (i.e., when two or more variables
are highly correlated) if ≥ 30. However, a more conservative index recommends that the CN be below 15. The CN is
equal to the square root of the maximum eigenvalue divided by the minimum eigenvalue. (Belsley, 1991)
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overpowered, as Hoelter’s Critical N 46 indicated that samples greater than 70.82 could be
inappropriate for the chi-square test (Hu & Bentler, 1995). The RMSEA = .066 indicated
acceptable fit; however, both the NNFI (.96) and the CFI (.97) indicated excellent fit. The
Standarized Root Mean Residual (SRMR) was at the upper cutoff of .05, which also indicated
excellent fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Table 11 summarizes the squared multiple correlations, factor means, and standard
deviations for the three-function, 10-item CFA. Squared multiple correlations were stable, with
the lowest R2 = .46 and the highest R2 = .75. Factor correlations were significant and acceptable,
ranging from .35 to .67 (see Table 12). All factor loadings, disturbances (psi matrix), and factor
variances (theta-epsilon matrix) were significant and positive (see Table 13). The path diagram is
displayed in Figure 13.
Results also showed the residuals to be reasonably normally distributed. The median
value for both the fitted and standardized residuals were 0, which is optimal, with residuals
clustered fairly symmetrically about the median (Jöreskog, 1993). The normal probability (Q-Q)
plot showed that residuals kept close to the diagonal line, with the exception being some slight
departure on either end. Such patterns are typical when data are significantly kurtotic (Raykov &
Marcoulides, 2006), as was the case with the Study 1 data.
Structural equation modeling (SEM) reliability calculations for each of the six factors all
exceeded the .70 cutoff to demonstrate high internal validity (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994;
Werts, Rock, Linn, & Jöreskog, 1978): Perspective-Taking = .91; Prospection = .86; and
Counterfactual Thinking = .94. The reliabilities per factor can also be found in Table 12. The
formula for computing SEM reliabilities can be found in Appendix E.
46

The Critical N (Hoelter, 1983) value reflects the sample size needed to yield a model appropriate for an adequate
chi-square test. Samples > than the Critical N may yield significant chi-square results (Hu & Bentler, 1995).
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Construct Validity Using the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ)
In support of Goal 2.3, bivariate correlations yielding Pearson’s coefficients were run on
the factors of the AMFS and factors of the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) to test for convergent and
discriminant validity. As expected, results showed that the ERQ dimension of Expressive
Suppression was negligibly and not significantly associated with any of the three AMFS factors
to support the AMFS’s discriminant validity (Perspective TakingAMFS, r = .13; Prospection, r =
.08; Counterfactual Thinking, r = –.01). Also as expected, Cognitive Reappraisal was
significantly (p < .001) correlated to Perspective TakingAMFS (r = .38), Prospection (r = .35), and
Counterfactual Thinking (r = .49), to show moderate support for the AMFS’s convergent
validity. That is, although the coefficients were lower than the recommended .50 cutoff to
indicate convergence (Carlson & Herdman, 2012), moderate coefficients were expected given
that Cognitive Reappraisal, which measures a simulation-based behavior, is not a direct
conceptual correlate for the use of autobiographical memory for simulation-based behaviors.
Thus, the overlap shared between AMFS functions and Cognitive Reappraisal should reflect only
their common characteristic of simulation. As such, smaller coefficients were expected, and
therefore convergent validity was considered attained; however, these effects will be re-verified
in Study 2. The bivariate correlations between the AMFS and EQR factors can be found in Table
14.
Provisional Analyses
In addition to the analyses conducted to test the validity and reliability of the AMFS, two
sets of additional analyses were conducted to get a better understanding of the AMFS functions,
and to inform potential hypotheses to be tested in Study 2. These analyses were considered
provisional because the same data used to validate the AMFS was also used for these analyses.
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Thus, caution was taken in the interpretation of the results and utility of the conclusions drawn,
as data used to validate a scale that is then used to assess properties of the construct at the
individual level is likely to produce biased results (Boslaugh, 2007). Findings from provisional
analyses will be verified in Study 2.
The Functional Relation Between the AMFS Functions and Cognitive Reappraisal.
A provisional analysis was run to test Chapter 1’s Hypothesis 1.7, which stated that the
autobiographical memory function of Perspective TakingAMFS, which is an other-directed
behavior (Shanton & Goldman, 2010), is underlain by interpersonal simulation, whereas
Prospection and Counterfactual Thinking, which are self-directed behaviors (Shanton &
Goldman, 2010), are underlain by intrapersonal simulation. Thus a provisional multiple
regression analysis was conducted to garner the functional relations between the simulationbased ERQ dimension of Cognitive Reappraisal (Gross & John, 2003), and the three AMFS
functions. The idea was that, if Perspective TakingAMFS and one of the two mental time travel
functions significantly explained variance in Cognitive Reappraisal, such would be evidence for
the two forms of mental simulation proposed. If only one of the three AMFS functions
significantly accounted for variance in Cognitive Reappraisal, such would be evidence the
AMFS functions are underlain by a single form of simulation. If all three AMFS functions
significantly accounted for variance in Cognitive Reappraisal, then attempts to understand why
would be undertaken in Study 2.
Results showed that the multiple regression model was significant, R = .55, F(3, 106) =
15.62, p < .001, with the three AMFS functions significantly accounting for 30.6% of the
variance in Cognitive The coefficients analyses showed that, when holding the other predictors
constant, Perspective TakingAMFS significantly accounted for 3.4% of the unique variance in
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Cognitive Reappraisal (b = 1.14, t(106) = 2.28, p = .025), and that Counterfactual Thinking
significantly accounted for 12.9% of the unique variance in Cognitive Reappraisal (b = 1.66,
t(106) = 4.44, p < .001). Prospection was not a significant predictor of Cognitive Reappraisal (b
= .46, t(106) = .88, p = .380, sr2 = .05%), and was therefore expelled from the model. Table 15
summarizes the results of multiple regression analysis. These functional relations will be reverified in Study 2.
Exploring Associations Between AMFS Factors and HEXACO Factors. Simple
linear regression analyses were run to explore whether the frequency with which individuals
engage in simulation-based autobiographical memory behaviors was predicted by personality as
measured with the 60-item, six-dimension HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2005, 2009). Results
showed that Perspective TakingAMFS was significantly predicted by Emotional Stability (the
inverse of Emotionality/Neuroticism), (R = .28, b = .30, t(100) = 2.93, p = .004), Extraversion (R
= .22, b = .22, t(100) = 2.21, p = .030), Conscientiousness (R = .26, b = .37, t(100) = 2.70, p =
.008), and Openness (R = .36, b = .33, t(100) = 3.91, p < .001). That is, the more emotionally
stable, conscientious, and open one is to new experiences, the more frequent the use of
autobiographical memory for Perspective TakingAMFS. With respect to Prospection, results
indicated that Emotionality/Neuroticism (R = .22, b = .18, t(100) = 2.21, p = .029), Openness (R
= .44, b = .40, t(100) = 4.84, p < .001), and Conscientiousness (R = .36, b = .37, t(100) = 3.45, p
= .001) were significant predictors. The significant predictors of Counterfactual Thinking were
Emotionality/Neuroticism (R = .37, b = .54, t(100) = 4.00, p < .001), and Introversion (the
inverse of Extraversion) (R = .21, b = –.30, t(100) = –2.17, p = .032). Counterfactual thinking
was also predicted by the inverse of Honesty-Humility R = .34, b = –.53, t(100) = –3.66, p <
.001, which indicates that people who use autobiographical memory with greater frequency for

83
the purpose of counterfactual thinking tend be deceptive, manipulative, and feel a strong sense of
entitlement. Table 16 summarizes the bivariate correlations between the AMFS and HEXACO
factors.
2.5 Discussion
The primary objective of Study 1 was to validate the Autobiographical Memory
Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale, a 10-item self-report instrument intended to measure
individuals’ use of autobiographical memory content when engaging in interpersonal and
intrapersonal simulation-based behaviors. Goals 2.1 and 2.2, which were to validate the threefactor structure of the AMFS, were supported by the results of two EPAFs and an SEM CFA. As
such, the items of the AMFS were found to reliably measure the proposed autobiographical
memory functions of Perspective TakingAMFS, Prospection, and Counterfactual Thinking.
Evidence for Goal 2.3, that the AMFS functions would demonstrate construct validity
when compared to a related simulation-based measure, was obtained via positive, significant
correlations between all three AMFS factors and the Cognitive Reappraisal dimension of the
ERQ (Gross & John, 2003). The ERQ’s second dimension, Expressive Suppression, which
measures outward, observable coping strategies, was found to be nonsignificantly correlated to
the three AMFS factors, thus showing discriminant validity. Cognitive Reappraisal has also
recently been linked with the reflective autobiographical memory function, which encompasses
“intellectual attentiveness, epistemic curiosity about the self, and self-focused attention
motivated by interest in ones’ self and behavior” (Harris, Rasmussen, & Berntsen, 2014, p. 8;
Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). These traits align with the idea of autonoetic consciousness—i.e.,
one’s sense of self in the past, present, and future (e.g., Baddeley, Eysenck, & Anderson, 2009;
Tulving, 1984, 1985, 2005; Wheeler et al., 1997). Autonoetic consciousness is thought to be a
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capacity essential to both mental time travel (Tulving, 1985, 2005) and the ability to use personal
experience (i.e., autobiographical memory content) for mental simulation (Spreng et al., 2009).
These considerations therefore suggest that Cognitive Reappraisal is a cogent correlate with
which to assess the role of simulation in the autobiographical memory functions of Perspective
TakingAMFS, Prospection, and Counterfactual Thinking.
A second objective of Goal 2.3 was to provisionally test the functional relation between
the three AMFS functions and Cognitive Reappraisal in support of Chapter 1’s Hypothesis 1.7.
Results showed that two of the three functions—Perspective TakingAMFS and Counterfactual
Thinking—significantly accounted for variance in Cognitive Reappraisal. This suggests that, as
proposed by Shanton and Goldman (2010), there are two forms of simulation that underlie
perspective taking and mental time travel: interpersonal and interpersonal, respectively.
However, given that Study 1 results were attained using data on which the AMFS was also
validated, these findings will be re-verified in Study 2.
Goal 2.4 was to provisionally explore associations between the three AMFS functions
and personality traits as measured using the HEXACO 60 (Ashton & Lee, 2005). Study 1 results
showed that individuals who estimate the frequency with which they use autobiographical
memory for Perspective TakingAMFS also rate themselves low in Emotionality/Neuroticism
(calm, emotionally autonomous and stable), Conscientiousness (responsible, dependable,
methodical), Extraversion (vivacious, loquacious, and assertive), and Openness (independent,
curious, adventurous). Examples that support the link between high trait neuroticism and
behavioral perspective taking come from research on sensitivity to social cues, which shows
links between neuroticism and the diligent attendance during social interactions for clues about
the other’s mental states (e.g., Denissen & Penke, 2008). Additionally, the literature on
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attachment style—which concerns how one forms, and behaves in, close relationships (Ickes,
2003), indicate that attachment style can be predicted by trait personality (Shaver & Brennan,
1992). Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1958) states that individuals fall within one of three
attachment categories: secure (reliable, communicative, proactive), anxious (insecure,
hypervigilant, clingy), or avoidant (distant, independent, emotionally detached (Ickes, 2003).
Studies show that anxious attachment and neuroticism predict the use of perspective taking in
response to social threats (e.g., Crawford, Shaver, & Goldsmith, 2007. Research suggests that,
because anxiously attached individuals fear others’ negative impressions, they hypervigilantly
watch for evidence of the other’s disapproval during social interactions (Vrtička, Andersson,
Grandjean, Sander, Vuilleumier, Zak, 2008). Thus individuals attempting to cope with fear of
social rejection, disapproval, and non-inclusion may rely more heavily on the use of
autobiographical memory to aid their assessments of social others.
Research in empathy may inform Study 1 findings that Conscientiousness predicted
Perspective TakingAMFS. Per the Davis (1980, 1983) empathy model, on which the IRI self-report
scale measuring the four dimensions of perspective taking, fantasy, empathic concern, and
personal distress is based, perspective taking is characterized as a form of “cognitive,” rather
than “emotional” empathy. Research shows that people who are both sensitive to other’s states of
mind and high in conscientiousness tend to strive to “get things right,” and are thus highly
motivated to accurately understand another’s point of view (Howe, 2012). Study 1 results
therefore suggest that people high in conscientiousness draw more upon personal past experience
in their attempt to achieve empathic accuracy.
The link between Extraversion and the use of autobiographical memory for perspective
taking may reflect the increased opportunities to infer other minds, due to the extended social
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network characteristically possessed by extraverts (Kessler, Creem-Regehr, Hamilton, 2015).
Further, both Extraversion and Openness have been found to predict social self-efficacy
(Cavanaugh, 2013), which has also been linked with social perspective taking (e.g., Gehlbach,
Brown, Ioannou, Boyer, Hudson, Ni-Solomon, et al., 2008). Thus people who are open and
willing to explore the thoughts and feelings of social others may depend more heavily on
information from their personal pasts to facilitate affinity and understanding.
Emotionality/Neuroticism, Openness, and Conscientiousness were also found to
significantly predict the use of autobiographical memory for prospection. Related research shows
that Neuroticism predicts an increase in negatively biased future imaginings (e.g., MacLeod &
Byrne, 1996; MacLeod, Tata, Tyrer, Schmidt, Davidson, & Thompson, 2005), suggesting that,
with respect to autobiographical memory functions, the higher the individual is on trait
neuroticism, the more frequently he or she uses autobiographical memory for downward biased
prospection.

However,

related

research

also

indicates

that

the

inverse

of

Emotionality/Neuroticism, Emotional Stability, has no apparent influence on the number of
positive future imagining (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod et al., 2005). Curiously, an
informal review of the responses given for the prospection mental time travel condition did not
reveal this negativity bias. But because the same data used to validate the AMFS was then used
to for the provisional personality analyses, some results may be distorted. Study 2 will therefore
attempt to verify these findings.
Related studies have also reported a link between behavioral prospection and Openness to
Experience (e.g., Allen et al., 2014; Furey & Fortunato, 2014). This association has been
attributed to the creativity and adventurousness that are characteristic of those high in Openness,
thus encouraging musings and predictions about future possibilities (Allen, Greenlees, & Jones,
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2014). Results of Study 1 may suggest that creative tendencies may facilitate the “preexperience” of imagined future scenarios constructed from autobiographical memory. Also,
although related research shows that Extraversion predicts behavioral prospection (Allen et al.,
2014; Furey & Fortunato, 2014), Study 1 results did not support this relation47. This may be
because, although Extraversion predicts the behavior of prospection, it may not predict the use of
autobiographical memory for the behavior of prospection. Likewise, the provisional nature of the
personality data, or the small sample size, may have produced misleading results. As such, the
relation between Extraversion and the function of Prospection will be retested in Study 2.
Study 1 also found that Emotionality/Neuroticism, Introversion, and the inverse of
Honesty-Humility

(vengefulness,

insincerity,

Machiavellianism)

significantly

predicted

Counterfactual Thinking. Related research reports that individuals high in neuroticism tend to
produce downwardly biased counterfactuals more often than do individuals low in neuroticism
(Allen et al., 2014). As was the case with the Study 1 finding that Emotionality/Neuroticism
predicted the use of autobiographical memory content for Prospection, this finding suggests that
the counterfactuals reported for the mental time travel condition should have been negatively
biased. While a review of the Counterfactual Thinking mental time travel task did reveal a
tendency to recall negatively toned actual events, most of the corresponding, “reframed”
counterfactuals were comparatively upwardly biased.
That the use of autobiographical memory content for counterfactual thinking was
inversely predicted by Extraversion may be due to findings indicating that introversion is related
to emotional intensity—the tendency to experience extreme, complex, shifting emotion, and high
sensitivity to others’ emotions (e.g., Aron, 1996). However, given that counterfactual thinking is

47

R2 = .4%; p = .550.
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known to be is often used a strategy for coping with emotionally charged memories (e.g., Allen
et al., 2014; Lindeman & Abraham, 2008; Ruiselová, Kresánek, & Prokopcáková, 2009;
Ruiselová & Prokopcáková, 2010), engaging in counterfactuals may be a employed more
frequently be people low in trait extraversion. As such, results suggest that individuals high in
Introversion are activating and retrieving autobiographical memory content with greater
frequency than extraverted individuals for both the “re-experience” of the actual, emotionally
charged events, as well as their imaginative “re-framing.” And finally, although related research
(e.g., Allen et al., 2014) shows that Openness 48 and Agreeableness 49 are predictive of
Counterfactual Thinking, Study 1 did not find these effects.
Finally, Goal 2.5 was to informally review responses to the mental time travel conditions
and accompanying self-descriptors to discern whether respondents understood how
autobiographical memory content informs counterfactual thinking and future thinking. Although
not formally analyzed, results suggested that respondents grasped the idea that autobiographical
memory content informs mental time travel, as responses were consistent with the given
instructions, and the properties of personal past episodes that were described were sensible and
aligned with the corresponding self-descriptors. For example, as shown in Table 6, when the
actual past event was that the respondent’s “cat knocked over the plant and dirt was everywhere.
I got mad and yelled at her,” the corresponding self-descriptors were, “irate,” “helpless,” “hurt,”
impatient,” “ashamed.” Such descriptors are intuitively consistent with the described event. The
counterfactual was then, “instead of getting mad I just cleaned up and realized the cat wasn’t
doing it to make me mad.” This description indicates that the respondent understood the
instruction to describe both an actual past event, as well as a counterfactual “reframing” of that
48
49

R2 = .8%; p = .383.
R2 = .8%; p = .360.
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actual past event. The corresponding self-descriptors also changed accordingly, to “calm,
“strong,” “rational,” “empathetic,” and “articulate.” That respondents understood the use of
autobiographical memory for the three mental time travel conditions also implies that
respondents are reasonably able to estimate the frequencies with which they use autobiographical
memory content for such purposes.
2.6 Conclusion
The AMFS was developed as an instrument for the overarching objective of Chapter 1—
that autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than long-term memory content
specifically, informs perspective taking and mental time travel, which has been operationalized
in the current paper as prospection and counterfactual thinking. Study 2 will use the AMFS to
support Chapter 1’s Hypothesis 1.2 (autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than
long-term memory content generally, can inform perspective taking), Hypothesis 1.5
(autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than long-term memory content generally,
can inform mental time travel), Hypothesis 1.6 (the use of autobiographical memory content for
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking is evidence that all three are
functions of autobiographical memory), and Hypothesis 1.7 (the autobiographical memory
function of perspective taking reflects interpersonal simulation, and the autobiographical
memory functions of prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect intrapersonal simulation).
Together, such findings would empirically elucidate the role of autobiographical memory in
interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation.
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CHAPTER 3 STUDY 2: EMPIRICALLY VALIDATING THE LONG-TERM MEMORY
COMPONENT OF THE EXPANDED SIMULATION MODEL
3.1 Introduction
Per simulation theory by Goldman (2006) and later Shanton and Goldman (2010),
perspective taking and mental time travel are informed by “background information” activated
and retrieved from long-term memory storage. The current paper has argued that a specific form
of long-term memory content that could be used for these purposes is autobiographical memory
content. To theoretically support, Chapter 1 proposed the Expanded Simulation Model, which
aimed to explain how autobiographical memory could be used for perspective taking and mental
time travel. Chapter 2 (Study 1) and Chapter 3 (Study 2) concern the empirical testing some of
Chapter 1’s claims.
The primary objective of Study 2 was to test four of Chapter 1’s hypotheses: 1)
Hypothesis 1.2, that autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than long-term
memory content generally, can be used for perspective taking; 2) Hypothesis 1.5, that
autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than long-term memory content generally,
can be used for mental time travel; 3) Hypothesis 1.6, that because autobiographical memory
content is used for perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, they are
therefore functions of autobiographical memory; and 4) Hypothesis 1.7, that the autobiographical
memory

function

of

perspective

taking

reflects

interpersonal

simulation,

and

the

autobiographical memory functions of prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect
intrapersonal simulation.
Justification and Background: Empirically Validating the Existence of, and Functional
Relations Between, Autobiographical Memory Functions
In order to validate the existence of the autobiographical memory functions of
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perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, Study 1 (Chapter 2) detailed the
validation of the Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale, a self-report
instrument designed to measure the use of autobiographical memory content for these purposes.
The format of the AMFS was modeled on the Autobiographical Memory Functions of Joint
Reminiscence (AMFJR) scale 50 , another self-report scale that measures rated frequency of
functional use of autobiographical memory for an expanded set of reminiscence behaviors for
adults (see Figure 9). The AMFJR was adapted from the Child-Caregiver Reminiscence Scale
(CRS) (Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009), which concerns the use of autobiographical memory for a
collection of reminiscence behaviors thought to be essential to the socialization and development
of the autobiographical memory system (Nelson & Fivush, 2004). Like the CRS, the AMFJR is
situated in the social context of joint-reminiscence, a setting within which autobiographical
memory develops (Nelson & Fivush, 2004). The purpose of adapting the CRS for adults was to
establish the extent to which functions that emerge in early childhood as a result of socialization
are used in later life. Results of the AMFJR validation suggested that, although a core set of
functions are used throughout life, some early-life functions either later coalesce or diverge into
new functions, presumably in response to acquired cognitive abilities, language, understanding
of time and self, and social interaction (Nelson & Fivush, 2004). This finding implies that
perceived distinctions between autobiographical memory functions could be more relative than
absolute.
Thus, of interest to Study 2 was whether or not the functions of the AMFS and AMFJR
would remain independent when examined collectively. However, it was assumed that the

50

The Child-Caregiver Reminiscence Scale for Adults (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), or “CRS-A,” has been
renamed the Autobiographical Memory Functions of Joint Reminiscence (AMFJR) scale, to make clear the
similarities and differences between it and the Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale.
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common construct of “perspective taking” measured by both the Perspective TakingAMFS and
Perspective TakingAMFJR subscales would be evident in respondents’ equivalent estimations of
their use of autobiographical memory content for this purpose. This assumption was made
despite structural differences between the Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR
subscales (the AMFS features two items in addition to the two that comprise the AMFJR), and
contextual differences between the AMFS and AMFJR scales (the AMFS is “simulation-based”
whereas the AMFJR is “socially situated”). It was expected that the constructual similarities of
the Perspective TakingAMFS and the Perspective TakingAMFJR functions would supersede the
structural differences to compel equivalent estimations of autobiographical memory content use
for the subscales concerning “perspective taking” behavior.
Also of interest to Study 2 was whether the functions of the AMFS would be empirically
linked to the broad functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), as was the case for all six
functions of the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation) and the six corresponding
functions of the CRS (Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009). Although Ranson and Fitzgerald found that the
Perspective TakingAMFJR function mapped onto the TALE’s broad Social function, it was
assumed that the Perspective TakingAMFS function would do likewise. But given the novelty of
the Prospection and Counterfactual Thinking functions, no direct evidence was available to
recommend associations with the TALE. However, because theory indicates that an objective of
the Directive function is the directing of present and future thoughts and actions (Williams et al.,
2008), it was reasonable to expect that the Prospection function would be broadly Directive.
Because counterfactual thinking can be used as an emotion regulation strategy (e.g., Allen et al.,
2014; Lindeman & Abraham, 2008; Ruiselová et al., 2009; Ruiselová & Prokopcáková, 2010),
and because Ranson and Fitzgerald found that the AMFJR function of Emotion Regulation
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mapped as Directive, it was also possible that Counterfactual Thinking would be broadly
Directive. Alternatively, Shanton and Goldman (2010) characterized simulated mental time
travel as a self-directed behavior, implying that Prospection and Counterfactual Thinking could
be broadly Self. Thus Study 2 explored whether the functions of Prospection and Counterfactual
thinking are primarily Directive, Self, a combination of both, or, altogether independent of the
broad functions of the TALE.
Justification and Background: Individual Differences in Autobiographical Memory Use
In addition to validating the existence of, and associations between, the autobiographical
memory functions measured by the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE, it was also important to the
current paper to discern who uses which autobiographical memory functions and why. Thus
Study 2 examined individual differences in the rated frequency of functions use of
autobiographical memory as measured by the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE. Specifically Study 2
tested for effects of personality, age, gender, and culture.
Although little direct evidence was available to inform expected results, the following
summarizes related research on how person characteristics influence autobiographical memory
and rated frequency of its functional use, as well as behavioral perspective taking, prospection,
and counterfactual thinking.
Personality Effects. Research shows that personality traits measured by Five Factor
(Emotionality/Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to
Experience) inventories can predict the experience and use of autobiographical memory
(Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010). Because personality traits inform conceptual self-knowledge,
they are considered constituents of semantic autobiographical memory (Abram et al., 2014;
Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Yet, self-identity is also said to arise from the
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life story or narrative, which consists of autobiographical memory content accumulated over
one’s lifetime, as well as previously imagined and stored future scenarios and the person one
predicts he or she might be in such situations (e.g., McAdams, 2001). As such, links have been
found between the content of one’s life-narrative and personality traits (McAdams, Anyidoho,
Brown, Huang, Kaplan, & Machado, 2004; Woike, Gersekovich, Piorkowski, & Polo, 1999).
Although the literature on autobiographical memory functions has grown in recent years,
only a small portion of functions studies have examined personality effects, and of those, results
have been inconsistent (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010). Although Bluck and Alea (2009, 2011)
found that Extraversion predicted the broad Social function (i.e., the more extraverted an
individual, the more that that individual is likely to use autobiographical memory for the purpose
of fostering and maintaining social relationships), Neuroticism—the only other trait evaluated in
that study—was unrelated to any of the TALE functions. This was unexpected given previous
findings that Neuroticism predicts both Self (Cappeliez & O’Rourke, 2002; Rasmussen &
Berntsen, 2010) and Directive (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010) functions. In an extensive study of
personality and autobiographical memory, Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010) not only replicated
the relation between Extraversion and the broad Social function reported by Bluck and Alea, but
also found that Openness to Experience predicted the Social, Self, and Directive functions.
However, Rasmussen and Berntsen found no significant associations between the three TALE
functions and the personality traits of Agreeableness or Conscientiousness. And although Ranson
and Fitzgerald did not assess personality effects in their validation of the AMFJR, it was
reasonable to expect that those personality traits shown by previous research to predict the broad
Social, Self, and Directive functions would be “inherited” by the broad functions’ corresponding
AMFJR functions.
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Thus, in an attempt to replicate previous findings and fill gaps in the literature, Study 2
tested for trait-level personality effects on the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE. Additionally, facetlevel effects were sought for the functions of the AMFS. Study 2 also aimed to yield evidence of
the HEXACO-100’s fitness and utility within the context of autobiographical memory functions
research, especially given that Study 1 of the current paper is the only known autobiographical
memory functions study to date that has incorporated it. Finally, because the AMFJR has not
previously been assessed for personality effects, Study 2 also sought to document the
relationship between personality factors and the rated frequency of its six “socially situated”
functions
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Conversation,

Perspective

TakingAMFJR,

Relationship

Maintenance,

Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control, Emotion Regulation, and Self.
Age Effects. Research shows that autobiographical memories change over the life span in
response to their integration with old and new memories and re-experience for various purposes
over time (Bluck & Habermas, 2001). As such, the differential use of autobiographical memory
as a function of age has informed such instruments as the Child-Caregiver Reminiscence Scale
(CRS) (Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009)—which concerns those functions essential to the socialization
and development of the autobiographical memory system—and the Reminiscence Functions
Scale (RFS) (Webster, 1995, 1997), which is especially focused on functions used later in life.
Thus, although research examines rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical
memory within isolated life stages, other studies have investigated the impact of age in general.
For example, Bluck and Alea (2009) found that older adults tend to use autobiographical
memory for the TALE’s broad family of Self functions less frequently than do younger adults.
This result was attributed to the hypothesis that older adults have, over time, acquired a clear
self-concept that can be sustained with little need to consult stored autobiographical information.
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In contrast, younger individuals discuss or contemplate autobiographical memories more often
than do older adults in order to facilitate the development of their still-forming self-concepts.
Bluck and Alea also found that age predicted the broad Directive function, claiming that young
adults may rely more heavily on autobiographical memory to direct future actions (i.e., engage in
prospection) because their sense of time ahead is greater than that of older adults. That Bluck and
Alea found no age effects for the broad Social function is surprising; both the CRS and RFS—
which were designed in response to known age effects in rated frequency of functional use of
autobiographical memory—feature items specifically intended to assess autobiographical
memory use for social purposes. Note that none of the studies of age effects have employed the
gold standard of longitudinal design, and none have possessed sufficient power to assess small
effects.
Related research also suggests possible age effects for the AMFS and AMFJR. With
respect to the AMFS, age is known to influences the behaviors of perspective taking,
prospection, and counterfactual thinking. For example, skillfulness in perspective taking
progresses in stages that aligns with the course of normal cognitive development—a trajectory
that begins with the emergence of theory of mind capacity at three to four years of age (Selman,
2003). By the age of 15, normally developed adolescents have acquired proficiency in thirdperson perspective taking, with “societal perspective-taking”—the ability to grasp, forecast, and
coordinate various perspectives—developing into adulthood from about the age of 14 (Selman,
2003). However, evidence that perspective taking abilities decline as a function of age has been
inconsistent. Some research indicates age-related deficiencies in perspective taking may be due
to age-related cognitive deficiencies (e.g., Helson, Jones, & Kwan, 2002; Maylor, Moulson,
Munson, & Taylor, 2002; Ruffman, Henry, Livingston, & Phillips, 2008). However, other
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studies show no decline in perspective taking abilities, surmising that the uptick in the number of
satisfying social relationships that individuals tend to acquire later life help to keep socialcognition skills sharp (Kilpatrick, Bissonnette, & Rusbelt, 2002). Likewise, meaningful social
interaction may motivate individuals to not only engage in, but become proficient in, perspective
taking (Zhang, Feng, Stanley, & Isaacowitz, 2013).
A study by Abram et al. (2008) reports that, during the early years of cognitive
development—when the autobiographical memory system is just beginning to emerge—children
have difficulty with both past and future episodic remembering—challenges that are typically
overcome by early adulthood. Other studies have found that older adults tend to generate more
semantic autobiographical memory details than episodic autobiographical memory details when
asked to imagine future events (Addis et al., 2009; Cole, Morrison, & Conway, 2013, Schacter,
Gaesser, & Addis, 2013). This finding somewhat contradicts the assumption that the primary
form of autobiographical memory content used during the “re-experiencing” of past events and
the “pre-experiencing” of future scenarios is episodic (e.g., Tulving, 2002b; Shanton &
Goldman, 2010).
Like perspective taking and prospection, individuals develop the ability to engage in
counterfactual thinking concurrent with the acquisition of theory of mind (Beck et al., 2011;
Bosaki, 2008; Epstude & Roese, 2008; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). However, children for whom
this capacity is just beginning to emerge have more difficulty with counterfactual tasks than they
do with imagining possible future realities (Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998). This
may be because children of this age are inexperienced in processing and expressing those
complex emotions associated with counterfactual thinking: relief (Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004),
disappointment (e.g., Coricelli & Rustichini, 2010), envy (Coricelli & Rustichini, 2010), and
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especially, regret (e.g., Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Roese, Pennington, Coleman, Janicki, Li,
and Kenrick, 2008; Roese, & Summerville, 2005; Tykocinski & Pittman, 1995). Research on
adulthood finds that, once the ability to generate counterfactuals has been instantiated, the
emotional valence of counterfactuals changes as a function of age. Specifically, older adults tend
to engage in more positive counterfactuals than do young people (Mather & Carstensen, 2005).
Gender Effects. Although gender effects with respect to various properties of
autobiographical memory have been widely reported (e.g., Grysman & Fivush, 2016; Grysman
& Hudson, 2012; St. Jacques, Conway, & Cabeza, 2011), other studies have been unable to
detect such effects (Rubin, Schulkind, & Rahhal, 1999). Such is the case with the broad
functions of the TALE, for which no gender effects have been found to date (Bluck & Alea,
2009). Thus, it could be assumed that gender would play no role in rated frequency of functional
use of autobiographical memory as measured by the AMFJR, the functions of which were found
by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation) to map onto the TALE. However, although the
AMFJR was shown to be structurally invariant across gender (i.e., the scale performed
equivalently for both men and women), mean gender differences were not tested.
Despite the lack of gender differences with respect to the TALE, gender effects in rated
frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content are nonetheless plausible given
related research. For example, studies show that men and women differ in the recollection of
early personal emotional events (Davis, 1999), the socialization of autobiographical memory
(Nelson & Fivush, 2002, 2004), the degree of detail recalled (Pillemer, Wink, Di Donato, &
Sanborn, 2003; Ross & Holmberg 1992; Seidlitz & Diener 1998), and the frequency of reflecting
on the past (Webster, 1995).
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Culture Effects. There is much evidence indicating that the development of the
autobiographical memory system, as well as the nature of autobiographical memory content, are
differentially socialized according to culture (Nelson & Fivush, 2002, 2004). Likewise, previous
research shows that culture can impact rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical
memory (Ranson, 2014), as well as the behaviors of perspective taking (e.g., Rasmussen &
Sieck, 2012), imagining future scenarios (e.g., Moore, 2006), and counterfactual thinking (e.g.,
Gilbert, 2012). Thus it was important for Study 2 to glean whether the cultural variation found in
such contexts are reflected in the use of autobiographical memory for the functions measured by
the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE.
Few autobiographical memory functions studies have had the opportunity to investigate
cultural variations, as obtaining ethnically diverse samples large enough for statistical evaluation
is challenging. However, Ranson (2014) tested the functions of the AMFJR for possible cultural
effects between the Caucasian and African-American/Black ethnic groups. Results showed that
that people who identify as Caucasian use of autobiographical memory with greater frequency
for the purpose of Conversation (thinking or talking about the past to promote social interaction;
i.e., engage in “small talk” about the past) than do people who identify as AfricanAmerican/Black. Related research shows that “small-talk” can be perceived as an informal, lighthearted means of increasing social intimacy, or contrarily, as superficial and manipulative
(Goldsmith & Baxter, 1996). Thus, the Ranson findings may suggest that “small-talk past-talk”
is a more widely accepted practice in Caucasian ethnic groups, whereas it is thought by AfricanAmerican/Black cultures to be undesirable and something to be avoided (Goldsmith & Baxter,
1996).
Ranson (2014) also found that African-American/Blacks used autobiographical memory
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content more often than Caucasians for Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (thinking
or talking about the past in an attempt to resolve everyday difficulties). Related research shows
that talking about the challenges one is facing and engaging in problem-solving with others may
facilitate decision-making, provide needed instruction, and prompt others to offer advice
(Goldsmith & Baxter, 2006), which would promote the Ranson finding. Such interactions may
occur more frequently when individuals’ real-life circumstances—whether real or perceived—
require resolution or repair. For example, research shows that, compared to Caucasians, the life
experiences of African-American/Blacks reflect more chronic negativity and hardship, that
aligns with other factors known to be associated with this ethnic group, such as poverty/low
socioeconomic status, feelings of oppression, actual and perceived discrimination, and loss of
control (Coleman, 2012). If considered with the other Ranson finding, African-American/Blacks
may engage in less Conversation “past-talk” than Caucasians because they tend to reminisce
with others instead about more serious matters.
Related research may also inform possible culture effects for the functions measured by
the AMFS. For example, there is evidence that the behaviors of perspective taking and
prospection are differentially influenced by culture. With respect to perspective taking, a recent
study found that perspective-taking accuracy is severely impaired when the perceiver has little to
no experience with the target other’s culture (Rasmussen & Sieck, 2012). Although such
conclusions emphasize the importance of cultural experience for developing a proficiency in
understanding others, it also implies that individuals will simulate whatever “background
information” they have available—however mismatched for the task—rather than not make an
attempt to infer the minds of unfamiliar others. While this may suggest that perspective taking,
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as an everyday phenomenon (Ickes, 2003; Winner, 2000), may be engaged in equivalently
regardless of culture, no studies were found that specifically tested this possibility.
With respect to prospection, research shows that different cultures perceive and plan for
the future for different purposes and with different expectations of what is possible. For example,
a study by Moore (2006) posited that, because American culture is future-oriented, it sees the
future as something that can be anticipated and controlled. As such, Americans tend to imagine
future scenarios in which desired short- and long-term outcomes are planned for and achieved.
Contrarily, because Hindu culture is past-oriented, its members believe that the future is
unalterably determined by past action. As such, their imagined future scenarios concern shortterm outcomes constrained by past occurrences.
Research exploring cultural effects in counterfactual thinking have found that the content
of counterfactuals differs between individualistic and collectivist cultures (e.g., Gilbert, 2012;
White & Lehman, 2005). Likewise, cultural priorities can inform the nature and frequency of the
counterfactuals generated. For example, Chen, Chiu, Roese, Tam, & Lau (2006) found that, in
response to negative life events concerning schoolwork, romance, family, and friendship,
collectivist participants were more likely to generate subtractive counterfactuals—i.e.,
“reframing” the negative event such that the actual outcome did not occur—than additive
counterfactuals—i.e., “reframing” the negative event such that the actual event is augmented to
make something new occur. Results also showed that collectivist cultures engaged in more
counterfactuals for schoolwork and family events than did participants from individualist
cultures. However, it is currently unknown if, in general, there are cultural differences in the
frequency with which collectivist versus individualistic cultures engage in counterfactual
thinking.
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3.2 Objective, Hypotheses, and Goals
Primary Objective
The primary objective of Study 2 was to provide empirical evidence for the Expanded
Simulation Model proposed in Chapter 1. Specifically, Study 2 sought evidence that
autobiographical memory content can be used for simulation-based perspective taking (Chapter
1, Hypothesis 1.2) and mental time travel (Chapter 1, Hypothesis 1.5), the latter of which was
operationalized in the current paper as prospection. and counterfactual thinking. Establishing that
autobiographical memory is used for these purposes will empirically support Chapter 1’s
Hypothesis 1.6, that perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking are therefore
functions of autobiographical memory. Study 2 also sought evidence in support of Chapter 1’s
Hypothesis 1.7, that the form of simulation that underlies perspective taking is interpersonal,
whereas the form of simulation that underlies mental time travel is intrapersonal.
In pursuit of these objectives, Study 2 was designed to evaluate six new hypotheses and
three goals. Hypotheses were stated when either direct evidence or strongly related previous
findings were available to recommend particular outcomes. Goals were stated in lieu of
hypotheses when gaps in the literature precluded prediction, or when available evidence was too
conceptually distal to make prediction plausible. The provisional analyses of Study 1 were also
rerun in Study 2, with the expectation that Study 1 results would be replicated.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 3.1. It was assumed that, despite structural differences between the
Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR subscales (i.e., the AMFS subscale featured
two additional items in addition to the two items comprising the AMFJR subscale), the use of
autobiographical memory content for perspective taking, regardless of the instrument on which it
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was measured, would be relatively equivalent. The result would be a single “autobiographical
memory functions” second-order construct indicated by eight distinct constructs comprising the
following subscales: the AMFS’s Prospection and Counterfactual Thinking subscales; the
AMFJR’s Conversation, Relationship Maintenance, Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral
Control, Emotion Regulation, and Self subscales; and a single Perspective TakingS&JR51 subscale.
The expected eight-function, second-order structure was in lieu of a single-order, oblique
structure, the latter of which had no reasonable conceptual basis (e.g., there was no reason why
such simulation-based functions as Counterfactual Thinking would be directly inter-correlated
with such socially situated functions as Conversation). As such, the hypothesized second-order
model was not only more parsimonious, but more interpretable (Chen, Sousa, & West, 2005;
Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002). The predicted eight-function structure is depicted in
Figure 14.
Hypothesis 3.2 The six autobiographical memory functions measured by the AMFJR
would map onto the three autobiographical memory functions measured by the TALE (Bluck &
Alea, 2011), in replication of results by Ranson & Fitzgerald (in preparation). However, to
extend the research by Ranson and Fitzgerald, Hypothesis 3.2 tested whether the TALE
functions could be characterized as higher-order functions of the AMFJR. It was also
hypothesized that the Perspective TakingAMFS function, as an other-directed phenomenon
underlain by interpersonal simulation (Shanton & Goldman, 2010), would be predicted by the
TALE’s broad Social function. Contrarily, it was predicted that Prospection and Counterfactual
Thinking, as self-directed phenomena underlain by intrapersonal simulation (Shanton &
Goldman, 2010), would map onto the broad Self function. Also, given related research that
51

Unless otherwise noted, from this point forward, the current paper will use the convention of tacking the subscript
notation “S&JR” to all references to the subscale comprising both the Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective
TakingAMFJR subscales.
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characterizes the Directive function as involving the use of autobiographical memory for future
planning (e.g., Bluck et al., 2005; Williams et al., 2008), Study 2 tested whether the Prospection
function was broadly Directive. Likewise, because counterfactual thinking can be used as an
emotion control strategy (e.g., Allen et al., 2014; Lindeman & Abraham, 2008; Ruiselová et al.,
2009; Ruiselová & Prokopcáková, 2010; Williams et al., 2008), which renders it conceptually
similar to the broadly Directive Emotion Regulation function of the AMFJR, Study 2 tested
whether the Counterfactual Thinking function was therefore also broadly Directive.
Assuming confirmation of the Hypothesis 3.2, of interest to Study 2 was whether the
AMFS and AMFJR functions would “inherit” significant individual difference effects from their
corresponding broad functions of the TALE. It was thought that, if the personality, age, gender,
and/or culture effects found for the functions of the TALE then manifested in the lower-order
functions of the AMFS and AMFJR, such would be additional support for the second-order
structure predicted in Hypothesis 3.2.
Hypothesis 3.3. Study 2 will replicate Study 1 findings regarding associations between
the AMFS functions and the ERQ’s (Gross & John, 2003) Cognitive Reappraisal dimension,
which reflects a simulation-based process (Lindeman & Abraham, 2008).
Hypothesis 3.4. Perspective TakingAMFS would emerge as the primary significant
predictor reflecting the interpersonal form of simulation proposed by the Shanton and Goldman
(2010) to underlie behavioral perspective taking. Likewise, it was expected that Counterfactual
Thinking would emerge as the second significant predictor of Cognitive Reappraisal and would
reflect the intrapersonal form of simulation posited by Shanton & Goldman to underlie mental
time travel.
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There are two arguments as to why Counterfactual Thinking, rather than Prospection, was
expected to significantly predict Cognitive Reappraisal on behalf of intrapersonal simulation.
One, Study 1 results indicated that Counterfactual Thinking accounted for almost four times the
variance in Cognitive Reappraisal than did Perspective TakingAMFS, and more than 25 times the
variance accounted for by Prospection—a pattern of effects that was expected to be replicated in
Study 2. Two, related research (e.g., Allen et al., 2014) implies that behavioral counterfactual
thinking is more emotion-based than either behavioral prospection or perspective taking.
Because Cognitive Reappraisal assesses emotion-control strategies (e.g., Allen et al., 2014;
Lindeman & Abraham, 2008; Ruiselová et al., 2009; Ruiselová & Prokopcáková, 2010), it is
thus conceptually plausible that the function most predictive of Cognitive Reappraisal would be
Counterfactual Thinking. However, given that the results of Study 1 were provisional and thus
potentially biased, it was possible that Study 2 effects would be comparatively smaller in
magnitude. Additionally, it was possible that, given that Study 2’s sample was substantially
larger than Study 1’s, Study 2 would yield significant results where Study 1 did not.
Hypothesis 3.5. An association would be found between the AMFJR’s function of
Emotion Regulation and the ERQ’s Expressive Suppression (Gross & John, 2003). The
Expressive Suppression dimension concerns the management of outward behaviors that can be
socially observed (Gross & John, 2003). Likewise, the AMFJR’s Emotion Regulation function
involves the use of “past-talk” to understand or obtain emotion control (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in
preparation). That Study 1 showed no relation between Expressive Suppression and the three
AMFS functions was attributed to the fact that Expressive Suppression is more likely to be
elicited by social situations (i.e., where one’s emotional behavior is observed, and to which
others may react), whereas the AMFS functions, which are simulation based, have been posited
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herein as being comparatively more subjective. Examples of Emotion Regulation items that
reflect their objectiveness include, “I think or talk about the past to emphasize or clarify
appropriate emotional responses”; and “I think or talk about the past to help me or another
control emotions” (see Table 18 for all AMFJR Emotion Regulation items). As the AMFJR’s
Emotion Regulation function thus concerns strategies played out in the social sphere, it was
anticipated that this and Expressive Suppression would be correlated.
Hypothesis 3.6. Results from previous studies regarding associations between Five
Factor inventory dimensions and the functions of the TALE were expected to be replicated.
Specifically, it was hypothesized that Openness to Experience would predict the broad Directive
function (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010; Webster, 1993), the broad Self function (Cappeliez &
O’Rourke, 2002; Rasmussen & Berntsen. 2010), and the broad Social function (Rasmussen &
Berntsen, 2010). Additionally, it was expected that Emotionality/Neuroticism would predict both
the broad Self function (Cappeliez & O’Rourke, 2002; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010), and the
broad Directive function (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010) Finally, it was hypothesized that
Extraversion would predict the broad Social function (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010). Also of
interest was whether personality effects would be found for the Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness dimensions, as no known autobiographical memory functions study to date
has reported associations between these dimensions and TALE functions (Rasmussen &
Berntsen, 2010).
With respect to the AMFS, the associations found in Study 1 between the personality
dimensions of the HEXACO-60 (Ashton & Lee, 2009) were expected to be replicated in Study 2
when using the 100-item HEXACO-PI-R (Ashton & Lee, 2005, 2009). Specifically, it was
hypothesized that Perspective TakingAMFS would be predicted by Emotional Stability (the inverse
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of Emotionality/Neuroticism), Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience;
that Prospection would be predicted by Emotionality/Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and
Openness to Experience; and that Counterfactual Thinking would be predicted by
Emotionality/Neuroticism, Introversion (the inverse of Extraversion), and the inverse of
Honesty-Humility. Also of interest was whether personality would differentially predict the
simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS function compared to the socially situated Perspective
TakingAMFJR function. The results should help elucidate the Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010)
contention that the stability of the relation between the TALE Social function (and thus its lowerorder functions) and Extraversion is dependent on the Social function’s operationalization.
Because there was no previous research on which to base specific hypotheses, Study 2
explored the relations between AMFS functions and the 24 HEXACO facets, as well as the
HEXACO’s interstitial dimension, Altruism (the inverse of which is Antagonism). Given the
extensive small, but significant findings that could not be corroborated by related research,
results of the facet analyses and a discussion of findings can be found in Appendix F.
Goals
Goal 3.1. To replicate the age effects previously reported for the TALE, and to test
whether age predicted the use of autobiographical memory for the functions of the AMFS and
AMFJR52. Although related research has reported cognitive development-related age effects for
behavioral perspective taking (Selman, 2003) and behavioral prospection (Abrams et al., 2008),
and because the functions of the AMFJR were adapted from a scale concerned with the functions
that emerge in early childhood but are presumed to be used in some form throughout the life

52

Age effects were not tested during validation of the AMFJR. The survey system (SONA) used to collect data for
that study featured a standard prescreen that asked respondents to indicate only if he/she was over 18 years of age or
not.
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span, it was unknown if such effects would impact the rated frequency of functional use of
autobiographical memory content for the functions measured by the AMFS and AMFJR.
Goal 3.2. To test for possible gender effects in the functions of the TALE, AMFS, and
AMFJR. Although no study to date has found gender differences in rated frequency of functional
use of autobiographical memory as measured by the TALE, differences in the processing,
experiencing, and properties of autobiographical memory are widely reported to occur between
men and women could plausible influence gender effects on autobiographical memory functions.
Goal 3.3. To examine differences in the frequency with which autobiographical memory
is used for the functions of the TALE, AMFS, and AMFJR across ethnic groups. Although no
culture effects have been reported for the TALE, Study 2 aimed to replicate findings by Ranson
(2014) that showed differential use of autobiographical memory for the AMFJR functions of
Conversation and Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control by Caucasians and AfricanAmerican/Blacks. Additionally, because related research indicates that there are cultural
differences in the use of behavioral perspective taking (e.g., Rasmussen & Sieck, 2012),
prospection (e.g., Moore, 2006), and counterfactual thinking (e.g., Chen et al., 2006; Gilbert,
2012; White & Lehman, 2005), Study 2 tested whether or not such influences impact the use of
autobiographical memory for the functions measured by the AMFS.
3.3 Methods
Participants
A

total

of

903

participants,

who

were

recruited

online

through

MTurk

(www.MTurk.com), completed a survey administered by Qualtrics (2015, Provo, UT).
Enrollment in Study 1, which was also conducted through MTurk, prohibited enrollment in
Study 2 to ensure that all cases were unique across the two studies.
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Participant ages ranged from 18 to 66+ (M = 34.92 years, SD = 11.21), with the majority
(n = 382, 42.4%) being slightly older than college-aged (ages 25–34). As was the case for Study
1, the gender split was nearly equal (F = 449, 49.7%, M = 450, 49.8%), with three participants
(0.3%) identifying as transgender, and one (0.1%) preferring not to answer. As for ethnicity/race,
because the Native American and Hawaiian/Pacific Islander ethnicity/race groups had
representation of < 1% of the total sample for both Study 1 and the AMFJR validation study by
Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation), those groups were omitted from Study 2. Instead, to
align with more recent recommendation by the U.S. Census Bureau (e.g., Hoeffel, Rastogi, Kim,
& Shahid, 2012), “Asian” was split into “East Asian” and “South Asian.” The frequencies and
proportions of the ethnic/race groups were as follows (from high to low): Five hundred eightyfour participants identified as Caucasian (64.7%); 157 as South Asian (17.4%); 51 as AfricanAmerican/Black (5.6%); 43 as East Asian (4.8%); 35 as Hispanic (3.9%); 14 as Other (1.6%); 10
as Multiracial (1.1%); and two as Arab/Middle Eastern (0.2%). Seven participants (0.8%) chose
“prefer not to answer.” Study 2 demographics are summarized in Table 20.
Compensation for the 903 participants who passed all attention checks and satisfactorily
completed the survey was an Amazon credit worth $1.6053, and which was posted to their
Amazon.com account within 24 hours of survey submission.
Instruments
The seven blocks (181 total items) that comprised the online survey are detailed below.
Except for the demographics and self-descriptors blocks, all items were rated on a 1 to 6 Likerttype scale. All items within each block were randomly ordered, and all blocks except the
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The Study 2 proposal indicated that participant compensation would be $2.00 per survey. However, due to an
increase in January 2-16 in the MTurk fee from 10% to 40% of total participant compensation, the $2.00/participant
fee was reduced to $1.60/participant. This rate, however, was still over MTurk’s guideline of $1.00/30 minutes, as
survey test metrics indicated that the average completion time was no more than 30 minutes.
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information sheet/introduction block, demographic items, and self-descriptors were also
randomly ordered. Blocks that included attention check items have been indicated below and in
their corresponding tables.
Block 1: Demographics. Study 2 included three demographic items: age (drop-down list
of ages 18 through 66+ and prefer not to answer); gender (male, female, transgender, prefer not
to answer); and ethnicity (Caucasian, South Asian, Arab/Middle Eastern, Hispanic, East Asian,
African-American/Black, Multiracial, Other, prefer not to answer).
Block 2: Self-Descriptors of Current Self. As per Study 1, respondents were primed to
activate the Self-Memory System (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) by
providing five self-descriptors. Respondents were presented with the following instruction:
“Take a moment to consider what traits and characteristics describe who you are at this point in
your life. For example, are you ambitious? A good friend? Shy? Think of 5 one- or two word
descriptions that best reflect these characteristics and enter them in the spaces below.” The item
will feature five open fields preceded by the statement, ‘I _______________.’ Each field
permitted a total of 60 characters. This item was adapted for Study 2 from the Twenty Statement
Test (TST), Kuhn & McPartland (1954).
Block 3: Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale. The 10item AMFS that was validated in Study 1 was included in Study 2. The 10 AMFS items and their
corresponding functions, as well as the attention check item, can be found in Table 3.
Block 4: Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ). The 10-item ERQ (Gross & John,
2003) used in Study 1 was included in Study 2. The 10 items of the ERQ are listed in Table 4.
Block 5: HEXACO Personality Inventory-Revised. The HEXACO-PI-R (Lee &
Ashton, 2008) features 100 items to assess the same six dimensions as the HEXACO-60, but
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with the addition of the interstitial facet scale of Altruism (inverse: Antagonism). Additionally,
all six dimensions are further subdivided into four facets each for a total of 24 facets. Results of
the HEXACO-PI-R validation study yielded Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities ranging from .78 to
.84.
Respondents were presented with the instruction, “The following section addresses
various personality traits. On a 1 to 6 scale, please rate the extent to which you agree (or
disagree) with each statement as it describes your personality.” As with the Study 1 HEXACO
survey block, Study 2’s HEXACO survey block included an attention check item. The
HEXACO-PI-R’s 100 items, dimensions, facets, and attention check item can be found in Table
17.
Block 6: Autobiographical Memory Functions of Joint Reminiscence (AMFJR). The
36-item AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), formerly called the CRS-A, comprises
the two Perspective Taking items that are now also included in the AMFS. The AMFJR was
found during validation to measure six autobiographical memory functions that mapped onto the
three broad TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) functions of Social, Self, and Directive. The six
functions of the AMFJR are: Conversation (Social: engaging in past-talk to promote and sustain
conversation); Relationship Maintenance (Social: engaging in past-talk to establish and
strengthen social bonds); Perspective TakingAMFJR (Social: engaging in past-talk to
understand/infer others’ minds); Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (Directive:
engaging in past-talk to make informed decisions and attitudes); Emotion Regulation (Directive:
engaging in past-talk to cultivate and encourage appropriate emotional responses); and Self (Self:
engaging in past-talk to develop and maintain one’s self-identity) The factors of the CRS-A were
shown during validation to have reliabilities ranging from .89 to .95 (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in
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preparation).
Respondents were presented with the instruction, “We are interested in how and why
people engage in past-talk. Past-talk is conversation about events that you have experienced with
the person(s) you are speaking to or that you have experienced but your conversational partner(s)
have not. Please keep past-talk conversations in mind when rating how often you engage in each
of the situations below using a 1 to 6 scale (1 = almost never; 6 = almost always). Please click
the NEXT button to continue.” Items are in response to the stem statement, “I engage in past-talk
with another or others in order to...” The AMFJR items and corresponding factors are
summarized in Table 18.
Block 7. Thinking About Life Experiences (TALE) scale. The TALE (Bluck et al.,
2005; Bluck & Alea, 2011) was the first instrument with which the three broad autobiographical
memory functions of Social, Self, and Directive were empirically validated. Study 2 used the 15item TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), which has been validated for use with adult populations. The
internal consistency reported for the TALE ranges from .74 for the Social subscale; .83 for the
Self subscale; and .78 for the Directive subscale (Bluck & Alea, 2011).
Respondents were presented with the instruction, “Sometimes people think back over
their life or talk to other people about their life: It may be about things that happened quite a long
time ago or more recently. We are not interested in your memory for a particular event, but more
generally in how you bring together and connect the different events and periods of your life.
Please rate how often you do the following on a 1 to 6 scale (1 = Almost Never; 6 = Almost
Always). Please click the NEXT button to continue.” Items then followed the stem statement, “I
think back over or talk about my life or certain periods of my life...” The TALE items and
corresponding functions can be found in Table 19.

113
Procedures
Study 2 approval was obtained from the conducting university’s Institutional Review
Board (IRB protocol 1604014867, 5/19/16). The Study 2 online questionnaire followed the
protocol already detailed for Study 1 with the exception of the following four modifications: 1)
Except for the current self-descriptors, the mental time travel components and accompanying
self-descriptors conditions were omitted; 2) the 36-item AMFJR was included; 3) the 15-item
TALE was included; and 4) the HEXACO-100 was used instead of the HEXACO-60. The online
questionnaire featured 179 items plus two attention check items for a total of 181 items. Items
and blocks—except for the informed consent, demographics, and self-descriptors blocks—were
randomly ordered.
MTurk metrics indicated that all 903 surveys were completed in about a five-hour time
period, with the average time spent on each survey reported as 21.52 minutes. Respondents who
passed all attention checks and satisfactorily completed the survey were compensated with a
$1.60 credit posted to their personal Amazon.com account. This rate was consistent with average
rate of $1.00 that MTurk participants earn per 30 minutes (www.MTurk.com). The total value of
the Amazon credits issued as compensation to respondents was $1,440 (900 × $1.60). The total
fee assessed by MTurk on participant compensation was $576 (40% × $1440), which brought the
total payout to $2,016. The $16 overage was paid out-of-pocket by the Study 2 Principal
Investigator.
Because MTurk keeps the survey open until the requested number of surveys (here, 900)
have been completed rather than started, three additional participants’ submissions were
submitted but missed the MTurk cutoff. As a result, only 900 participants were compensated, as
only the first 900 Worker IDs flagged as completing the survey appear in the researcher’s
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compensation queue. Because the MTurk de-identification process makes impossible the
discernment of which three participants’ surveys were uncompensated, there was no way to
know which surveys were paid versus unpaid; nor was there any way to issue compensation to
the three extra participants. However, MTurk does disclose this possibility, instructing
respondents to monitor how close a survey is to being closed or risk being uncompensated for
their work.
Data Analyses
The Study 2 data analysis protocol was similar to that of Study 1. Data screening,
descriptive statistics, and regression analyses were conducted using SPSS v23 (IBM Corp,
2015), LISREL v9.2 (Jöreskog, & Sörbom, 2015), and AMOS v22 (Arbuckle, 2014). Type I
error risk was limited to 5% (α = .05); thus results that featured p ≤ .05 were considered
statistically significant.
For all non-SEM inferential tests, composite “scale score” variables comprising the items
for each function, dimension, and facet were generated. Only the HEXACO-100 (Ashton & Lee,
2005) featured reverse-scored items, which were recoded prior to composite score generation.
The associations between AMFS functions and the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) predicted
by Hypothesis 3.3, as well as the association between the AMFJR function of Emotion
Regulation and the ERQ predicted by Hypothesis 3.5, were tested using bivariate correlation
analyses. Hypothesis 3.4, which predicted the functional relation of the AMFS factors with
respect to interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation, was tested using simultaneous multiple
linear regression. Simple linear regression was used to test whether personality predicts the use
of autobiographical memory for the functions measured by the TALE, AMFS, and AMFJR
(Hypotheses 3.6). Simple linear regression was also used to test for age and gender effects per
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Goals 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Kruskal-Wallis W chi-square comparison tests with Bonferroni
corrected Mann-Whitney U post-hocs (using αADJ = .0167 to reflect three pairwise comparisons
per each Kruskal-Wallis model) were used for Goal 3.3, which sought differences in the use of
autobiographical memory for the functions of the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE across Study 2’s
three largest ethnic groups (Caucasian, n = 582; African-American/Black, n = 51; South Asian, n
= 157). The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests were used due to both the nonnormality
of the data, and the differences in subgroup sample size, which can impair results when tested
parametrically (Helsel, 1992). The effect size for the Mann-Whitney U, r = |Z|/√N, is interpreted
similar to a Cohen’s d, where effects of .10 = small, .30 = moderate, and .50 = large (Fields,
2005; Rosenthal, 1994). The effect size r was computed using the following total sample sizes:
for Caucasian versus South Asian comparisons, N = 741; for Caucasian versus AfricanAmerican/Black comparisons, N = 635; and for African-American/Black versus South Asian
comparisons, N = 208.
Power Analyses. The target sample size of 900 was sufficient for the most complex SEM
configuration tested. An SEM power analysis based on power = .80, α = .05, minimum effect
size of .1054, number of observable variables = 61 (10 AMFS + 36 AMFJR + 15 TALE), and
number of latent variables = 12 (3 AMFS, 6 AMFJR, 3 TALE) yielded a minimum sample of
766 (see Figure 16). However, given that a number of Study 2’s hypotheses and goals included
strictly exploratory components, N = 900 was obtained to ensure that inferential tests using
simple and multiple regression were sufficiently powered, especially given that some of the
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The current paper used the A-priori Sample Size Calculator for Structural Equation Models, an online power
analysis program by Soper (2016). The calculator requires an effect size as specified by Westland (2010), who states
that the approach for determining N for SEM is analogous to that for standard univariate calculations (e.g., 0.1 =
smallest minimum effect; 0.3 = moderate; 0.5 = large) (Cochran 1977; Kish 1955; Lohr 1999; Snedecor & Cochran
1989, Westland & See, 2007), but which employs a formulation for variance customized for SEM.
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effects that Study 2 aimed to replicate were expected to be very small (r2 < 2%)55. Figure 17
shows the power analysis results for a general multiple regression analysis using power = .80, α
= .05, minimum effect size (squared multiple correlation) of approximately .10, and two
predictors.
Several post-hoc power analyses were also conducted to get a sense of how overpowered
the bivariate correlation, simple regression, and multiple regression models of Study 2 were.
Results showed that, even for effect sizes smaller than 10% (e.g., R2 = 6.5%), achieved power
was > .99, with a minimum N needed to detect a significant effect = 118, which was way below
the actual N = 903. Because significance is largely driven by the sample size, it is helpful to
consider p-values in the context of effect size and achieved power in order to determine how
relevant and/or meaningful a significant result is. Thus, because nearly all tests for Study 2 were
overpowered, and because many effects were small, Study 2 effect sizes have also been reported
for all analyses.
3.4 Results
Data Screening
Data from all Study 2 survey blocks were screened prior to all planned analyses. As
expected there were no missing data. Data were evaluated for UV normality using Z ≥ |1.96| as
an indicator of significant nonnormality at the .05 level; Z ≥ |2.58| at the .01 level; and Z ≥ |3.29|
at the .001 level. Results indicated a high amount of skew and moderate kurtosis at the item
level, as well as in the scale scores used to test Hypotheses 3.3–3.7 and Goals 3.1–3.3.
Specifically, of the 20 scale scores (three from the AMFS, two from the ERQ, six from the
HEXACO, six from the AMFJR, and three from the TALE) that were evaluated, all but five
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Effect sizes < 2% were reported by Ranson & Fitzgerald (in preparation) when analyzing cultural effects.
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(75%) were significantly negatively UV skewed. Results also showed that 11 of the 20 (55%)
scale scores were significantly UV leptokurtic, and that three of the 20 (11%) were significantly
UV platykurtic. Scale score means, standard deviations, and UV skew and kurtosis Z-scores for
the dimensions of the AMFS, ERQ, HEXACO, AMFJR, and TALE are detailed in Table 21.
Other preliminary analyses included bivariate correlations of and regressions on the items
that comprise each of the functions of the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE. Assessed were potential
problems, such as high inter-item correlations. As can be seen in Table 22, results showed that
inter-item correlations for items of each scale were within a desired range of .39–.77, with nine
out of 61 (~85%) between .40 and .69. However, two of the three inter-item correlations for
Counterfactual Thinking were higher than .80 (.87, and .89) to suggest either item redundancy
or that the construct measured was “too specific” (Briggs & Cheek, 1986, p. 114). This was
surprising given that the Study 1 inter-item correlations for Counterfactual Thinking were much
lower (.54, .57, and .68). Likewise, the mean inter-item correlation for the AMFS scale using the
Study 2 data was .39—which was a bit higher than the inter-item correlation mean of .30 for
Study 1—but which is still within the optimal range of .20–.40 (Briggs & Cheek, 1986, p. 115)
to suggest both sufficient coverage of various construct characteristics (i.e., perspective taking,
prospection, and counterfactual thinking), and the faithful encapsulation of the overarching
construct (e.g., use of autobiographical memory content). Thus, although the cause of the higherthan-expected Counterfactual Thinking inter-item correlations was unknown, their values were
below the .90 threshold that can portend unstable matrices or inadmissible solutions for CFA
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 90). Therefore, the performance of these items in the testing of
Study 2 hypotheses was monitored for possible issues, and caution was taken when interpreting
results.
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Individual CFAs were then conducted on the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE to verify their
expected structures prior to running the series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) used to test
Study 2’s Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2, as well as using the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE scale scores
for the inferential tests of Hypotheses 3.3–3.7 and Goals 3.1–3.3. Individual CFAs were
conducted in LISREL v9.2 using robust ULS estimation on polychoric correlation matrices with
the asymptotic covariance matrices to yield Satorra-Bentler nonnormal-adjusted chi-square
values. The fit indices of RMSEA, NNFI, and CFI, which, by default, LISREL computes using
the ML Ratio chi-square rather than the Satorra-Bentler, were manually recomputed according to
the formulas detailed in Appendix E, and using the Satorra-Bentler chi-square and degrees of
freedom values as recommended (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Results supported all three scales’
expected structures, thus hypothesis and goal testing proceeded. Summaries of the three scales’
individual CFA results can be found in Table 23. The factor correlations for each individual scale
can be found in Table 24.
Hypothesis 3.1 Analyses
Overcoming Data Analysis Issues. Although results of the data screening procedures
verified the structures and properties of the variables to be used to test Hypothesis 3.1 (as well as
Hypothesis 3.2), there were problems in getting the models to converge when using LISREL
v9.2 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2015). This was likely mostly due to the fact that LISREL computes
each pairwise correlation of the polychoric correlation matrix—which is used to generate the
asymptotic covariance matrix on which the Satorra-Bentler adjusted chi-square is derived) one at
a time. Because model convergence is assessed as the polychoric matrix is being built, there is a
risk of yielding “not positive definite” errors, which halts the analysis before the entire matrix
has been completed (Lee, Poon, & Bentler, 1992). However, even for those statistical programs
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that generate matrices simultaneously56, the processing burden can cause the program to crash
with as few as 10 variables (Hox, 1995), but is more likely to occur for models with more than
30 variables, especially with sample sizes > 500 (Muthèn & Kaplan, 1992). Because the Study 2
sample size was almost twice this limit (N = 903), and because each model featured a large
number of variables from multiple scales (25–61, depending on the model), the models could not
be run in LISREL. Finally, the highly correlated Counterfactual Thinking items could have
compelled inadmissible solutions. However, if the Counterfactual Thinking items were the root
cause of the LISREL issues, alternate software programs and/or statistical approaches would
yield the same nonconvergence problems.
As both a workaround to the model complexity issues, and to determine the utility of the
Counterfactual Thinking for the planned CFAs, models for Hypothesis 3.1 (and Hypothesis 3.2)
were configured in AMOS v22 (Arbuckle, 2014) using robust maximum likelihood (ML)
estimation with bias corrected bootstrapping for ML and the Bollen-Stine correction (Bollen &
Stine, 1992). Using AMOS 57 to conduct Bollen-Stine bootstraps of 2,000 iterations is
recommended for models that would otherwise employ the asymptotic covariance matrix
approach, but that fail to converge due to a large number (> 25) of model variables (Muthèn &
Kaplan, 1992; Nevitt & Hancock, 2001). In fact, under such conditions, the modified BollenStine bootstrap has been shown in Monte Carlo studies to produce results that are commensurate
with, if not slightly more accurate than, those based on the Satorra-Bentler adjustment (e.g.,
Byrne, 2000; Cheung & Lau, 2008; Hox, 1995; Ichikawa & Konishi, 1995; Yuan & Bentler,
2000; Yung & Bentler, 1996; Zhu, 1997). One caveat to the Bollen-Stine bootstrap, however, is
that its use can result in a slight loss of power (Nevitt & Hancock, 2001). However, a power
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ESQ (Multivariate Software, Inc., 2014) conducts simultaneous polychoric correlation matrix generation, but this
program was not available for use for Study 2.
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The Bollen-Stine correction (Bollen & Stine, 1992) is not available in LISREL v9.2.
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analysis run prior to the recruitment of Study 2 participants indicated that a sample of 766 (137
cases fewer than the actual sample size) was sufficient for yielding significant small effects in
the planned CFAs (see Figure 16). Therefore, there was little risk that conducting the BollenStine would unduly underpower the models used to test Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2. As such, the
Hypothesis 3.1 and 3.2 models were excellent candidates for Bollen-Stine bootstrapping
available in AMOS.
In order to ensure that results from the Bollen-Stine bootstrap in AMOS were similar to
those produced using the polychoric correlation and asymptotic covariance matrices in LISREL,
three independent CFAs, with the same configurations used during data screening, were run in
AMOS on the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE. Results of the AMOS CFAs were then compared to
those obtained from the individual structure validation CFAs run in LISREL—which were the
only models from Study 2 that would converge. Results showed that key estimates and fit indices
were commensurate for all three individual scales (see Table 25). However, increased chi-square
values, which can occur under ML estimation when data are nonnormal and/or the model
features a large number of variables (e.g., Cook, Kallen, & Amtmann, 2009; Jöreskog, 2005),
was evident when comparing the Satorra-Bentler to the ML Ratio chi-square test statistics.
Although the LISREL- and AMOS-generated χ2s for the AMFS were similar (74.74 vs. 67.13,
respectively), the increase in the AMOS versus the LISREL χ2 tests statistics became more
pronounced as the number of model variables increased (see Table 24). Thus, it was likely that,
as the models increased in complexity, the fit indices generated for Hypothesis 3.1 (and
Hypothesis 3.2)—which were designed to follow null model logic—would reflect a somewhat
poorer fit than would have been attained had the polychoric-based approach been possible. As
such, the objective was to find a sufficiently fitting model that both theory and statistical results
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suggested was the most likely to be replicable (e.g., Cudeck & Henly, 1991; Meehl, 1991;
Tanaka, 1993). With that caveat, Study 2 proceeded with the testing of Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2
using AMOS and the Bollen-Stine bootstrap.
CFA: Eight-Function Structure. A second-order CFA was conducted to test whether a
second-order “autobiographical memory functions” construct was indicated by eight first-order
latent variables comprising the AMFS subscales of Prospection and Counterfactual Thinking; the
AMFJR

subscales

of

Conversation,

Relationship

Maintenance,

Teaching/Problem

Solving/Behavioral Control, Emotion Regulation, and Self; and the combined Perspective
TakingS&JR subscale, comprising items from both Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective
TakingAMFJR (see Figure 14). A second-order model was used to reflect the idea that,
contextually, although the AMFS functions were “simulation-based,” whereas the AMFJR
functions were “socially situated,” all ultimately reflect rated frequencies of functional use of
autobiographical memory. Thus it made more conceptual sense to take a second-order approach
than to correlate the simulation-based functions with each other, and correlate the socially
situated functions together, then employ the Perspective TakingS&JR function as a common
source of shared variance between the AMFS and AMFJR scales. Such modeling would also
indicate the integrity of the combined Perspective TakingS&JR subscale in the presence of the
other two AMFS subscales and the other five AMFJR subscales.
Results showed that, as expected, the large sample compelled a significant Bollen-Stine
bootstrap-adjusted chi square test statistic, χ2(981) = 4071.98, p < .001. The RMSEA (.059) was
above the optimal cutoff of .05, but below the acceptable cutoff of .08, to indicate adequate
model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). However, both the NNFI (.86) and CFI (.82) were ≤ .90 to
indicate less than adequate model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
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Estimates results showed that the squared multiple correlations (SMCs) were mostly
stable (R2 = .31–.98), with the exception of the first-order Counterfactual Thinking latent, which,
at R2 = .10, was below the recommended lower-bound cutoff of .20 to signify that the indicator
(or first-order factor) is explaining a reasonable amount of variance in its factor (or second-order
factor) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). As this was the only SMC outside the recommended
bounds, it may have been reflecting the high inter-item correlations of the Counterfactual
Thinking items (see Data Screening section), rather than model instability. This latter
explanation seemed reasonable given that all standardized regression coefficients, disturbances,
and error variances were positive and significant (p < .001). Likewise, all standardized regression
coefficients were > .30 (λ = .31–.99), with ~98% over .50 and ~93% over .60. Structural equation
modeling (SEM) reliabilities for all eight first-order latent variables exceeded the .70 cutoff to
demonstrate high internal validity (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994; Werts et al., 1978): PerspectiveTakingS&JR = .87; Prospection = .82; Counterfactual Thinking = .99; Conversation

= .85;

Relationship Maintenance = .83; Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control = .78; Emotion
Regulation = .89; and Self = .82. The formula for computing SEM reliabilities can be found in
Appendix E. Table 26 summarizes the first- and second-order standardized regression
coefficients, squared multiple correlations, and SEM reliabilities of the eight-factor model.
“Simulation-Based” Versus “Socially Situated” Perspective Taking. Given that the
eight-function structure yielded an overall “adequate,” rather than “good,” fit, additional analyses
were conducted to test the Hypothesis 3.1 assumption that Perspective TakingAMFS and
Perspective TakingAMFJR were functionally and conceptually equivalent enough to warrant their
being combined as a single Perspective TakingS&JR function. To start, two multiple regression
models were run to test the functional relation between the two Perspective Taking functions and
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the dimensions of the ERQ (Gross & John). In the first model, the Cognitive Reappraisal scale
score variable served as the dependent variable, with the Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective
TakingAMFJR scale scores variables as predictors. Results showed that the model was significant,
R = .31, F(2, 900) = 49.39, p < .001, with 9.9% of the variance in Cognitive Reappraisal
accounted for by Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR together. The coefficients
analysis indicated that Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR were each
significant predictors, with Perspective TakingAMFS uniquely accounting for 2.9% of the variance
in Cognitive Reappraisal (b = .19, t(900) = 5.40, p < .001), and Perspective TakingAMFJR
uniquely accounting for 1.7% of the variance in Cognitive Reappraisal (b = .13, t(900) = 4.16, p
< .001). However, a one-tailed Z-test for the differences between correlations (Preacher, 2002)
indicated that the amount of variance in Cognitive Reappraisal that was uniquely accounted for
by Perspective TakingAMFS was not significantly greater than the amount of variance uniquely
accounted for by Perspective TakingAMFJR (Z = .69, p = .246) to suggest that, regardless of scale
context (AMFS versus AMFJR), the use of autobiographical memory for perspective taking is a
simulation-based phenomenon.
To test whether, in contrast, Perspective TakingAMFJR was more socially oriented than
Perspective TakingAMFS, a second multiple regression model was run using the Expressive
Suppression scale score variable as the dependent variable, again with Perspective TakingAMFS
and Perspective TakingAMFJR as predictors. Results showed that this model was also significant,
R = .34, F(2, 900) = 58.15, p < .001, with 11.4% of the variance in Expressive Suppression
accounted for by Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR together. Results of the
coefficients analysis indicated that, as before, Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective
TakingAMFJR were each significant predictors, with Perspective TakingAMFJR uniquely accounting
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for 5.6% of the variance in Expressive Suppression (b = .36, t(900) = 7.59, p < .001), and
Perspective TakingAMFS function uniquely accounting for 0.6% of the variance in Expressive
Suppression (b = .13, t(900) = 2.40, p = .016). A Z-test indicated that the unique variance of
Perspective TakingAMFJR was significantly greater than the unique variance of Perspective
TakingAMFS (Z = 6.16, p < .001), to suggest that, although both Perspective TakingAMFJR and
Perspective TakingAMFS reflect rating frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory
content for the social behavior of perspective taking, Perspective TakingAMFJR is more socially
situated than Perspective TakingAMFS.
To test the degree of direct association between Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective
TakingAMFJR, a Pearson’s coefficient correlation and a Spearman’s rho correlation were run on
the scale scores of the two functions. The Spearman’s—which evaluates the rank-order
monotonic relation between two ordinal-level variables, and is thus less biased by nonnormality
(e.g., Hauke & Kossowski, 2011)—was included to determine if the UV nonnormality present in
the data was overly upwardly biasing the regression coefficients. The Pearson’s correlation
analysis showed that Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR function were
significantly, but only moderately positively related, r = .54, p < .001, with 29.2% overlapping
variance. Results of the Spearman’s correlation analysis showed the same relation, ρ = .51, p <
.001, with 26.0% overlapping variance. A one-tailed Z-test run on the difference between the
coefficients (Preacher, 2002) showed that the r and the ρ (rho) were statistically equivalent, Z =
.88, p = .189, which suggested that the nonnormality of the data was not overly upwardly biasing
the Pearson’s coefficient. Furthermore, results of the bivariate correlations between Perspective
TakingAMFS and the remaining functions of the AMFS and AMFJR (see Table 27) showed that

125
the only correlation coefficient that was higher58 was between Perspective TakingAMFS and
Prospection, r = .64, p < .001 (41.0% overlap). This suggests that Perspective TakingAMFS and
Perspective TakingAMFJR are no more statistically, and therefore conceptually, equivalent than are
any of the AMFS or AMFJR functions with each other.
Because Perspective TakingAMFS featured two new items in addition to the two items
comprising Perspective TakingAMFJR, Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation analyses were also
run on the scale score variable for the two-item Perspective TakingAMFJR and a Perspective
TakingAMFS(2) scale score comprising only the two Perspective TakingAMFS items that directly
corresponded to those comprising Perspective TakingAMFJR. Results showed that the Perspective
TakingAMFJR and Perspective TakingAMFS(2) were only moderately positively, but significantly
correlated, r = .51, p < .00, and ρ = .48, p < .001. Results of a one-tailed Z-test (Preacher, 2002)
to determine whether the difference between the Pearson’s r coefficient of .51 was significantly
stronger than the Spearman’s ρ coefficient of .48 showed that the two coefficients were also
statistically equivalent, Z = .84, p = .201. Because the Pearson’s r of .51 between Perspective
TakingAMFJR and Perspective TakingAMFS(2) was slightly weaker than the Pearson’s r of .54
between Perspective TakingAMFJR and Perspective TakingAMFS, a one-tailed Z-test was run to test
the difference between these coefficients. Although results showed that the two coefficients were
statistically equivalent, Z = .88, p = .189, the only moderate, rather than strong, association
between Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR suggested that they are
independent, and should not be combined into a single “Perspective TakingS&JR” function. Table
28 summarizes the results of the functional multiple regression and correlation models run to test
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Note that some of the bivariate correlations between items within the same scale were stronger, as can be seen in
Table 27.
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the “simulation-based” Perspective TakingAMFS versus the “socially situated” Perspective
TakingAMFJR.
Finally, to determine the extent to which respondents differed in their rated frequency of
functional use of autobiographical memory content for perspective taking as a function of the
measurement instrument (i.e., the simulation-based AMFS vs. the socially situated AMFJR), a
Wilcoxon paired-samples T-test59 was conducted. Results showed that respondents rate their use
of autobiographical memory as statistically significantly more frequent for simulation-based
perspective taking (M = 4.31, SD = 1.02) compared to socially situated perspective taking (M =
4.19, SD = 1.18), Z = –3.26, p < .001. However, when comparing the mean ranks of Perspective
TakingAMFS(2) to Perspective TakingAMFJR, effects were significant, but reversed. Results showed
that respondents rate the frequency with which they use autobiographical memory content for
Perspective TakingAMFS(2) (M = 4.05, SD = 1.26) as lower than for socially situated Perspective
TakingAMFJR when using the AMFJR subscale, Z = –4.85, p < .001.
Given these results, Hypothesis 3.1 was next tested as a nine-factor model with each the
simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS and socially situated Perspective TakingAMFJR
functions.
CFA: Nine-Function Structure. An additional second-order CFA was conducted, this
time treating Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR as independent of one another
(i.e., not combined as Perspective TakingS&JR) (see Figure 18). Results showed that, again, as
expected, the Bollen-Stine bootstrap-adjusted chi square test statistic was significant, χ2(980) =
3441.92, p < .001. The RMSEA (.052) was still above, but closer to the optimal cutoff of .05
than was the RMSEA of the eight-factor structure to indicate that the nine-function structure
59

Although the Wilcoxon T evaluates differences between mean ranks, such values are less intuitive than subscale
means; therefore, the subscale means (with standard deviations) have been provided here.
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demonstrated adequate to good model fit. The NNFI (.91), which met the cutoff for adequate fit,
was an improvement over the .86 of the eight-function model. However, the CFI (.89) was still a
low, but also an improvement over the eight-function CFI of .82. Also examined was the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC). The AIC is useful when two or more models are being estimated
and compared. Because lower AICs indicate better fit, the model with the lowest AIC is
considered the better fitting model (Kenny, 2015). Results of the nine-function CFA showed that
the AIC of 3735.917 was quite a bit lower than the eight-function model’s AIC of 4363.983, to
suggest that that the nine-function model was the better fitting of the two.
Estimates showed that the squared multiple correlations were similar to that of the eightfunction model (R2 = .31–.98). Again, however, the Counterfactual Thinking latent was, at R2 =
.10, still below the optimal lower-bound cutoff of .20. Standardized regression coefficients were
also similar to those of the eight-function model (λ = .31–.99; ~98% > .50; ~93% > .60), with all
regression coefficients, disturbances, and error variances positive and significant at the p < .001
level. SEM reliabilities for all nine first-order latent variables were above the .70 cutoff;
likewise, the Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR latents demonstrated higher
reliability than did Perspective TakingS&JR (.87). Specifically, the computed reliabilities were,
Perspective TakingAMFS = .94; Prospection = .82; Counterfactual Thinking = .99; Conversation =
.85; Perspective TakingAMFJR = .94; Relationship Maintenance = .83; Teaching/Problem
Solving/Behavioral Control = .78; Emotion Regulation = .89; and Self = .82. The formula used
to compute the SEM reliabilities can be found in Appendix E. The first- and second-order
standardized factor loadings, squared multiple correlations, and reliabilities of the nine-factor
model can be found in Table 29. In all, results of the nine-function CFA appeared to support the
independence of Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR.
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Hypothesis 3.2 Analyses
To replicate associations between the functions of the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in
preparation) and the broad functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), and to explore
associations between the TALE and AMFS functions, Hypothesis 3.2 was tested with three
second-order CFAs: 1) The mapping of the AMFJR onto the TALE; 2) the mapping of the
AMFS onto the TALE; and 3) the mapping of the AMFS and AMFJR onto the TALE.
Mapping the AMFJR onto the TALE: Replicating previous findings and exploring
additional associations. The purpose of first second-order CFA (with the broad Social, Self, and
Directive functions as second-order latents indicated by AMFJR functions; see Figure 19) was to
replicate previous findings by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation). Specifically, it was
expected that the AMFJR functions of Conversation, Perspective TakingAMFJR, and Relationship
Maintenance

would

map

onto

the

broad

Social

function;

that

Teaching/Problem

Solving/Behavioral Control and Emotion Regulation would map onto the broad Directive
function; and that SelfAMFJR60 would map onto the broad SelfTALE.
Results supported Hypothesis 3.2, such that the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in
preparation) functions mapped onto the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) functions as expected. The
large sample size compelled a significant ML Ratio chi-square, χ2(1215) = 3331.76, p < .001.
The RMSEA (.043) was below the optimal cutoff of .05, to indicate excellent model fit. The
NNFI = .92 indicated an adequate model fit, where as the CFI = .88 was below the acceptable
cutoff of .90. However, taken in aggregate, the fit indices suggested that the CFA model was
acceptable.
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From this point forward, the current paper will notate the AMFJR Self function as “SelfAMFJR,” and the broad
TALE function as “SelfTALE” unless otherwise noted.
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Estimates also confirmed that the model was acceptable. The squared multiple
correlations for both the first-order AMFJR indicators (R2 = .31–.70) and second-order latents
(R2 = .50–.85) were stable, as were SMC’s for the TALE items (R2 = .39–.69) Standardized
regression coefficients for the first-order AMFJR indicators were all above .50 (λ = .57–.83),
whereas the second-order AMFJR standardized coefficients were also strong (λ = .70–.92).
Loadings for the TALE indicators were also strong (λ = .63–.83) All regression coefficients,
disturbances, and error variances were positive and significant at the p < .001 level. SEM
reliabilities (see Appendix E for the formula) for the first-order AMFJR functions were above the
.70 cutoff: Conversation = .85; Perspective TakingAMFJR = .94; Relationship Maintenance = .83;
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control = .78; Emotion Regulation = .89; and SelfAMFJR =
.82. The factor correlations for the TALE were all > .30 to support the TALE’s assumed oblique
structure: Social × Directive = .85; Social × SelfTALE = .64; and Directive × SelfTALE = .77. A
summary of the factor correlations, first- and second-order standardized factor loadings, squared
multiple correlations, and reliabilities of the AMFJR-TALE second-order CFA can be found in
Table 30.
Mapping the AMFS onto the TALE. A second-order CFA was also run to explore the
associations between the AMFS functions and the broad functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea,
2011). It was expected that Perspective TakingAMFS would map onto the TALE’s Social function,
but it was unknown whether the mental time travel functions of Prospection and Counterfactual
Thinking would map as broadly Directive, broadly SelfTALE, or both.
Although a number of model configurations were run, the best-fitting model (χ2(269) =
1225.93, p < .001) indicated that, as expected, Perspective TakingAMFS was broadly Social,
whereas the Prospection function was broadly Directive, and the Counterfactual Thinking
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function was broadly SelfTALE (see Figure 20). The RMSEA (.063) was a bit above the optimal
cutoff of point .05, but below the upper cutoff of .08 to indicate that the fit was adequate. The
NNFI (.92) and CFI (.93) also indicated adequate fit, falling above the .90 lower-bound cutoff,
but a bit short of the optimal .95 cutoff.
Estimates indicated that the model was stable, with all regression coefficients,
disturbances, and error variances positive and significant (p < .001). Standardized regression
coefficients for the first-order AMFS indicators were all above .60 (λ = .66–.98), with the
Counterfactual Thinking indicators, ranging the highest (λ = .88–.98), which was foreshadowed
by these three items’ high inter-item correlations discussed previously in the Data Screening
section. Loadings for the TALE indicators were similar to those found in the AMFJR mapping
CFA (λ = .66–.84). The second-order standardized coefficients for the AMFS functions were
more widely varied than those of the AMFJR-TALE CFA, but within a desirable range (λ = .36–
.62). The squared multiple correlations were very stable (R2 = .38–.71), with the expected
exception of the SMC for the Counterfactual Thinking indicators (R2 = .78–.98), which were
reflective of the high inter-item correlations discovered at data screening. Likewise, the SMCs of
the second-order Perspective TakingAMFS (R2 = .38) and Prospection (R2 = .34) latents were
good, while Counterfactual Thinking latent, at R2 = .13, accounted for less than the
recommended lower bound cutoff of .20. The SEM reliabilities remained above .70: Perspective
TakingAMFS = .94; Prospection = .82, and Counterfactual Thinking = .99. The TALE’s factor
correlations were as expected for an assumed oblique structure: Social × Directive = .65; Social
× SelfTALE = .52; and Directive × SelfTALE = .71. A summary of the factor correlations, first- and
second-order standardized factor loadings, squared multiple correlations, and reliabilities of the
AMFS-TALE CFA can be found in Table 31.
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Mapping the AMFJR and AMFS onto the TALE. To fully test Hypothesis 3.2, and to
add support to the nine-function model that emerged from the testing of Hypothesis 3.1, a third
second-order CFA was conducted to verify whether the associations between the functions of the
AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation) and TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), and the AMFS
and TALE, would hold when all three scales were examined together.
As before, a series of model configurations were run, but the best fitting model (see
Figure 21) confirmed previous results. The ML Ratio chi-square was again significant, χ2(1757)
= 5008.367, p < .001), most likely due to the large Study 2 sample size. The RMSEA (.045) was
excellent, falling below the optimal .05 cutoff. However, as was the case for all Study 2 CFAs,
the NNFI (.90) was merely adequate, while the CFI (.85) fell short of the lower acceptable cutoff
of .90.
Estimates showed that, as with all previous models, all regression coefficients,
disturbances, and error variances positive and significant (p < .001). Other results suggested a
fairly stable model, with most erratic performance again stemming from the Counterfactual
Thinking function. The squared multiple correlations for the AMFJR indicators ranged from .32
to .76; the AMFS indicators ranged from .43 to .98; and the TALE indicators ranged from .39 to
.69. For the AMFJR latents, the range of SMCs was .50–.85, and for the AMFS, .13–.41.
Standardized regression coefficients for the first-order AMFJR indicators were all above .50 (λ =
.57–.81); the AMFS loadings were above .60 (λ = .66–.99); as were the TALE loadings (λ = .62–
.83). The second-order standardized coefficients were λ = .71–.92 for the AMFJR, and λ = .37–
.64. There were no changes to the SEM reliabilities. For the AMFJ: Conversation = .85;
Perspective TakingAMFJR = .94; Relationship Maintenance = .83; Teaching/Problem
Solving/Behavioral Control = .78; Emotion Regulation = .89; and SelfAMFJR = .82. For the
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AMFS: Perspective TakingAMFS = .94; Prospection = .82, and Counterfactual Thinking = .99.
The TALE’s factor correlations were similar to those yielded from the AMFJR-TALE CFA:
Social × Directive = .87; Social × SelfTALE = .65; and Directive × SelfTALE = .77. A summary of
the factor correlations, first- and second-order standardized factor loadings, SMCs, and
reliabilities of the AMFS-AMFJR-TALE CFA can be found in Table 32.
Hypothesis 3.3 Analyses
Hypothesis 3.3 stated that, because the ERQ’s dimension of Cognitive Reappraisal
assesses individuals’ use of simulation-based emotion-control strategies (Lindeman & Abraham,
2008), the AMFS functions would be moderately and significantly related to indicate that
simulation was a common property of Perspective TakingAMFS, Prospection, and Counterfactual
Thinking. Thus bivariate correlation analyses were conducted to show this relation and to
replicate the provisional results of Study 1. Results showed that all three AMFS functions were
significantly associated with Cognitive Reappraisal: Perspective TakingAMFS (r = .29, p < .001,
with 8.20% variance explained), Prospection (r = .24, p < .001, with 5.52% variance explained),
and Counterfactual Thinking (r = .15, p < .001, with 2.40% variance explained). However,
although all three AMFS functions were, as expected, significantly associated with Cognitive
Reappraisal to support Hypothesis 3.3, the magnitude of each of the correlations was lower than
expected per the provisional results of Study 1.
To more thoroughly assess whether simulation was the common property of the AMFS
functions, a second set of bivariate correlations were run on the three AMFS functions and the
ERQ dimension of Expressive Suppression. Because Expressive Suppression measures
individuals’ tendency to use outward, behavior-based emotion-control strategies, it is not
considered a simulation-based emotion control strategy (Lindeman & Abraham, 2008).
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Therefore, it was hypothesized that the magnitude of the correlations between Expressive
Suppression and the three AMFS functions would be weak and nonsignificant. Results showed
that the magnitude of correlation coefficients were, as expected, smaller than those between the
AMFS functions and Cognitive Reappraisal, but results also showed that all three correlations
were significant: For Perspective TakingAMFS, r = .24, Prospection, p < .001, with 5.70% of
variance explained; for Prospection, r = .20; p < .001, with 4.00% of variance explained; and for
Counterfactual Thinking, r = .12, p < .001, with 1.40% of variance explained.
The significant results that were not predicted for the Expressive Suppression correlations
are likely due to the highly powered model. To establish whether the coefficients from the
Cognitive Reappraisal associations were significantly stronger than the coefficients from the
Expressive Suppression correlations, one-tailed Z-tests for differences between correlations were
conducted (Preacher, 2002). Results showed that none of the Cognitive Reappraisal correlations
were significantly greater than those for Expressive Suppression: Perspective TakingAMFS (r =
.29 versus r = .24), Z = 1.14, p = .127; Prospection (r = .24 versus r = .20), Z = .89, p = .187; and
Counterfactual Thinking (r = .15 versus r = 12), Z = 1.08, p = .140. As such, in terms of
magnitude—i.e., the correlations between the AMFS functions were stronger when correlated
with Cognitive Reappraisal than with Expressive suppression, results supported Hypothesis 3.3.
However, the pattern and differential magnitude of effects were not faithfully replicated. The
bivariate correlations between the AMFS and EQR scale scores can be found in Table 33.
Hypothesis 3.4 Analyses
The purpose of Hypothesis 3.4 was to obtain empirical support for Hypothesis 1.7, which
stated that the form of simulation underlying the autobiographical memory function of
Perspective TakingAMFS is interpersonal simulation, whereas the form of simulation underlying
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the autobiographical memory functions of mental time travel—Prospection and Counterfactual
Thinking—is intrapersonal simulation. Hypothesis 3.4 evaluated the consistency of the current
data and the evidence presented in Study 1. Simultaneous multiple linear regression was used to
determine the amount of variance in Cognitive Reappraisal dimension of the ERQ (Gross &
John, 2003) that was explained by the three AMFS functions. It was predicted that, if Perspective
TakingAMFS is an example of a purpose for which autobiographical memory is used for otherdirected, simulation-based behaviors, then Perspective TakingAMFS would be a significant
predictor of simulation-based Cognitive Reappraisal. Additionally, if Prospection and
Counterfactual Thinking are examples of purposes for which autobiographical memory is used
for self-directed simulation behaviors, then only one of these two mental time travel behaviors
would emerge as a significant predictor of Cognitive Reappraisal. Given that results of Study 1
showed Counterfactual Thinking to be the AMFS function representing intrapersonal simulation,
the same was expected for Study 2.
Results showed that the multiple regression model was significant, R = .30, F(3, 899) =
29.86, p < .001, with the three AMFS functions significantly accounting for 9.1% of the variance
in Cognitive Reappraisal. When holding the other predictors constant, as hypothesized, both
Counterfactual Thinking

(b = .06, t(899) = 2.11, p = .035, .45% unique variance) and

Perspective TakingAMFS (b = .21, t(899) = 5.31, p < .001, 2.86% unique variance) were
significant predictors of Cognitive Reappraisal, but Prospection was not (b = .07, t(899) = 1.67, p
= .094, .28% unique variance). Thus Hypothesis 3.4 was supported by Study 2 results. A
summary of the Hypothesis 3.4 functional multiple regression results can be found in Table 34.
Hypothesis 3.5 Analyses
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Because the Expressive Suppression dimension of the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003)
concerns emotion regulation strategies that can be socially observed, and are likely precipitated
by social pressures and interactions (Gross & John, 2003), Hypothesis 3.5 predicted that
Expressive Suppression would be significantly and moderately associated with the AMFJR’s
socially situated Emotion Regulation function. The Emotion Regulation function is grounded in
the social context of joint reminiscence, a characteristic of which is the use of “past-talk” with
another or others in order to obtain, or an attempt to understand how to obtain, emotion control.
Results showed that Hypothesis 3.5 was supported. The bivariate correlation between the
AMFJR function of Emotion Regulation and the ERQ’s dimension of Expressive Suppression
was significant, r = .45, p < .001, with 20.3% of the variance in Expressive Suppression
accounted for by Emotion Regulation. In comparison, the bivariate correlation between the
AMFJR function of Emotion Regulation and Cognitive Reappraisal was significant, but weaker
in magnitude, r = .26, p < .001, with 6.5% of the variance in Cognitive Reappraisal explained by
Emotion Regulation. A Z-test for the difference between correlations (Preacher, 2002) showed
that the coefficient for Emotion Regulation and Expressive Suppression (r = .45) was
significantly greater than the coefficient for Emotion Regulation and Cognitive Reappraisal (r =
.26), Z = 4.64, p < .001. However, because Emotion Regulation, Cognitive Reappraisal, and
Expressive Suppression all concern emotion control, it is reasonable that all three would share
variance; yet, as expected, more variance was shared between the two explicitly social factors:
Emotion Regulation and Expressive Suppression. The bivariate correlations between the AMFJR
Emotion Regulation scales score and ERQ scale scores summarized in Table 35.
Hypothesis 3.6 Analyses61
61

All descriptions of HEXACO dimensions and facets provided with respect to the Hypothesis 3.6 Analyses
sections are by Lee & Ashton (2009).
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Hypothesis 3.6 was extended for the purpose of replicating the personality effects
previously reported with respect to the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) as well as the effects found
for the AMFS in Study 1. Because no previous study had tested for personality effects on the
functions of AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), Study 2 explored the idea that those
personality traits predictive of the broad TALE functions would be inherited by their
corresponding subordinate functions according to the confirmed Hypothesis 3.2 mapping.
Additionally, the idea of inheritance was also explored with respect to the lower-order AMFS
functions and their higher-order TALE correlates. All Study 2 personality dimensions were
measured using the HEXACO-PI-R (Ashton & Lee, 2005; 2009).
The following personality-effects subsections includes only those results that were
significant at p < .05 or less. Because effects were small, only effect sizes in the form of squared
semi-partial coefficients (i.e., the amount of variance that the predictor uniquely explains in the
outcome) have been reported. The customary statistics reported for regression analyses (e.g.,
zero-order correlation coefficient, t-statistic, unstandardized regression coefficients, and p-value
(* = .05, ** = .01, and *** = .001) are detailed in the accompanying tables.
Personality and the TALE. To support the replication of findings reported elsewhere,
Study 2 results showed that, as expected, the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) function of Openness
to Experience was significantly predictive of the broad Directive function (R2 = 3.7%) and
SelfTALE (R2 = 1.1%). Also as expected, Extraversion significantly predicted the broad Social
function (R2 = 5.4%).
Study 2 results also showed a number of other personality effects for the functions of the
TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) not previously reported in the literature. For the Social function,
Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 6.2%), Conscientiousness (R2 = 1.8%), Openness to Experience
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(R2 = 4.6%), and the interstitial facet of Altruism (R2 = 4.9%) were all significant predictors.
With respect to the Directive function, results showed that all HEXACO dimensions except for
Honesty-Humility were significant predictors: Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 6.8%),
Extraversion (R2 = 3.2%), Agreeableness (R2 = 1.7%), Conscientiousness (R2 = 3.7%), and
Altruism (R2 = 6.9%). Finally, for SelfTALE, the inverse of Honesty-Humility (R2 = 1.2%),
Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 6.7%), Extraversion (R2 = 0.8%), and Altruism (R2 = 1.0%)
were significant predictors. A summary of the regression analysis results for the TALE functions
can be found in Table 36.
Personality and the AMFS. In support of Study 1 findings, results showed that
Perspective TakingAMFS was significantly predicted by Extraversion (R2 = 2.7%),
Conscientiousness (R2 = 1.4%), and Openness to Experience (R2 = 3.7%). Not supported was the
Study 1 finding that the function of Perspective TakingAMFS is predicted by Emotional Stability
(the inverse of Emotionality/Neuroticism). Rather, results of Study 2 showed that
Emotionality/Neuroticism predicted the function of Perspective TakingAMFS (R2 = 3.9%).
Although not found in Study 1—most likely due to the small effects—Study 2 found that
Perspective TakingAMFS was significantly predicted by both the dimension of Agreeableness (R2
= 0.5%) and Altruism (R2 = 2.5%). Table 37 summarizes the significant results of the AMFS
personality effects tests (dimensions and facets).
With respect Prospection, as expected per Study 1 results, the dimensions of
Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 2.5%), Conscientiousness (R2 = 0.7%), and Openness to
Experience (R2 = 4.8%) were significant predictors. In addition, although not foreshadowed by
Study 1 results, the inverse of the Honesty-Humility dimension (R2 = 0.5%), Extraversion (R2 =
0.6%), and Altruism (R2 = 0.8%) significantly predicted the function of Prospection.
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All three of the HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2005; 2009) dimensions expected to
significantly predict the function of Counterfactual Thinking based on Study 1 provisional results
were confirmed: The inverse of Honesty-Humility (R2 = 3.7%), Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2
=1.6%), and the inverse of Extraversion, also thought of as Introversion (R2 = 0.5%). Two of the
remaining three HEXACO dimensions were also significant predictors of the function of
Counterfactual Thinking: the inverse of Agreeableness—i.e., a tendency toward criticism and
argumentativeness (R2 = 0.5%), and the inverse of Conscientiousness—i.e., tending to be
impulsive, non-reflective, and careless (R2 = 1.3%).
Personality and the AMFJR. Regression analyses were also run to test for possible
personality effects on the functions of the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation). It was
hypothesized that those AMFJR functions that had been shown in previous research by Ranson
and Fitzgerald to map onto the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) would inherit the personality effects
of their corresponding higher-order TALE functions. Results supported that expectation for all
AMFJR functions except for Conversation, which was not predicted by Agreeableness although
the TALE Social function was.
With respect to those TALE personality effects that were replicated from previous
findings,

Openness

to

Experience

predicted

the

AMFJR

Directive

Functions

of

Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (R2 = 3.3%) and Emotion Regulation (R2 =
3.6%). As was found for SelfTALE, SelfAMFJR (R2 = 2.8%) was also significantly predicted by
Openness to Experience. Also supported was the expectation that Extraversion would predict the
broadly Social AMFJR functions of Conversation (R2 = 5.9%), Perspective TakingAMFJR (R2 =
5.9%), and Relationship Maintenance (R2 = 10.0%).
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Of the other personality effects inherited by the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in
preparation) functions from their corresponding TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) functions, results
showed the following. In addition to Extraversion, the Social function of Conversation was
significantly predicted by Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 3.7%), Conscientiousness (R2 =
3.1%), Openness to Experience (R2 = 3.4%), and Altruism (R2 = 4.6%). For the broadly Social
Perspective TakingAMFJR, additional significant predictors were Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 =
4.0%), Agreeableness (R2 = 1.7%), Conscientiousness (R2 = 2.5%), Openness to Experience (R2
= 4.7%), and Altruism (R2 = 3.9%). For the remaining AMFJR Social function of Relationship
Maintenance, in addition to Extraversion, Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 9.8%), Agreeableness
(R2 = 1.3%), Conscientiousness (R2 = 1.9%), Openness to Experience (R2 = 2.9%), and Altruism
(R2 = 6.0%) were all significant predictors.
With respect to the broadly Directive AMFJR functions, the HEXACO (Ashton & Lee,
2005; 2009) dimensions that were, in addition to Openness to Experience, significant predictors
of Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control were Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 4.8%),
Extraversion (R2 = 6.2%), Agreeableness (R2 = 0.5%), Conscientiousness (R2 = 2.9%), and
Altruism (R2 3.6%). The HEXACO dimensions that, in addition to Openness to Experience,
significantly predicted the AMFJR Emotion Regulation function were Emotionality/Neuroticism
(R2 = 10.9%), Extraversion (R2 = 4.6%), Agreeableness (R2 = 0.8%), Conscientiousness (R2 =
1.4%), and Altruism (R2 = 5.3%).
Finally, as was prefigured by the significant personality effects for the SelfTALE function,
SelfAMFJR

was

predicted

by

the

inverse
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Honesty-Humility
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Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 4.9%), Extraversion (R2 = 5.2%), Openness to Experience (R2 =
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2.8%), and Altruism (R2 = 0.7%). Table 38 summarizes the significant results of the regression
analyses run to test personality effects of AMFJR functions.
Goal 3.1 Analyses
Results of the Goal 3.1 analyses yielded two significant age effects. Age predicted the use
of autobiographical memory for the broad SelfTALE, with 0.8% of the variance in SelfTALE
significantly accounted for by age. The obtained regression equation (Y = 4.292 – .010X)
indicated that individuals use autobiographical memory with less frequency on average for the
SelfTALE function as they get older, with the average frequency of autobiographical memory use
of broad SelfTALE of 4.11 (on a 1 to 6 Likert Scale) at 18 years of age decreasing to an average
frequency of 3.63 by the age of 66+.
In keeping with the idea that age effects are inherited by the lower-order functions that
map onto their higher-order TALE “parent” function, age predicted the use of autobiographical
memory for the broadly Self Counterfactual Thinking function, with 1.7% of the variance in the
function of Counterfactual Thinking significantly accounted for by age. Consistent with effect
found for SelfTALE, per the obtained regression equation (Y = 4.586 –.015X), as individuals age,
they use autobiographical memory content with less frequency on average for the purpose of
counterfactual thinking, with an average frequency of 4.32 at 18 years of age, which declines to
an average frequency of 3.60 by the age of 66+. Table 39 summarizes the results of the Goal 3.1
regression analyses.
Goal 3.2 Analyses
As expected, the gender split for Study 2 was equivalent (M = 49.8%; F = 49.7%;
Transgender or Prefer Not to Answer, 0.4%), making gender comparisons across males and
females tenable. However, given that very little direct evidence was available to inform

141
hypotheses, Goal 3.2 was instead to explore the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), AMFS, and
AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation) functions for possible gender effects.
Although no previous findings regarding gender effects for the TALE have been
reported, Study 2 results showed that females use autobiographical memory content for the broad
Social purposes with significantly greater frequency on average (M = 4.40, SD = 1.04) than men
(M = 4.19, SD = 1.04), with 1.0% of the variance in the broad Social significantly accounted for
by gender. However, none of the lower-order AMFS and AMFJR functions that Hypothesis 3.2
found to map onto the broad Social function were significantly predicted gender.
Although not inherited as gender effects from their corresponding Directive or SelfTALE
functions, results showed that gender predicts Counterfactual Thinking (R2 = 1.0%), such that
men use autobiographical memory for counterfactual thinking significantly more frequently on
average (M = 4.20, SD = 1.32) than do females (F = 3.95, SD = 1.18). It was also found that
gender predicted the frequency with which autobiographical memory is used for the AMFJR
function of Emotion Regulation (R2 = 0.5%), whereby females use autobiographical memory
with significantly greater frequency on average (M = 4.08, SD = 1.05) than do men (M = 3.93,
SD = 1.04). Goal 3.2 regression analyses are summarized in Table 39
Goal 3.3 Analyses
Goal 3.3 was to examine differences in the frequency with which individuals from Study
2’s three largest ethnic groups (Caucasian, n = 584; South Asian, n = 157; and AfricanAmerican/Black, n = 51) use autobiographical memory for the functions measured by the TALE
(Bluck & Alea, 2011), AMFS, and AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation). Of primary
interest to Study 2 was the replication of results found by Ranson (2014), such that Caucasians
(M = 4.53, SD = 1.01) were found to use autobiographical memory with greater frequency than
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African-American/Blacks (M = 4.40, SD = 1.07) for the AMFJR function of Conversation, and
that Caucasians (M = 3.97, SD = .93) were found to use autobiographical memory with less
frequency than African-American/Blacks (M = 4.12, SD = 1.02) for the AMFJR function of
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control. Also consistent with the Ranson findings were
the size of the Study 2 effects, where, for Conversation, r = .039 (compared to R2 < 2%62 for
Ranson, 2014); and for Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control, r = .041 (compared to R2
< 2% for Ranson, 2014). However these effects did not reach significance given the
unexpectedly small African-American/Blacks sample. A post-hoc power analysis confirmed that
these two comparisons were underpowered, showed that, based on the smallest of the two effect
sizes, r = .03963, achieved power was only .20 (where ≥ .80 considered the lowest amount of
power needed to obtain significance). Thus, had the African-American/Black subsample been
commensurate with the Ranson study subsample (n = 451), the Study 2 effects would have been
fully replicated.
Goal 3.3 analyses also yielded evidence for a number of novel culture effects across
various functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), AMFS and AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald,
in preparation). For the TALE, culture predicted SelfTALE (r = .24), but not Social or Directive.
Specifically, results showed that South Asians (M = 4.48, SD = .92) use autobiographical
memory more for SelfTALE than do Caucasians (M = 3.78, SD = 1.25).
The SelfTALE subordinate function of Counterfactual Thinking was also significantly
predicted by culture (r = .15) to suggest that the culture effects were inherited by Counterfactual
Thinking from SelfTALE. Results of the Mann-Whitney U post-hoc comparison tests showed that
individuals who identify as South Asian use autobiographical memory with greater frequency (M
62

Ranson (2014) evaluated culture effects using multiple regression, whereas the current paper used Kruskal-Wallis
comparison tests to better accommodate the unequal sample sizes.
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From a Mann-Whitney U comparison test, where r = |Z|/√N (Field, 2005).
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= 4.43, SD = 1.08)64 for Counterfactual Thinking than do individuals who identify as Caucasian
(M = 3.97, SD = 1.29). However, although not foreshadowed by the culture effects found for the
higher-order SelfTALE, results also showed that South Asians (M = 4.43, SD = 1.08) use
autobiographical memory or the purpose of Counterfactual Thinking with significantly greater
frequency (r = .20) than individuals who identify as African-American/Black (M = 3.82, SD =
1.43).
Also implying that the culture effect found for SelfTALE was inherited by its AMFJR
subordinate function, SelfAMFJR was significantly predicted by culture (r = .25), such that South
Asians use autobiographical memory content with greater frequency (M = 4.39, SD = .86) than
do Caucasians (M =3.77, SD = 1.08). However, results also showed that South Asians use
autobiographical memory with greater frequency than African-American/Blacks (M = 3.80, SD =
1.11; r = .25). Thus, while results support the inheritance from SelfTALE of differential use of
autobiographical memory content between Caucasians and South Asians, the differential use of
autobiographical memory content between South Asians and African-American/Blacks was not
prefigured by culture effects for SelfTALE.
Although no significant culture effects were found for the broad Social function, small
but significant individual differences in the rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical
memory content across the evaluated culture groups were found for all functions the AMFJR
functions except Conversation (p = .223). Specifically, for Perspective TakingAMFJR (r = .172),
post-hoc Mann-Whitney U tests showed that South Asians (M = 4.52, SD = 1.05) use
autobiographical memory with greater frequency than Caucasians (M = 4.06, SD = 1.18). With
respect to Relationship Maintenance, South Asians use autobiographical memory more
64

Table 40 lists the group mean ranks on which each reported Mann-Whitney U Z-score was computed. However,
mean scale scores are featured here, given that they are more representative of the range of possible scores, and thus
more intuitively interpretable than group mean ranks.
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frequently (M = 4.52, SD = .79) than do both Caucasians (M = 4.00, SD = 1.02), r = .21, or
African-American/Blacks (M = 4.01, SD = 1.14), r = .20.
Finally, no culture effects were found for the broad Directive function, but culture effects
were found for the broadly directive AMFJR function of Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral
Control (r = .21), whereby Caucasians (M =3.97, SD = .93) report using autobiographical
memory content with less frequency for this purpose than do South Asians (M =4.41, SD = .77).
The same pattern was found for the broadly Directive Emotion Regulation function of the
AMFJR (r = .18), such that Caucasians (M = 3.88, SD = 1.07) reporting less frequent use of
autobiographical memory content for this function than South Asians (M =4.35, SD = .83). For a
summary of the significant results of the culture effects analyses, see Table 40.
3.5 Discussion
In Support of Hypotheses and Goals
The following sections address the results of Study 2’s six hypothesis tests and the
exploration of its three goals. The broader merits, limitations, implications, and future directions
of Study 2 (Chapter 3) as it pertains to the current paper (i.e., Chapters 1–3) will be discussed in
Chapter 4.
Hypothesis 3.1. The first of Study 2’s six hypotheses was meant to establish that the
Perspective TakingAMFS, Prospection, and Counterfactual Thinking functions of autobiographical
memory were viable in their own right, thus demonstrating structural and functional integrity
when combined with a set of previously validated autobiographical memory functions measured
by a separate scale. Results showed that the AMFS functions were distinct and independent from
the functions of the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation).
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However, Hypothesis 3.1 predicted an eight-function model consisting of Prospection,
Counterfactual

Thinking,

Conversation,

Relationship

Maintenance,

Teaching/Problem

Solving/Behavioral Control, Emotion Regulation, Self, and the “Perspective TakingS&JR”
function, which consisted of the combined items of the Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective
TakingAMFJR subscales. Study 2 assumed that the “perspective taking” construct, regardless of
autobiographical memory functions scale to which it belonged, or within which context
(simulation-based or socially situated) its items were embedded, could be viewed as a single
purpose for which autobiographical memory content could be used. However, results did not
support this assumption. Rather, additional analyses run to investigate differential patterns of
effects across the Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR functions showed that the
use of autobiographical memory for perspective taking is both simulation-based and socially
situated. When examined with respect to simulation—i.e., using both Perspective TakingAMFS
and Perspective TakingAMFJR as predictors of the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) dimension of
simulation-based Cognitive Reappraisal—both Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective
TakingAMFJR explained significant variance in Cognitive Reappraisal. Likewise, although not
statistically significant, Perspective TakingAMFS function uniquely explained more variance in
Cognitive Reappraisal than did Perspective TakingAMFJR. This finding suggests that, although the
mechanism of simulation is common to the behavior of perspective taking, regardless of whether
measured using the AMFS or AMFJR, Perspective TakingAMFS, as a simulation-based measure
of perspective taking, yields the stronger association with simulation-based Cognitive
Reappraisal. When Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR were tested as
predictors of the socially oriented Expressive Suppression dimension of the ERQ, both
Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR accounted for significant variance in
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Expressive Suppression. However, that the socially situated Perspective TakingAMFJR uniquely
explained a significant amount of this variance above and beyond that explained by Perspective
TakingAMFS to imply that, although perspective taking as measured by either scale is a social
behavior (e.g., Ickes, 2003; Malle & Hodges, 2005), the social aspect is enhanced when
measured using the Perspective TakingAMFJR subscale.
Also evaluated were individual differences in the estimated use of autobiographical
memory content for simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS versus socially situated
Perspective TakingAMFJR. When the mean estimated use of autobiographical memory content for
the four-item Perspective TakingAMFS subscale was compared to the mean use for the two-item
Perspective TakingAMFJR subscale, results showed that people use autobiographical memory
content more frequently for simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS. However, when
comparing the two-item Perspective TakingAMFJR subscale to the Perspective TakingAMFS(2)
subscale, which featured only the same two items comprising Perspective TakingAMFJR, the
opposite effect was found. With the random ordering of survey blocks eliminating the possibility
of order effects, other than the different contexts within which the AMFS and AMFJR are
situated, there were no other measures in Study 2 that would help explicate why respondents
differentially estimated their use of autobiographical memory content for Perspective
TakingAMFJR and Perspective TakingAMFS(2).
Because these myriad discrepancies endorsed the treatment of Perspective TakingAMFS
and Perspective TakingAMFJR as independent, rather interdependent (e.g., Perspective
TakingS&JR), functions, the Hypothesis 3.1 model was revised to include nine, rather than eight,
functions. And although the modified CFA showed that, overall, the nine-function model
demonstrated better fit than the eight-function model, there were minor issues with the
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Counterfactual Thinking subscale that may have undermined an even better fit. However, results
implied that any compromised estimates were likely limited to the Counterfactual Thinking
subscale, as estimates for the remaining subscales were stable. That the fit indices implied an
adequate, rather than excellent, fit was likely due to the Counterfactual Thinking items’ high
inter-item correlations—an occurrence known to produce inflated chi-square statistics that in
turn attenuate the value of fit indices (Clark & Watson, 1995)—rather than misspecification of
the nine-function model.
Hypothesis 3.2. The first objective of Hypothesis 3.2 was to use second-order CFA
modeling to replicate the associations between the functions of the (Bluck & Alea, 2011) and the
AMFJR as reported by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation). As expected, results showed that
the AMFJR Conversation, Perspective TakingAMFJR, and Relationship Maintenance functions
mapped onto the broad Social function of the TALE; the Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral
Control and Emotion Regulation functions of the AMFJR mapped onto the TALE’s broad
Directive function, and SelfAMFJR mapped onto SelfTALE. Although, to be thorough, several other
configurations, including cross-loadings between functions, were explored, none were backed by
compelling theoretical evidence, nor did any yield a better fit than that based on findings by
Ranson and Fitzgerald.
The second objective of Hypothesis 3.2 was to explore associations between the AMFS
functions and the broad functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), also using second-order
modeling. As expected, CFA results showed that Perspective TakingAMFS mapped onto the broad
Social function. However, theory and related research were somewhat ambiguous in terms of
how the two mental time travel functions would definitively map—accordingly, either or both
could have been broadly Directive, SelfTALE, or some combination thereof. Results showed that

148
Prospection was strongly broadly Directive, Counterfactual Thinking was moderately broadly
Self, with neither cross loading onto other TALE functions. That the Prospection function was
found to be broadly Directive was best supported by theory: It has long been hypothesized
elsewhere that one of the Directive uses of autobiographical memory content is the predicting of
and planning for the future (e.g., Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Alea, 2011; Williams et al., 2008).
This purpose is reflected in two explicitly “future thinking-oriented” Directive items (numbers 7
and 9), which ask respondents to estimate their use of autobiographical memory content for
“guiding one’s future” and “deciding which path to take.” Thus, the conceptual alignment of
these two TALE items and the three items of the Prospection subscale likely fostered the
mapping indicated by CFA results. That Study 2 found no association between the Prospection
function and SelfTALE was fairly unsurprising: Although research shows that self-continuity—
which is an overarching purpose of SelfTALE by definition (Bluck & Alea, 2011)—is a
phenomenon that concerns the extending of self forward (and backward) in time (e.g., Benoit,
Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hershfield, 2011), no SelfTALE items
explicitly reflect the use of autobiographical memory for such a purpose.
Although behavioral counterfactual thinking is arguably conceptually Directive—i.e., it is
known to be a strategy for regulating behavior (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 2008) and emotions (e.g.,
Allen et al., 2014; Lindeman & Abraham, 2008; Ruiselová et al., 2009; Ruiselová &
Prokopcáková, 2010)—results yielded no association between the AMFS’s Counterfactual
Thinking function and the Directive function of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011). Rather, results
showed the Counterfactual Thinking function to be broadly, albeit moderately, Self. One
possible explanation as to why a seemingly conceptually Directive phenomenon like
Counterfactual Thinking would be SelfTALE rather than Directive may be due to the content of the
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Directive function subscale items. Although the TALE’s Directive items address the expected
practical use of autobiographical memory content for Directive purposes (e.g., “learning from
past mistakes” and “remembering lessons learned”), these items are not in any way aligned with
the idea of “reframing” one’s past—for any reason, much less counterfactual thinking
specifically. But nor do the items of SelfTALE reflect the “reframing” of autobiographical memory
content; rather, SelfTALE concerns the self-reflective use of autobiographical memory content to
establish self-concept and maintain self-continuity (e.g., “still the type of person I was”;
determining “how I have changed”). However, the literature indicates that counterfactual
thinking is motivated by a number of self- (and perhaps therefore Self-) directed goals and
phenomena, such as ego-involvement (Anderson & Slusher, 1986), self-evaluation (Tyser,
McCrea, & Knüpfer, 2012), self-motives (Sanna, Chang, & Meier, 2001), self-esteem (Roese &
Olson, 1993), self-efficacy and self-confidence (Roese, 1999), and self-referencing (e.g.,
Burnkrant & Unnava, 1989; Roese & Olson, 1993). Thus, although counterfactual thinking
clearly has a Directive-like utility—i.e., it can highlight one’s actions and prompt alternative
responses—it is the self—its efficacy, motivation, confidence, and consistency—that Study 2
results, and to some extent, related theory, suggest is ultimately being served by counterfactual
thinking.
The third and final objective of Hypothesis 3.2 was to test whether mappings found for
the TALE and AMFJR, and the TALE and AMFS, would hold when combined. It was thought
that stability in this model would be additional support for the autonomy of the AMFS and
AMFJR functions found in the testing of Hypothesis 3.1. Results of this second-order CFA
showed that the best-fitting model confirmed the mappings of the previous two CFAs, such that
the broadly Social functions were Perspective TakingAMFS, Perspective TakingAMFJR, AMFJR
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Conversation, and AMFJR Relationship Maintenance. The three functions that were broadly
Directive were AMFS Prospection, AMFJR Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control, and
AMFJR Emotion Regulation. And finally, AMFS Counterfactual Thinking SelfAMFJR were
broadly SelfTALE.
Hypothesis 3.3. In order to test the construct validity of the AMFS, Study 1 evaluated the
associations between the three AMFS functions and the two ERQ (Gross & John, 2003)
dimensions of Cognitive Reappraisal (to establish convergent validity) and Expressive
Suppression (to establish discriminative validity). Significant, moderate correlations between
Cognitive Reappraisal and the three AMFS functions suggested that simulation was the source of
the association, whereas weak, nonsignificant correlations between the AMFS functions and the
socially oriented Expressive Suppression further supported that line of reasoning. Thus Study 2’s
Hypothesis 3.3 aimed to replicate the Study 1 findings with respect human behavior rather than
the psychometric properties of the AMFS. Hypothesis 3.3 results supported the predicted
associations; however, the expected associations between the AMFS functions and Cognitive
Reappraisal were only slightly larger than the associations between the AMFS functions and
Expressive Suppression. Further, all Hypothesis 3.3 correlations were significant, even when
effect sizes were small—an outcome compelled by Study 2’s large sample size. Yet, results
implied that people who use autobiographical memory content with greater frequency for
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking are more likely to employ
subjective, thought-restructuring emotion control strategies than outward, behavior-regulating
strategies—i.e., those that can be socially observed and/or are likely to be prompted by social
pressures and interactions (Gross & John, 2003).
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Another difference between the Study 1 and Study 2 findings was that, for Study 1,
Counterfactual Thinking accounted for the most variance in Cognitive Reappraisal. This was a
plausible outcome given that both Cognitive Reappraisal and behavioral counterfactual thinking
concern simulation-based strategies for controlling emotional responses. As such, it was assumed
for Study 2 that some of the variance shared between Cognitive Reappraisal and the
Counterfactual Thinking would be, above and beyond that attributable to simulation, attributable
to their use as emotion control strategies. Study 2 therefore expected to replicate not only
direction, but magnitude, of Study 1 effects. However, results showed that the function
explaining the most variance in Cognitive Reappraisal was Perspective TakingAMFS—not
Counterfactual Thinking—the latter of which shared the least amount of variance with Cognitive
Reappraisal. As for why the Study 2 assumptions were not supported, one or more of the
following reasons are possible. One, as was discovered during Study 2 data screening, the three
Counterfactual Thinking items were more highly correlated in Study 2 than in Study 1. As
redundancy can attenuate the magnitude of effects (e.g., Loevinger, 1954), if the high inter-item
correlations are due to redundancy (although there was no evidence of redundancy in Study 1),
such would explain the reduced association between Counterfactual Thinking and Cognitive
Reappraisal. Two, Study 1 results may reflect order and/or priming effects. The Study 1 AMFS
block, which preceded the ERQ block, was itself preceded by the mental time travel conditions.
Thus, the mental time travel conditions—which included a counterfactual thinking condition but
not a perspective taking condition (see the Chapter 2 Instruments section for details)—may have
compelled respondents to estimate their use of autobiographical memory for the AMFS items
differently in Study 1 than in Study 2. Order effects were not possible in Study 2 because the
mental time travel conditions were omitted, and because, with the exception of the demographics
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and self-descriptor blocks, all subsequent survey blocks were randomly ordered. And three, the
Study 1 results that correspond to those of Hypothesis 3.3 were provisional, as the same data
used to validate the AMFS was then used for further inferential testing using the validated
AFMFS. Consequently, Study 1 results may have been biased whereas Study 2 results were not.
If both bias and order effects were an issue in Study 1, then the Study 1 effects may have been
excessively inflated and therefore unreplicable.
Hypothesis 3.4. Hypothesis 3.4 tested the functional relation between the AMFS
functions and Cognitive Reappraisal to determine if simulation was a source of shared variance
as found in Study 1. Results replicated the Study 1 findings, thus supporting the Hypothesis 3.4
prediction that Perspective TakingAMFS and Counterfactual Thinking would significantly explain
variance in Cognitive Reappraisal but Prospection would not. That Study 2 replicated these
findings from Study 1 had additional utility in results provided empirical support for Chapter 1’s
Hypothesis 1.7—that the autobiographical memory function of perspective reflects interpersonal
simulation, whereas the autobiographical memory functions of mental time travel—here,
prospection and counterfactual thinking—reflect intrapersonal simulation.
That said, although the testing of Hypothesis 3.4 confirmed the expected functional
relation between the AMFS functions and Cognitive Reappraisal, Study 1 findings were not
replicated as faithfully as expected. Specifically, Study 1 found that the Counterfactual Thinking
function uniquely explained the most variance in Cognitive Reappraisal, but Study 2 found that
the strongest predictor of Cognitive Reappraisal was instead Perspective TakingAMFS. That these
incongruous patterns of effects were prefigured in the results of Hypothesis 3.3 imply that
Hypothesis 3.4 results could have been prejudiced by the same psychometric issues as detailed
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for Hypothesis 3.3—i.e., high inter-item correlations within the Counterfactual Thinking
function, Study 1 order effects, and/or bias in Study 1’s provisional results.
Hypothesis 3.5. Hypothesis 3.5 predicted that, because the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003)
dimension of Expressive Suppression concerns emotion control strategies that involve more
social, externally observable behavior, the Expressive Suppression subscale would be more
strongly associated with the Emotion Regulation subscale of the socially situated AMFJR than it
would with simulation-based Cognitive Reappraisal. Findings supported the prediction, with
results showing that the amount of variance shared by Emotion Regulation and Expressive
Suppression was significantly greater than the amount of overlapping variance shared by
Emotion Regulation and Cognitive Reappraisal. These results suggest that, as expected,
individuals who use autobiographical memory content with greater frequency for Emotion
Regulation reminiscence behaviors are also more likely to employ Expressive Suppression-type
emotion control strategies, which presumably help them to regulate outward behavior.
Hypothesis 3.6. A main objective of Hypothesis 3.6 was to replicate previous results
concerning the personality dimensions of the HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2005, 2009) and the
autobiographical memory functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011). However, all HEXACO
dimensions were tested as predictors of the three TALE functions in order to either confirm
previous reports that certain personality traits were not predictive of the Social, SelfTALE, and
Directive functions, or to discover new associations that previous studies may have been too
underpowered to detect. Hypothesis 3.6 also sought to replicate the personality effects found for
the AMFS functions during Study 1, and to explore whether those personality effects found for
the TALE would be inherited by the AMFS and AMFJR functions onto which the TALE
functions correspondingly mapped.
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Personality and the TALE: The Social Function. Study 2 replicated results from
previous studies (Cappeliez & O’Rourke, 2002; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010; Bluck & Alea,
2009) of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) functions to confirm that Openness to Experience was
predicted the Social, SelfTALE, and Directive functions; Emotionality/Neuroticism predicted the
Directive and Self functions; and Extraversion predicted the Social function.
A number of novel personality effects with respect to the broad functions of the TALE
(Bluck & Alea, 20110 were also obtained in Study 2. In addition to Extraversion and Openness
to Experience, results showed that the broad Social function was predicted by
Emotionality/Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and the interstitial facet of
Altruism. Although Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010) reported that the relation between the Social
function and Emotionality/Neuroticism was positive, it was nonsignificant. However, given the
small effect (5.4% variance in the Social subscale accounted for by Emotionality/Neuroticism)
yielded in Study 2, it may be that the Rasmussen and Berntsen sample of 136 was not
statistically powerful enough to detect it. There is also something of a contradiction in this effect
when compared to Extraversion; a number of studies report that trait Extraversion and
Emotionality/Neuroticism tend to produce differential and often contrasting effects, especially
when assessed with respect to social behaviors (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1980; Hamburger & BenArtzi, 2000; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1980; Magnus, Diener, Fujita, & Pavot, 1983). Yet Study 2
results suggest that the use of autobiographical memory for Social purposes is equally high for
extraverts (i.e., low in introversion) and people high in neuroticism. Studies by Hamburger and
Ben-Artzi (2000) and Hamburger, Wainapel, and Fox (2004) show that, whereas people high in
Extraversion are naturally social and therefore seek out social situations, people high in
Introversion are less comfortable in social settings, and thus become anxious or experience other
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negative emotions as a result. However, introverts demonstrate a level of sociability similar to
extraverts in the online setting. As such, it may be individuals consider both face-to-face and
online settings when estimating their rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical
memory for Social purposes.
Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010) found no significant associations between the three
TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) functions and Agreeableness or Conscientiousness. However, Study
2 found both personality dimensions to predict the broad Social function, albeit with very small
effects (0.7% and 1.6%, respectively), which could explain the Rasmussen and Berntsen results.
However, the direction of the Rasmussen and Berntsen effects were opposite that found in Study
2, the latter of which suggested that rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical
memory content for reminiscence behaviors of a Social nature are cooperative, willing to
compromise, disciplined, and careful (Lee & Ashton, 2009)—all traits that would plausibly
facilitate social interactions. This also aligns with the Study 2 finding that the Social function is
predicted by Altruism—the tendency to be sympathetic and empathetic toward others (Lee &
Ashton, 2009).
Finally, of note with respect to personality and the broad Social function of the TALE
(Bluck & Alea, 2011) is that the significant personality effects found for the TALE corresponded
to those found for Perspective TakingAMFS. The relevance to this to Study 2’s conclusions, is that
the Perspective TakingAMFS was shown in the testing of Hypothesis 3.2 to map broadly onto the
TALE Social function. Thus, that personality effects can seen as flowing from the higher-order
functions (such as the broad Social function) to the lower-order functions to which they are
empirically linked (such as Perspective TakingAMFS function) is vital to Study 2 conclusions.
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Personality and the TALE: The Directive Function. Study 2 also confirmed previous
findings by Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010) with respect to Directive function of the TALE
(Bluck & Alea, 2011), such that the broad Directive function Emotionality/Neuroticism and
Openness to Experience. In addition, Study 2 found that the broad Directive function was
predicted by Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Altruism. Although no
previous association between Extraversion and the broad Directive function have been reported,
it is a plausible link considering that there is a social component to the TALE, including its
Directive subscale. For example, that the TALE items are prefaced with instructions to consider
the extent to which they think about or “talk to other people about their life.” (Bluck et al., 2005;
Bluck & Alea, 2011). As such, it is likely that the TALE elicits estimations of individuals’ rated
frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory for Directive purposes that facilitate or
even require explicit social interaction—e.g., talking about the past with others to “help solve a
problem”; talking about the past with others to “remember something that someone else said or
did that might help me now.” That Study 2 found Agreeableness to predict the Directive function
contradicts the Rasmussen and Berntsen finding that, although nonsignificant, showed an inverse
association. However, the Study 2 results is more in line with the idea that, in order to discuss
problems or past scenarios with others requires some degree of cooperation and tendency not to
judge that are characteristic of high levels of trait Agreeableness (Lee & Ashton, 2009). Yet, the
Rasmussen and Berntsen finding is mirrored in the personality effect between the Prospection
function—which Hypothesis 3.2 testing indicated is a Directive subscale—and the Flexibility
facet of Agreeableness. Thus, the inconsistency of the Agreeableness function across
autobiographical memory function studies as observed by Rasmussen and Berntsen appears to be
confirmed by Study 2. However, it may be that such inconsistency reflects instead adaptability:
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Being well intentioned, nonjudgmental, and warm could facilitate socially oriented Directive
reminiscence behaviors and the reduces risk of criticism or rejection; but being too agreeable
could encourage others to take advantage or call the shots on one’s behalf—the latter of which
would reduce one’s need to use of personal past information for Directive purposes. That
Altruism predicts the Directive function implies that empathy toward others facilitates the use of
brainstorming past-talk with others.
Finally, in support of the Hypothesis 3.2 results, the personality effects found for the
higher-order Directive function corresponded to those found in the AMFS Prospection. This
corroborates the Hypothesis 3.2 conclusion that the broad Directive function is empirically
linked to the Prospection function such that Prospection can be thought to have inherited the
effects from the broad Directive function onto which it maps.
Personality and the TALE: The SelfTALE Function. Findings by Rasmussen and
Berntsen (2010) that Emotionality/Neuroticism and Openness to New Experience predict
SelfTALE were replicated in Study 2. Additionally, SelfTALE was found for the first time in Study 2
to be predicted by Extraversion, Altruism, and the inverse Honesty-Humility. As with the
Directive function, that Extraversion is predictive of SelfTALE may be influenced by the social
dimensions of the TALE, such that talking about the past with others to understand and maintain
the self may align with trait sociability. However, the effect found in Study 2 was very small
(with Extraversion explaining only 0.8% of the variance in SelfTALE), thus being low in
Extraversion is not likely to diminish one’s use of autobiographical memory content for SelfTALE
purposes. The empirical link with Altruism may also be tapping into the social aspects of the
SelfTALE function, such that empathy toward others, as well as toward one’s self, should help
foster the personal dialog beneficial to the understanding of one’s self and others. SelfTALE was
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the only TALE function to be predicted by the Honesty-Humility dimension—and here,
inversely so—thus no previous research exists to support this result. However, that this effect
appears to have been inherited by the SelfTALE subordinate function of AMFS Counterfactual
Thinking, which was found in Hypothesis 3.2 analyses to moderately map onto SelfTALE gives it
a bit more weight, and is discussed further in the subsection that addresses personality effects for
the Counterfactual Thinking function.
Personality and Simulation-Based Perspective TakingAMFS. Study 2 results replicated
the Study 1 findings that Perspective TakingAMFS was predicted by Extraversion,
Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience. The Study 1 finding that Perspective
TakingAMFS was predicted by Emotional Stability was not replicated; however, Perspective
TakingAMFS was found in Study 2 to be predicted by the inverse of Emotional Stability,
Emotionality Neuroticism. Related research suggests that extraverts may have more
opportunities to engage in perspective taking given their characteristically large social circles
(Kessler et al., 2015).
That Study 2 results showed that Emotionality/Neuroticism predicted rated frequency of
functional use of autobiographical memory content for Perspective TakingAMFS is more strongly
supported by the literature than is the Study 1 finding Perspective TakingAMFS is predicted by
Emotional Stability. For example, research shows that proficiency in perspective taking, which is
referred to as empathic accuracy, is enhanced in women whose are insecurely, or “anxiously”
attached (Ickes, 2003). Because anxiously attached women, who tend also to be high in
Emotionality/Neuroticism (e.g., Crawford et al., 2007; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007), tend also to
be insecure in close relationships, they become hypervigilant about reading their romantic
partner’s thoughts and feelings, which enhances their perspective taking accuracy (Simpson,
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Ickes, & Grich, 1999). This effect can be even further amplified by trait Conscientiousness
(Crawford, 2007). Other research shows that relationships need not be romantic for perspective
taking acuity to be heightened; attachment and neuroticism are also linked to an increased
tendency to engage in perspective taking in response to any perceived social threat (e.g.,
Crawford et al., 2007). Because anxiously attached persons fear social others’ disapproval, they
become hypervigilant about inferring the others’ mental states (Vrtička et al., 2008). Not only do
these related findings align strongly with the HEXACO dimensions found in Study 2 to predict
simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS, but also the Study 2 evidence that Perspective
TakingAMFS is predicted by the Emotionality/Neuroticism facets of Anxiety, Dependence, and
Sentimentality. Such individuals may use simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS as a means
of coping with perceived social rejection, condemnation, or abandonment. Contrarily, people
high Emotionality/Neuroticism (as well as the facets of Anxiety and Dependence) whose rated
frequency in functional use of autobiographical memory content for Perspective TakingAMFS is
low may be more inclined toward “motivated inaccuracy”—the intentional attempt to not
correctly infer another’s mental states (Cuperman, Howland, Ickes, & Simpson, 2011). Research
shows motivated inaccuracy serves as a coping mechanism for individuals who believe that not
understanding another’s mind will mitigate potential hurt. Contingently, perspective taking may
be used to assuage social status anxiety—whereby individuals use one another as “social looking
glasses” through which to glean one’s social status compared to another or others (Schwartz,
1967, p. 7). Thus, for people high in Emotionality/Neuroticism, as well as Anxiety, the motive to
perspective take may involve a need to determine others’ perceptions of the perspective taker’s
place in the immediate or broader social circle. This may explain the Study 2 finding that people
whose rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content for Perspective
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Taking is high are also low in Greed-Avoidance—a concern over and tendency to pursue social
status (Lee & Ashton, 2009). For full coverage of facets, see Appendix F.
In addition to replicating Study 1 personality effects, Study 2 also found evidence that,
like the broad Social function onto which it mapped, Perspective TakingAMFS was predicted by
Agreeableness and the interstitial facet of Altruism. Research in intercultural communication
shows that Agreeableness predicts motivation to engage in and be accurate in perspective taking
(Cavanaugh, 2013); most likely because Agreeableness is largely a social trait (Graziano &
Tobin, 2009). Agreeableness is also associated with social affiliation—the motive to seek
interpersonal relationships (Digman, 1990)—which also aligns with altruistic tendencies
(Ashton, Paunonen, Helmes, & Jackson, 1998; MacDonald & Messinger, in press; Buss, 1991,
1996). As such, people who use of autobiographical memory content with high frequency for
simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS may be calling on their own past experiences to
understand others to meet prosocial goals.
Personality and Prospection. Study 2 also replicated results from Study 1 whereby the
autobiographical memory function of Prospection was predicted by the personality dimensions
of Emotionality/Neuroticism, Openness to Experience, and Conscientiousness—all of which
were also predictive of the broad Directive function onto which Prospection mapped. As to how
the inherited effects manifest at the subordinate Prospection level, related research may provide
insight. For example, much of the related research regarding Emotionality/Neuroticism and
Prospection concerns the emotional valence of imagined future scenarios. For example,
Emotionality/Neuroticism has been found to predict a greater tendency to form negatively biased
future imaginings (e.g., MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod et al, 2005). However, it is unknown
if the autobiographical memory content that is activated and retrieved for the purpose of “pre-
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experiencing” downwardly biased prospective imaginings is itself of a negative nature, or if
positive and/or emotionally neutral memory content is being so modified during simulation.
That both Study 1 and Study 2 found a link between the Prospection function and
Openness to Experience is supported by related research. Related research attributes the
adventurousness and creativity that are characteristic of the Openness trait as prompting
individuals to imagine future scenarios (e.g., Allen et al., 2014; Prenda & Lachman, 2001). Study
2 also replicated the Study 1 finding that Conscientiousness predicted the Prospection function.
Related research aligns with these findings, indicating that Conscientiousness predicts behavioral
perspective taking to suggest that, because people high in Conscientiousness are goal-oriented,
non-impulsive, and reflective (Lee & Ashton, 2009), they may engage in prospection as a way of
shepherding and optimizing both ongoing or future success (Prenda & Lachman, 2001). That
both traits—Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness—were also predictive of the broad
Directive function, further supports the Hypothesis 3.2 second-order configurations.
Although Study 1 results did not yield personality effects between Prospection and the
personality dimension of Extraversion, Study 2 did. Extraversion has been found in related
research to predict future thinking (e.g., Allen et al., 2014; Furey & Fortunato, 2014), but some
studies report no association (e.g., Prenda & Lachman, 2001). Given the small effect size found
in Study 2 (< 1.0%), it may be that the apparent inconsistency of this association is due to
underpowered analyses rather than lack of association. However, Extraversion did significantly
predict the broad Directive function, which helps to substantiate this effect, however small, given
evidence that it was inherited.
Personality and Counterfactual Thinking. Study 2 confirmed the Study 1 findings that
the autobiographical memory function of Counterfactual Thinking is predicted by
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Emotionality/Neuroticism, the inverse of Extraversion (i.e., Introversion), and the inverse of
Honesty-Humility. People high in Emotionality/Neuroticism are known to generate more
downwardly biased counterfactuals than people who demonstrate trait emotional stability (Allen
et al., 2014), often as a coping mechanism (e.g., Allen et al., 2014; Lindeman & Abraham, 2008;
Ruiselová et al., 2009; Ruiselová & Prokopcáková, 2010) or means of avoiding regret (e.g.,
Tykocinski & Pittman, 1995). This corresponds to research showing that trait procrastination
predicts downward-biased counterfactuals (Sirois, 2004, p. 279). People high in traitprocrastination tend to also be neurotic (Schouwenburg & Lay, 1995), highly anxious (Sirois,
2004), low in Conscientiousness (Schouwenburg & Lay, 1995), and possess a tendency to selfenhance in order to improve their social image (Sirois, 2004, p. 271).
Study 2 replicated the Study 1 finding that Introversion predicted the function of
Counterfactual Thinking. However, there was no evidence in the counterfactual thinking
literature to substantiate this finding, as the examination of Big Five personality effects with
respect to counterfactual thinking is both sporadic (Ruiselová & Prokopcáková, 2011), and often
unfruitful (e.g., Sirois, 2004). Thus, the fact that Study 2 found the Counterfactual Thinking
function to be predicted by the facets of Sociability, as well as the inverse of both Social SelfEsteem—i.e., the tendency to see oneself as worthless and unpopular (Lee & Ashton, 2009) and
Liveliness—i.e., characterized by pessimism and dampened mood—may provide insight.
Research by Roese and Olson (1993) investigating associations between counterfactual thinking
and self-esteem found that, although individuals with high and low self-esteem engage in
counterfactual thinking, the counterfactuals people with low self-esteem are self-critical
following one’s own failure, whereas the counterfactuals of people with high self-esteem focused
more on one’s success following the failure of others. This aligns with Study 2 links between the
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Counterfactual Thinking function and both pessimism (the inverse of Liveliness) and
Introversion, such that introverts tend to internalize (e.g., Brenner, 1996) and reflect upon their
experiences (e.g., Feist, 1998; Verhaegen, Joormann, & Khan, 2005). Thus, not only may people
high in trait Introversion use autobiographical memory content with greater frequency for
Counterfactual Thinking compared to people low in trait Extraversion.
Consistent with the personality effect found for SelfTALE, the inverse of Honesty-Humility
dimension was found in both Study 1 and Study 2 to predict the function of Counterfactual
Thinking. These associations may imply that people who use autobiographical memory content
with the greatest frequency for Counterfactual Thinking have a tendency to be manipulative,
self-important, inveigling, fraudulent, status-seeking, pompous, and have a strong sense of
entitlement (Lee & Ashton, 2009). Indirect support for these findings may come from the
revenge motive literature, which indicates that the magnitude of perceived injustices occur as a
result of having considered how things should have gone instead (e.g., Beugré, 2005; Folger &
Cropanzano, 1998; Hardman & Hardman, 2009). Given the relation between revenge motive and
such personality traits as vindictiveness, superiority, manipulativeness (e.g., Gurtman, 1992)., it
may be that the Study 2 findings reflect a tendency to use autobiographical memory content for
the purpose of generating alternative scenarios in response to perceived slights. This may also tie
in with the literature on fairness theory (Folger and Cropanzano, 1998), which posits that
individuals contrastively consider what could have occurred instead of what actually occurred;
what should have occurred; and what would have ideally occurred had the negative event played
out as alternatively imagined (McColl-Kennedy & Sparks, 2003, p. 254).
Allen et al. (2014) also reported an inverse relation between counterfactual thinking and
Conscientiousness—such that low trait Conscientiousness predicted negative emotionality,
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which corresponded to the generation of downward-biased counterfactuals. Although Study 1
findings did not support these related findings, Study 2 findings did, with the inverse of
Conscientiousness significantly predicting Counterfactual Thinking. As such, people whose rated
frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content for counterfactual thinking tend
to be impulsive, unstructured, haphazard, and have little concern over potential consequences of
their actions (Lee & Ashton, 2009).
With respect to the inheritance argument, the effect of Extraversion Counterfactual
Thinking contradicted the effect on SelfTALE, such that the association was negative for
Counterfactual Thinking and positive for SelfTALE. However, there was alignment in that the
Extraversion facet of Sociability was also positive for Counterfactual Thinking. Although it is
unknown whether the Sociability facet of Extraversion would have produced the strongest effect
on SelfTALE to bring these effects into greater alignment, it is likely that the positive effect of
Extraversion of SelfTALE is also enhanced by the social dimensions of the socially situated
TALE. Likewise, Study 2 found Openness to Experience to be predictive of SelfTALE; and
although the direction of the effects were consistent with those for Counterfactual Thinking, the
association was not significant. The inverse of Conscientiousness was also found to predict
Counterfactual Thinking, but no corresponding relation was found between Conscientiousness
and SelfTALE. One of the strongest personality effects for Counterfactual Thinking was with the
inverse of Agreeableness; however, Study 2 did not find that trait to be associated with the broad
function of SelfTALE. However, also of note is that the empirical link between the SelfTALE and
the subordinate Counterfactual Thinking was the weakest of the associations between the TALE
and AMFS functions, which may explain why not all SelfTALE effects were faithfully inherited.
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Personality and the AMFJR: The (Social) Conversation Function. Also explored in
Study 2 were, for the first time, personality effects with respect to the functions of the AMFJR
(Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation). As such, because no previous findings were available to
replicate, the objective of Hypothesis 3.6 with respect to the AMFJR was to verify the
assumption that the personality effects of the higher-order TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) functions
are inherited by the lower-order functions of the AMFJR.
With the exception of Agreeableness, all personality effects found for the broad Social
function of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) were also found for the Conversation function of the
AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation). The Conversation function was found in Study 2
to map onto the higher-order Social function. That there was no personality effect of
Agreeableness on Conversation may be an issue of power; although the effects of Agreeableness
on Conversation were directionally aligned to those of the broad Social function, it was
nonsignificant. This is unsurprising given that the magnitude of the effect on Social was itself
weak (0.7%), which, conceptually, may have been too unsubstantial to impact the subordinate
function of Conversation. This may also be in keeping with the Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010)
assertion that the relation between Agreeableness and autobiographical memory functions across
studies has been inconsistent, suggesting that varying degrees of agreeableness serve different
purposes in different social settings (e.g., Digman, 1990; Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, & Hair,
1996).
Personality and the AMFJR: The (Social) Perspective TakingAMFJR Function. Results
showed that all personality effects found for the broad Social function of the TALE (Bluck &
Alea, 2011) were inherited by Perspective TakingAMFJR; i.e., Emotionality/Neuroticism,
Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience, and Altruism. Thus
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the only HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2005; 2009) dimension that predicted neither Perspective
TakingAMFJR nor the broad Social function was the Honesty-Humility dimension.
Also of interest to Hypothesis 3.6 was whether the personality effects for simulationbased Perspective TakingAMFS versus those found for socially situated Perspective TakingAMFJR
would coincide. Both Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR mapped onto the
broad Social function, but were shown in supplementary analyses (see results of Hypothesis 3.1)
to be independent functions from one another. Study 2 results showed that Perspective
TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR were positively predicted by Emotionality/Neuroticism,
Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience, and Altruism.
However, only simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS was predicted by the inverse of the
Honesty-Humility facet of Greed Avoidance—a preoccupation with social status (Lee & Ashton,
2009). This inconsistency across Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR may be a
product of their contextual differences. For example, the social context of joint reminiscence—
within which Perspective TakingAMFJR subscale items are situated—may have elicited a stronger
sense of social obligation and cooperation, which influenced rated frequencies of functional use
of autobiographical memory content for items in the Perspective TakingAMFJR subscale. This may
have resulted in the rated frequencies on Perspective TakingAMFJR being less aligned with the use
of social situations to gain an advantage against a perceived social rival. Or there may have been
something about the content of the two Perspective TakingAMFS subscale items that are not
included in the Perspective TakingAMFJR subscale (i.e., “I use my own past experiences as
examples of why others might do what they do”; and “I refer to my own past experiences when
trying to figure out another’s behaviors”) that inadvertently led respondents to consider their
rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content for these items from a
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“social competition” framework, which may explain why only Perspective TakingAMFS, and not
Perspective TakingAMFJR, was predicted by the Greed-Avoidance facet.
Personality and the AMFJR: The (Social) Relationship Maintenance Function. As was
the case with Perspective TakingAMFJR, the personality effects for the AMFJR Relationship
Maintenance function were fully inherited from the broad Social function, onto which
Relationship Maintenance was found to map in the testing of Hypothesis 3.2.
Personality and the AMFJR: The (Directive) Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral
Control Function. As a broadly Directive function, it was expected that the personality effects
on the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation) function of Teaching/Problem
Solving/Behavioral Control would inherit those found for the Directive function of the TALE
(Bluck & Alea, 2011). Results supported this prediction, with both the Teaching/Problem
Solving/Behavioral

Control

and

Directive

functions

being

predicted

by

Emotionality/Neuroticism, Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience, and
Altruism. As such, these findings provide additional support for the mapping of the
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control function onto the broad Directive function.
Personality and the AMFJR: The (Directive) Emotional Regulation Function. As with
the Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control function of the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald,
in preparation), the personality effects of the broad Directive function of the TALE (Bluck &
Alea, 2011), were fully inherited by the broadly Directive AMFJR function of Emotion
Regulation. Study 2 results showed that Emotion Regulation was positively predicted by
Emotionality/Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to
Experience, and Altruism.
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Personality and the AMFJR: The (Self) SelfTALE Function. Finally, the personality
effects that were found for the broad SelfTALE were found for SelfAMFJR. Rated frequency of
functional use of autobiographical memory content for both SelfTALE and SelfAMFJR were
predicted by Emotionality/Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Altruism, and the
inverse of Honesty-Humility. Thus the mapping of SelfAMFJR onto higher-order SelfTALE further
supports the mapping established in the testing of Hypothesis 3.2.
Goal 3.1. Study 2 yielded two age effects: One for SelfTALE, and one for its subordinate
AMFS function of Counterfactual Thinking and the broad Self function of the TALE (Bluck &
Alea, 2011). Both effects indicated that rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical
memory content declines as a function of age. That age inversely predicts the use of
autobiographical memory content for SelfTALE replicates previous results. Bluck and Alea (2009)
found that older adults tend to use autobiographical memory content for SelfTALE purposes less
frequently than do younger adults, presumably because older adults have developed a stable selfconcept that, contrary to the self-concepts of younger adults, requires little continued input from
autobiographical memory content.
These age effects also align with the mapping of the Counterfactual Thinking function
onto broad SelfTALE that was found in the testing of Hypothesis 3.2. And although results also
showed that the use of autobiographical memory content for SelfAMFJR—which also mapped onto
SelfTALE—also declined with age, the age effect for SelfAMFJR was only marginally significant.
This may have been due to slight differences in constructs of SelfAMFJR and SelfTALE, such that
SelfAMFJR items are more concerned with self-identity than SelfTALE items, which are more
oriented toward self-continuity (see Tables for 18 and 19 for AMFJR and TALE items,
respectively). As such, the Counterfactual Thinking items may be more aligned with the SelfTALE
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items (e.g., “how I have changed,” and whether “ I am still the same type of person as before”),
than are the SelfAMFJR items (e.g., , “recognizing that (one) is part of a larger group,” or
“reminding (one’s self) of who (one) was when younger,”)—especially given that
counterfactuals are often used to reconcile past actions in order to maintain self-understanding
and sustain a consistent sense of self (e.g., Roese & Morrison, 2009; Roese & Olson, 1993).
Although mapping of Counterfactual Thinking onto SelfTALE supports the idea that
Counterfactual Thinking inherited the age effect from SelfTALE, there is recent related research
that also supports this finding. For example, a study be De Brigard, Giovanello, Stewart,
Lockrow, O’Brien, & Spreng (2016), yielded age effects between young and older healthy adults
with respect to the generation of “likely” versus “unlikely” positive and negative
autobiographical counterfactuals. Participants self-rated on a 1–7 scale the “likeliness” that their
counterfactuals reflected details and outcomes that could have actually occurred, such that
ratings of 1–3 constituted an “unlikely” counterfactual, and ratings of 5–7 reflected
counterfactuals that were “likely.” Additionally, events were rated for their “internal” (main
event/episodic properties) versus “external” (semantic/nonepisodic properties) (p. 5). Results
showed that younger adults were more likely to generate both positive and negative
autobiographical counterfactuals about “likely” events, whereas older adults were more likely to
generate positive “unlikely” autobiographical counterfactuals. More importantly, older adults’
autobiographical counterfactuals were less likely than younger adults’ autobiographical
counterfactuals to feature “internal” or episodic details, to indicate that younger adults use more
episodic memory content than older adults when generating counterfactuals. This suggests that,
because older adults compared to younger adults use less episodic memory content for their
counterfactuals, and because episodic memory content is what is thought necessary to the “re-
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experience” of a past event (Abram et al., 2014; Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011; Piolino,
Desgranges, & Eustache, 2009; Tulving, 2002b) so that it can be “reframed” counterfactually
(Addis et al., 2009; De Brigard et al., 2013; De Brigard et al., 2015; Schacter, Benoit, De
Brigard, & Szpunar, in press; Van Hoeck, Ma, Ampe, Vandekerckhove, & Van Overwalle,
2013), older adults would, as Study 2 found, rate the frequency with which they use
autobiographical memory content for counterfactual thinking lower than would younger adults.
Goal 3.2. Gender was found to predict the use of autobiographical memory content for
the broad Social function of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), the Emotion Regulation function
of the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), and the Counterfactual Thinking function
of the AMFS. Thus the argument for the heritability of individual difference effects is not
supported for Goal 3.2, as neither the Emotion Regulation or Counterfactual Thinking functions
were found to be broadly Social.
Nor do the results of the Study 2 gender effects tests replicate findings found elsewhere.
Although the TALE (e.g., Bluck & Alea, 2009) has been tested for gender effects, none have
been reported to date. However, the Study 2 gender effect found for Social was small (R2 =
1.0%) which may have made it difficult to detect in comparatively underpowered studies. Yet,
indirect evidence may offer possible explanations for this finding. For example, McMahon and
Rhudick (1961) describe interpersonal reminiscing as an act of self-disclosure. In 2005, Igarashi,
Takai, & Yoshida reported evidence that women are more motivated than men to foster and
maintain social relationships, often through self-disclosure. As such, women may be more likely
than men to self-disclose–—i.e., engage in “past-talk” about autobiographical memories for the
purpose of fostering and maintaining social bonds and intimacy. By comparison, men are less
likely than women to self-disclose, preferring instead to use social interaction as a way to
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maintain social position or status (Igarashi, Takai, & Yoshida, 2005)—an objective of social
collaboration that is not considered an objective of the Social function of the TALE.
Study 2 also found that men use autobiographical memory content with less frequency
than women for the AMFJR function of Emotion Regulation. Although this effect was not found
for the broadly Directive function onto which Emotion Regulation was show in in Study 2 to
map, related research may support this effect. For example, brain evidence presented by
MacRae, Ochsner, Mauss, Gabrieli, and Gross (2008) showed that, compared to women, men
demonstrate an increase in the down-regulation of amygdala activity—which is associated with
emotional response—and a decrease in prefrontal activity (p. 154)—which is associated with
regulatory control. It was posited that men may therefore be more efficient regulators of emotion
than women, such that men depend less on simulation-based, cognitive reappraisal-like (p. 148)
strategies to bring emotions into check (p. 154). As such, men may rely less on the use of
autobiographical memory content, as measured by the Emotion Regulation function, as a strategy
for regulating emotions. Because such evidence is more conceptually aligned with the Emotion
Regulation construct than to the constructs of the other broadly Directive functions—Prospection
and Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control—such might explain why the effect was
found for a first-order function but not its second-order “parent.”
Finally, Study 2 found that men use autobiographical memory with greater frequency
than women for Counterfactual Thinking. The general consensus in the counterfactual thinking
literature is that gender does not predict the frequency with which individuals generate
counterfactuals (Roese & Summerville, 2005). However, the Study 2 effect was quite small (only
0.2% of the variance in the function of Counterfactual Thinking was explained by gender); thus,
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it may be that previous studies seeking the differential use of counterfactual thinking by men and
women were sufficiently powered to find equivalently small effects.
Goal 3.3. The first objective of Goal 3.3 was to replicate the culture effects found by
Ranson (2014), which showed that Caucasians used autobiographical memory content for the
function of Conversation with greater frequency than did African-American/Blacks.
Additionally, Ranson found that African-American/Blacks used autobiographical memory
content with greater frequency than Caucasians for the function of Teaching/Problem
Solving/Behavioral Control. However, these effects were small (with ethnicity accounting for
approximately 2.0% of in the variance in each the Conversation function and Teaching/Problem
Solving/Behavioral Control function). Thus, although Study 2 results replicated these same
patterns of effects, statistical significance was not obtained because the African-American/Black
sample was prohibitively small.
With respect to the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), culture was predictive only of SelfTALE.
Study 2 also found that this effect was inherited by it’s the SelfTALE subordinate functions of
SelfAMFJR and Counterfactual Thinking. Specifically, results showed that the rated frequency of
functional use of autobiographical memory content for SelfTALE, SelfAMFJR, and Counterfactual
Thinking is higher for South Asians than Caucasians. Results also showed that South Asians use
autobiographical memory content more frequently than African-American/Blacks for the two
SelfTALE subordinate functions of SelfAMFJR and Counterfactual Thinking, but not for the parent
function of SelfTALE. Such was the case for other Study 2 results that also showed that Caucasians
use autobiographical memory with less frequency than South Asians for the AMFJR functions of
Perspective TakingAMFJR, Relationship Maintenance, Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral
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Control, and Emotion Regulation, but not for the broad Social or Directive functions onto which
theses AMFJR functions map.
Although theses effects failed to fully comply with the idea of inheritance, related
research in differences between collectivistic and individualistic cultures may elucidate why
culture effects were found for these specific Self- and Social-oriented functions. Traditionally,
South Asian culture has long been considered collectivistic—i.e., interdependent, with a focus on
social interaction and cooperation (Chadda & Deb, 2013). However, in more recent years, South
Asian culture has been characterized as a “mixed” culture (Hofstede, 1984) that exhibits
characteristics more common in cultures that considered individualistic—independent, with a
focus on autonomy and self-achievement (Triandis & Bhawuk, 1997). This may be due to the
fact that South Asian culture is “vertically” collectivistic—i.e., it features greater disparity across
its hierarchy of social classes and thus more social inequality than collectivist (or individualistic)
cultures characterized as “horizontal” (Triandis & Bhawuk, 1997). As such, the family unit—
which tends to exist within the same social class—serves as the primary focus of South Asian
cultures’ social structures (Chadda & Deb, 2013). With respect to autobiographical memory,
individuals from collectivist cultures tend to recollect memories of social interactions more
readily than do collectivist cultures (e.g., Jobson & O’Kearney; 2008; Wang, 2001), whereas
individuals from individualistic cultures think and talk about their autobiographical memories
with greater frequency than individuals from collectivist cultures (e.g., Fiske & Pillemer, 2006;
Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008). Although Caucasians cultures (presuming Northern European
cultures of origin) are characterized as more strongly individualistic than South Asian culture
(Chadda & Deb, 2013), that Study 2 found South Asians to use autobiographical memory content
with greater frequency than Caucasians for all six of the AMFJR’s functions. South Asians were

174
also found to use autobiographical memory content with greater frequency than individualistic
African-American/Blacks for the AMFJR functions of Relationship Maintenance and Self. These
cultural effects may be attributable the AMFJR’s social context of joint reminiscence, which is
thought to elicit social and cultural influences on “past-talk” content and use (Kulkofsky & Koh,
2009). While “past-talk” is thought to facilitate autobiographical memory use for the socially
situated AMFJR functions, its influence may be pronounced for individuals from collectivist
cultures.
3.6 Conclusion
A number of replications and novel findings were yielded in the testing of Study 2
hypotheses and goals. Because the current paper is the first to examine the simulation-based
functions of Perspective Taking, Prospection, and Counterfactual Thinking, and because few
autobiographical memory functions studies have investigated the effects as personality, age,
gender, and culture, many Study 2 findings are unsupported by direct evidence from previous
studies, but often aligned with evidence from related lines of inquiry to provide some insight.
As for the overall contributions, limitations, implications, and future directions of
Chapters 1–3 findings and conclusions, such are the topics discussed in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4 INTEGRATION OF CHAPTERS 1, 2, and 3: GENERAL DISCUSSION
4.1 General Summary
The springboard for the current paper was the detection of a new and previously
unanticipated autobiographical memory function of perspective taking. Although the evidence
for the perspective taking function was strong (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), its novelty
warranted theoretical substantiation and empirical replication. Chapter 1 of the current paper
explored the theoretical justification of the perspective taking function by adapting an existing
cognitive process model to explain how autobiographical memory content might be used in the
service of perspective taking, thereby qualifying perspective taking as function of
autobiographical memory. Simulation theory according to Goldman (2006) posits that
perspective taking was made possible when “background information” drawn from long-term
memory storage was imaginatively mixed simulated to generate the possible mental states of
another. Long-term memory content could therefore be seen as “input” for simulation
processing. Using theory, taxonomy, conceptual cognitive models, and empirical evidence from
brain imaging studies, Chapter 1 argued that a specific form of long-term memory content
serving as simulation “input” is autobiographical memory content.
A recent revision to simulation theory by Shanton and Goldman (2010) augmented the
simulation process model to explain both perspective taking and another simulation-based
phenomena, mental time travel. To complement these dual purposes for which simulation could
be used, Shanton and Goldman proposed the existence of two simulation forms: interpersonal,
which underlies other-directed perspective taking, and intrapersonal, which underlies selfdirected mental time travel. To illustrate how the specific form of long-term memory content
used for interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation could be autobiographical, Chapter 1
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proposed the Expanded Simulation Model—an extension of the revised simulation process
model by Shanton and Goldman into which a conceptual model (the Self-Memory System by
Conway, 2005, and Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and a computational model (the Source
Activation Confusion model by Reder et al., 2002, and Reder et al., 2009) were integrated in
order to explain how autobiographical memory content could be activated and retrieved for
perspective taking or mental time travel. To make the Expanded Simulation Model more
amenable to empirical testing, Chapter 1 operationalized mental time travel as prospection (the
use of autobiographical memory content to go forward in conceptual time to “pre-experiencing”
the future) and counterfactual thinking (the use of autobiographical memory content to go back
in conceptual time to “reframe” the past). Chapter 1 then argued that, if it could be empirically
demonstrated that autobiographical memory content was used for perspective taking,
prospection, and counterfactual thinking, such would be evidence that perspective taking,
prospection, and counterfactual thinking are hypothetical functions of autobiographical memory.
The objectives of Chapters 2 and 3 concerned the empirical testing of select Chapter 1
hypotheses. Chapter 2 reported Study 1, which detailed the validation of the Autobiographical
Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale. Chapter 3 detailed Study 2, which employed the
AMFS and existing measures intended to support Chapter 1 hypotheses. Chapter 4 provides a
general discussion about the intellectual merit and broader impacts of the current paper. The
confirmation of previous research; strengths and novel contributions; issues, limitations, and
nonsignificant findings; and implications and future directions are specifically addressed.
4.2 Confirmation and Corroboration of Previous Research
Confirmation of Chapter 1 Hypotheses
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Study 2 was designed to empirically confirm the theoretically substantiated hypotheses of
Chapter 1. Results of Study 2’s Hypotheses 3.1 (the nine-factor structure) and 3.2 (the mapping
of the nine-function structure onto the broad functions of the TALE) provided evidence for
Hypothesis 1.2 (autobiographical memory content is a form of long-term memory content that
can be used for simulation-based perspective taking), and Hypothesis 1.5 (autobiographical
memory content is a form of long-term memory content that can be used for simulation-based
mental time travel). The rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content
for perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking as measured by the AMFS
served to demonstrate that individuals do use autobiographical memory content for theses
purposes. As such, the use of autobiographical memory content for these purposes renders them
functions of autobiographical memory to support Hypothesis 1.6 (perspective taking and the
mental time travel behaviors of prospection and counterfactual thinking are functions of
autobiographical memory). Finally, results of Hypothesis 3.4—that Perspective TakingAMFS
and Counterfactual Thinking were significant predictors of the simulation-based Cognitive
Reappraisal dimension from the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003), whereas Prospection was not—
supported Hypothesis 1.7 (the autobiographical memory function of simulation-based
perspective taking reflects interpersonal simulation; and the autobiographical memory functions
of simulation-based prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect intrapersonal simulation). As
such, results of the current paper add practical relevancy to what was as previously an untested
conceptual supposition. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, results of Hypothesis 3.2 tests
confirmed the replication of the Perspective TakingAMFJR function, an objective that was the
initial catalyst for the current paper.
Corroboration of Related Brain Evidence
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Because

the

current

paper

demonstrated,

theoretically

and

empirically,

that

autobiographical episodic memory content could be used for the simulation-based functions of
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, the current paper corroborates and
provides a framework within which evidence from a variety of brain studies is unified.
Neuroimaging research shows that the circuitry involved in autobiographical memory content
retrieval (Buckner et al., 2008); mental simulation (e.g., Buckner, et al., 2008; Spreng & Mar,
2012); perspectivity (e.g., Buckner & Carroll, 2006; Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng & Grady, 2010;
Rabin et al., 2010), perspective taking (Dodell-Feder et al., 2014; Knox, 2010; Perry et al.,
2011); episodic simulation for prospection (Addis et al., 2009; De Brigard et al., 2013; De
Brigard et al., 2016; Schacter, 2012; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Zheng et al., 2014), and
counterfactual thinking (e.g., Addis et al., 2009; De Brigard et al., 2013; De Brigard &
Giovanello, 2012; De Brigard et al., 2015; Schacter et al., in press; Van Hoeck et al., 2013) are
underlain by shared neural circuitry largely within the default network (e.g., Andrews-Hanna,
Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014). Not only does this research indicate that such capacities share
neural real estate, the implicated neural substrates are known to feature overlapping
functionality. The widely accepted interpretation of such neural collaboration is that these
structures and processes arose simultaneously for the purposes of working symbiotically (e.g.,
Atance & O’Neill, 2001, 2005; Barsalou, 1988, 2003; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Suddendorf &
Busby, 2003). Thus, the current paper’s finding that retrieved autobiographical memory content
can be mentally simulated for the purpose of perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual
thinking provides an example of how known interconnected and interdependent brain processes
manifest as everyday observable human behaviors.
Corroboration of Simulation Theory and Its Expansion
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By acquiring evidence that autobiographical memory content—a hypothesized form of
long-term memory content (e.g., Cohen & Squire, 1980; Tulving, 1972)—is used for perspective
taking, indirect support was yielded for the simulation process model of perspective taking
according to simulation theory (Goldman, 2006). Simulation theory posits that background
information from long-term memory storage is used as simulation “input” (see Figure 2), which
is then mixed with imagination to generate possible mental states to be attributed to a target
other. Because autobiographical memory is a form of long-term memory (e.g., Tulving, 1972),
the current paper provides empirical evidence that long-term memory content is used as
simulation input for perspective taking.
The current paper also provides empirical support for the recent extension of simulation
theory (Shanton & Goldman, 2010), which was augmented to account for mental time travel.
Although Shanton and Goldman propose simulation as the mechanism through which individuals
travel back through conceptual time in order to “re-experience” episodic memory content (a
phenomenon that they call “episodic memory”), or through which individuals travel forward
through conceptual time in order to “pre-experience” the future based on episodic memory
content (a phenomenon that they call “prospection”), the current paper hypothesized that
individuals also travel back through conceptual time in order to “reframe” episodic memory
content—a phenomenon known in the literature “counterfactual thinking.” The current paper
also presented and discussed brain evidence that supports the inclusion of counterfactual thinking
as a purpose for which episodic memory content is imaginatively simulated (e.g., Addis et al.,
2009; De Brigard et al., 2013; De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; De Brigard et al., 2015; Schacter
et al., in press; Van Hoeck et al., 2013), thereby extending even further the utility of simulation
theory and the simulation process model.
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Confirmation of Individual Differences in Rated Frequency of Functional Use of
Autobiographical Memory
The current paper also confirmed a number of individual differences in personality, age,
gender, and culture as reported in the literature with respect to the Social, SelfTALE, and Directive
autobiographical memory functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011). Study 2 confirmed
previous findings that the broad Social function is predicted by Extraversion (Rasmussen &
Berntsen, 2010; Bluck & Alea, 2009) and Openness to Experience (Rasmussen & Berntsen,
2010; Bluck & Alea, 2009); that the broad Directive function is predicted by
Emotionality/Neuroticism (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010) and Openness to Experience
(Rasmussen

&

Berntsen,

2010);

and

that

the

Self

function

is

predicted

by

Emotionality/Neuroticism (Cappeliez & O’Rourke, 2002; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010) and
Openness to Experience (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010). Such replications were important given
that the reported effects of personality on rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical
memory are not consistent across studies (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010).
Study 2 also confirmed the age effect reported by Bluck and Alea (2009), whereby older
adults use autobiographical memory content for SelfTALE with less frequency than younger
adults. Additionally, Study 2 found this same effect for SelfAMFJR and Counterfactual Thinking—
both of which map onto SelfTALE—to support the current paper’s contention that first-order
functions can inherit the individual differences of the second-order function to which they are
empirically linked.
Finally, Study 2 replicated, albeit only marginally significantly, the pattern of two culture
effects found in the validation of the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation). As was
reported previously, Caucasians were found to use autobiographical memory content for the
AMFJR function of Conversation with greater frequency than African-American/Blacks.
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Likewise, results of Study 2 confirmed that African-American/Blacks use autobiographical
memory with greater frequency than Caucasians for the AMFJR function of Teaching/Problem
Solving/Behavioral Control. Although the effects were not significant, this was most likely due
to the small sample size of the African-American/Black group obtained for Study 2.
Chapter 4.3 Strengths and Novel Contributions
Strengths
A major strength of the current paper is the rigor with which the statistical analyses of
Study 1 and Study 2 were conducted. Whereas much research with ordinal-level data is
improperly treated as continuous, the current paper employed several statistical methods and
techniques designed to accurately assess Likert-type responses. Such an approach better ensures
the acquisition of truthful results and therefore more credible and meaningful interpretations.
Another strength is the current paper’s multi-perspective approach to testing the viability
of the autobiographical memory function of perspective taking, and ultimately the
autobiographical memory functions of prospection and counterfactual thinking. From a
theoretical standpoint, conceptual and computational models were adapted and integrated in
support of the hypotheses that autobiographical memory is employed in ways that have not
previously been considered by memory researchers. Brain evidence from various lines of
research was presented and integrated in support of theory and as the basis of prediction. A
reliable measurement instrument, the AMFS, was developed and validated for the purpose of
empirically testing the current paper’s theoretical claims.
Novel Contributions
Although the initial impetus for the current paper was the theoretical and empirical
substantiation of Perspective TakingAMFJR, what emerged was the discovery and ultimate
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verification of the two new and independent autobiographical memory functions of Prospection,
and Counterfactual thinking. Study 2 also showed that the new functions mapped onto the broad
TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) functions such that Perspective TakingAMFS was broadly Social,
Prospection was broadly Directive, and Counterfactual Thinking was broadly SelfTALE as
predicted by theory and related findings.
The current study also introduced a new valid and reliable instrument for measuring the
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking functions of autobiographical
memory. Because the functions measured using the Autobiographical Memory Functions of
Simulation (AMFS) scale were shown to be independent in the presence of the functions
measured by the Autobiographical Memory Functions of Joint Reminiscence (AMFJR) scale
(Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation)—which also map onto the broad Social, Self, and
Directive functions—the AMFS can be used alone or in conjunction with other autobiographical
memory functions scales without loss of structural integrity.
Although previous research supports the argument that the context within which the items
of an autobiographical memory scale are situated is vital to the detection and accurate assessment
of the functions being measured (e.g., Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009), the current paper was the first
known study to compare and contrast the subscales of two constructually identical, but
differentially contextually situated, functions. The current study found that the “simulationbased” Perspective TakingAMFS and the “socially situated” Perspective TakingAMFJR yield only
moderately correlated response data, even across the two items shared by both scales. Because
the presentation of Study 2 survey blocks were randomly ordered, the current study eliminated
the risk that such effects would be confounded by order effects.
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As was recommended by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation), associations found
between the broad Social, SelfTALE, and Directive functions and the functions of the AMFJR
were tested in a second-order structural equation model whereby the AMFJR functions were
configured as first-order latents subordinate to the second-order TALE function to which they
were associated per previous findings. Not only as the model recommended by Ranson and
Fitzgerald confirmed, but a CFA incorporating the AMFS functions also yielded the predicted
second-order model. Further support for the higher-order configurations was obtained through
the “inheritance” of the individual difference effects by first-order AMFS and AMFJR functions
from the second-order TALE function with which they were empirically linked. The current
paper argued that, if the higher-order function was indicated by the lower-order function, then
the effects of the broader higher-order function would be shared by the lower-order function,
which represents more narrowly defined aspects of the broad function.
The current paper not only replicated a number of individual differences effects reported
in the literature, but also yielded evidence for effects that have eluded detection in other studies.
For example, Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010) reported that personality effects assessed on the
broad functions of the TALE (Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Alea, 2011) were inconsistent with
respect to Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. However, the current paper found that both
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness positively predicted the Social and Directive functions, as
well as Social’s subordinate functions of Perspective TakingAMFS, Perspective TakingAMFJR, and
AMFJR Conversation and Relationship Maintenance, and the Directive’s subordinate functions
of AMFS Prospection, and AMFJR Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control and Emotion
Regulation. However, the effects yielded by the current paper are small—perhaps negligible—
and may therefore have limited utility to autobiographical memory functions research. If nothing
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else, the reported effect sizes should assist researchers in determining the needed power to detect
expected effects of this size, or help to justify why effects may be inconsistent across studies.
Finally, the current paper demonstrated the fitness and utility of the HEXACO-100
(Ashton & Lee, 2004; 2009) for autobiographical memory research. Study 1 and 2 results
showed that, for those HEXACO dimensions that align with traditional Big Five factors
(Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotionality/Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Openness to
Experience), effects found in previous studies were replicated. As such, the HEXACO was
shown to be a faithful alternative to traditional Five Factor scales. Additionally, the HEXACO’s
Honesty-Humility dimension and the interstitial facet of Altruism provided additional insight
into the individual differences in rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory
content.
Chapter 4.4 Issues, Limitations, and Nonsignificant Findings
Issues in Measurement and Analysis
The foremost issue of the current paper was the high inter-item correlations between the
items of the AMFS’s Counterfactual Thinking subscale, which were yielded by the Study 2 data.
This finding was unexpected, as it was not prefigured by Study 1 results. Before proceeding, the
AMFS structure was re-verified with EFA65 using Study 2 data, as well as CFA. Although the
CFA results revealed some attenuated fit indices and destabilized estimates, the least favorable
outcomes were restricted to the Counterfactual Thinking subscale, and the overall models were
not unduly compromised according to accepted guidelines. Thus analyses proceeded, and results
were interpreted with caution.
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Upon discovery of the high inter-item correlations of the Counterfactual Thinking subscale, a principal axis
factoring EFA was run using R-Factor (Basto & Pereira, 2012a) in SPSS (IBM Inc., 2015) so as to verify the AMFS
structure. Despite the fact that the loading values of the Counterfactual Thinking items on its factor were high,
overall results were commensurate with the EFA conducted for Study 1.
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The reason for the high inter-item correlations on the Counterfactual Thinking subscale in
Study 2 is unknown. Potential causes include the possibility that, although not portended by
Study 1 results, the Counterfactual Thinking subscale may be too conceptually narrow (Clark &
Watson, 1995). Because individual differences in counterfactual thinking are rarely assessed
(Ruiselová et al., 2009), there are no existing self-report counterfactual thinking scales from
which potential Counterfactual Thinking items might have been adapted. Secondly, the Study 1
survey included the qualitative mental time travel conditions, one of which concerned
counterfactual thinking. Because Study 1 presented the mental time travel conditions before the
AMFS scale, Study 1 respondents may have been inadvertently primed to respond to the AMFS
items differently than was the case for Study 2, which did not include the mental time travel
conditions. However, this explanation suggests that similar issues should have occurred with the
AMFS subscale of Prospection, which was also preceded by a prospection mental time travel
condition in Study 1. However, the Prospection subscale performed consistently across Studies 1
and 2. Thirdly, the blocks of scale items were randomly presented in the Study 2 online survey,
but were not for randomly ordered in Study 1. As such, Study 1 may have inadvertently induced
order effects that would not have likewise occurred in Study 2. However, this too suggests that
any such order effects would have likewise impacted the Perspective Taking and Prospection
subscales, but did not. Finally, there may have been differences between the Study 1 and Study 2
samples that influenced these results. Although the mean ages, age ranges, and gender split for
Study 1 and Study 2 were equivalent, there were differences in ethnic/race representation. For
example, the Study 1 sample was approximately 25% African-American/Black (which was also
the case for Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), but the African-American/Black group
comprised less than 6% of the sample for Study 2.

186
A second issue with Study 2 was that the complexity of the proposed CFA models
prohibited the use of polychoric correlations with asymptotic covariance matrices, both of which
are recommended for ordinal and MV nonnormal data, and which are necessary to produce the
Satorra-Bentler adjusted chi-square. Although a workaround using the Bollen-Stine (Bollen &
Stein,1992) bootstrap (2000 iterations) was recommended as an acceptable workaround in the
literature (e.g., Byrne, 2000; Cheung & Lau, 2008; Hox, 1995; Ichikawa & Konishi, 1995; Yuan
& Bentler, 2000; Yung & Bentler, 1996; Zhu, 1997), comparisons of CFA results for each of the
three individual scales (AMFS, AMFJR, TALE) used to test the hypothesized models showed
that, compared to estimates and fit indices yielded with the polychoric protocol, results were
acceptably commensurate, but nonetheless less favorable (e.g., higher chi-square values using
Bollen-Stine). As such, results were interpreted with caution. The current paper also emphasizes
the importance of future research to replicate results with a statistical software package (e.g.,
EQS, Multivariate Software, 2014) capable of simultaneous polychoric matrix construction.
Limitations
There are a number of assumptions made by the current paper that could, if unfounded,
weaken, if not invalidate, results. One, it was assumed that respondents understood the use of
autobiographical memory content for various behaviors to the extent that they could reasonably
estimate their use of autobiographical memory content for those behaviors. In an attempt to
garner support for this assumption, Study 1 included qualitative measures intended to support the
assumption that respondents’ perceptions of their estimated use of autobiographical memory
content is just that (i.e., how frequently they use autobiographical memory content for
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking), and not simply their estimates of
the frequency with which they engage in the corresponding behavior (i.e., how frequently they
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engage in perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking regardless of whether or
not autobiographical memory content is used). Although these Study 1 data were not formally
analyzed, responses were consistent with related research employing similar paradigms.
However, without the corroboration of corresponding brain data (e.g., indicating that the areas of
the brain responsible for autobiographical memory retrieval are activated during estimation of
rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content for any of the measured
functions), this remains an empirically unsubstantiated assumption.
Additionally, the literature supports the assumption that episodic, more so than semantic,
autobiographical memory content is used for the reminiscence behaviors measured by
autobiographical memory functions scales (e.g., Tulving, 2002b), as well as mental simulation
(e.g., Gaesser & Schacter, 2014), perspective taking (Shanton & Goldman, 2010), and mental
time travel (e.g., Duval, Desgranges, de La Sayette, Belliard, & Eustache et al., 2012; Irish,
Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Manning, Denkova, &
Unterberger, 2013; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). As such, the current paper founded arguments
on this assumption and supported these contentions with established theory. For example,
Chapter 1 employed the SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder et al., 2009) to explain how episodic
autobiographical

memory

content

could

be

preferentially

activated

over

semantic

autobiographical memory content so that simulation for perspective taking or mental time travel
could ensue. However, no current autobiographical memory functions scale can empirically
verify that episodic memory content is preferentially used; thus if it were discovered that
semantic memory content could be simulated as well as episodic memory content for the “reexperience” of past events, a number of the current paper’s conclusions would be annulled.
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The current paper also assumes that the autobiographical memory functions proposed and
verified herein exist fully independently of human-designed measurement procedures (e.g.,
Maul, 2013). However, much like the nature of light (“is it a wave or a particle”?), the
autobiographical memory functions that emerge through the various self-report instruments may
be shaped by the instrument itself. Given the differential use of autobiographical memory content
for simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS versus socially situated Perspective TakingAMFJR,
rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content for any purpose may be
fully dependent on the measurement context within which it is grounded, whether intentional or
not. However, at least at present, there appears to be no way to find autobiographical memory
functions that are not first conceptualized, then explicitly sought.
Nonsignificant Findings
As for nonsignificant findings, Study 2 was intentionally adequately powered to ensure
that even small effects would be detected. This facilitated the current paper’s success in yielding
effects that other studies have either failed to find or reported as inconsistent, most likely because
other studies were underpowered. As such, the current paper’s nonsignificant effects were in
most cases true null effects. For those effects that were significant, effect sizes were also
reported so that researchers could draw their own conclusions about their relative importance.
In other cases, the current study did not include supplementary measures that may have
yielded effects found in related research. For example, previous studies (Addis et al., 2009; Cole,
Morrison, & Conway, 2013, Schacter, Gaesser, & Addis, 2013) have reported that older adults’
imagined future scenarios tend to feature more semantic versus episodic detail. This could have
implications for rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content for
prospection, given that prospection is thought to rely primarily on episodic autobiographical
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memory content (e.g., Tulving, 2002b; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). That Study 2 found no
differential use of autobiographical memory content as a function of age for Prospection, could
imply that any predominance of semantic detail used for older adults’ prospections has little to
no impact on rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory for that purpose.
However, because one of the limitations of the current study is that the AMFS—like any
functions

scale—cannot

distinguish

between

the

use

of

episodic

versus

semantic

autobiographical memory content, it is not possible to draw a firm conclusion about any
nonsignificant results for which episodic versus semantic detail may be a factor.
Although the majority of individual difference effects found for the Social, SelfTALE, and
Directive functions were “inherited” by their corresponding subordinate functions, there were a
few nonsignificant findings. For example, for personality, Perspective TakingAMFS inherited all
of the Social TALE effects, but Perspective TakingAMFS was predicted by the inverse of the
Honesty-Humility facet of Greed-Avoidance, whereas the broad Social function was not.
Likewise, although results of Hypothesis 3.2 indicated that SelfAMFJR function mapped onto
SelfTALE, results showed that, unlike SelfTALE, SelfAMFJR was not significantly predicted by age.
However, in this case, the effect of age on SelfAMFJR was marginally significant (p = .062), and,
like SelfTALE, showed the same decline in rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical
memory over the lifespan. Therefore, the failure of the first-order functions to inherit the effects
found for their higher-order broad functions may imply that, whereas some individual
differences can be captured only at the broad, higher-order level, other individual differences can
only be detected at the subordinate level where the constructs are more precisely defined.
Finally, that the current study did not include more measures that may have elucidated
various findings and effects may be seen as a limitation. For example, variables such as
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attachment and coping styles, or the incorporation of emotion manipulation techniques, would
have provided additional data with which to parse the effects of emotional valence known to
inform autobiographical memory content, its recall, and its use (for a review, see Holland &
Kensinger, 2010). But given that the main objective of the current paper was to validate and
examine the autobiographical memory functions of perspective taking, prospection, and
counterfactual thinking, the current paper’s investigations were limited to those that would most
thoroughly, yet resourcefully, serve that purpose.
Chapter 4.5 Implications and Future Directions
From a research perspective, it is hoped that substantiating the existence of three new
autobiographical memory functions of perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual
thinking through theory and testing will prompt other researchers to consider potentially
overlooked uses of autobiographical memory. From a clinical perspective, understanding how
autobiographical memory content informs interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation can aid
counselors and developers of interventions interested in addressing the source of maladaptive
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking strategies. Future studies should aim
to replicate the findings of Study 2 and use its results as guidelines for further inquiry. Future
studies should also develop ways to test elements of the Expanded Simulation Model other than
the long-term memory component—either those that follow as proposed in simulation theory
(Goldman, 2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010) or those that were revealed when the long-term
memory component was “unpacked” in Chapter 1.
Chapter 1 also posits that the Expanded Simulation Model, by way of the SAC (Reder et
al., 2002; Reder et al., 2009), accounts for research indicating that semantic and episodic
autobiographical memory exist on a continuum that allows these memory forms to overlap
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(Baddeley, 2001; Brewer, 1996; Burianova et al., 2010; Gilboa, 2004; Rajah & McIntosh, 2005;
Tulving, 2001). And although episodic memory is thought essential to “re-experiencing,” “preexperiencing,” and “reframing” past scenarios (Abram et al., 2014; Markowitsch & Staniloiu,
2011; Piolino et al., 2009; Tulving, 2002b), it is known that the retrieval of semantic
autobiographical memory content can facilitate access to more specific episodic autobiographical
memory content (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In fact, recent research
suggests that, with respect to prospection, autobiographical memory has a definitive “future”
form comprised of episodic (imagining future scenarios) and semantic (imagining future selfknowledge or general events) properties (Duval et al., 2012; Irish et al., 2012; Klein et al., 2002;
Manning et al., 2013). However, with respect to autobiographical memory functions, neither the
AMFS, nor the AMFJR, nor the TALE were designed to evaluate the differential use of past
versus future episodic and semantic memory. As this is an expanding line of research that could
bring clarity and cohesion to the current paper and other studies, future research should focus on
developing paradigms that more thoroughly explore the extent to which episodic versus semantic
content is used with respect to rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory
content.
That the current paper yielded evidence of differential context effects for “simulationbased” Perspective TakingAMFS and “socially situated” Perspective TakingAMFJR, should prompt
researchers to consider other contexts from which other functions might emerge—that is,
research might take a less global approach to the exploration of autobiographical memory
functions in order to discern more situation-specific uses of autobiographical memory. Likewise,
much like trends in personality research, researchers might take a holistic, process-based

192
approach to the conceptualization and exploration of autobiographical memory functions as a
complement to the study of traditional, mechanistic functions.
Future autobiographical memory functions studies would be well served by including
measures of emotion/affect. There is a wealth of literature corroborating the importance of
emotion—at

both

state-

and

trait-levels—to

the

encoding

and

“re-experience”

of

autobiographical memory content. Results of the current paper imply that taking emotion into
consideration would enrich our understanding of rated frequency of functional use of
autobiographical memory, especially for those functions that manifest as behaviors known to
have strong emotional components. For example, while the conclusion of the current paper is
that Counterfactual Thinking is a function of autobiographical memory, the counterfactual
thinking literature has surprisingly little to say about the use of memory information in the
generation of counterfactuals, unlike research on reminiscence and prospection, for which the
use of memory information is a main focus. Rather, the use of memory content with respect to
counterfactual thinking is simply assumed. Instead, research in this area focuses on the emotional
basis of counterfactual thinking, and in particular, whether the counterfactuals generated are
upward (positive) or downward (negative) in emotional bias. Thus, such individual differences
as older adults having been found to engage in more positive (upward) counterfactuals than
younger adults (Mather & Carstensen, 2005), could be neither confirmed nor disconfirmed by
the current paper because the current paper included no measures for discerning the emotional
bias of the autobiographical memory content used for counterfactuals. Future studies should
attempt to add emotion and other measures to their research designs in order to make full use of
the findings from related literatures as support for the results of functions research.
The current paper also added to the literature on autobiographical memory and culture,
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having yielded evidence for the differential use of autobiographical memory content within and
between ethnic groups. Granted, the investigation of culture effects on autobiographical memory
functions research is challenging, given the difficulties in obtaining subgroup samples large
enough to sufficiently power a study in which such effects are likely to be small. However,
cultural differences in the content (e.g., Ross & Wang, 2010), use (e.g., Ranson & Fitzgerald, in
preparation), and cognitive processing (e.g., Ambady & Bharucha, 2009) of autobiographical
memory suggest that this is a valid and important line of inquiry.
With respect to individual differences in general, memory research—including Studies 1
and 2 of the current paper—have perhaps been negligent by not evaluating the sum total of
variance attributed to individual differences. In retrospect, the inclusion of such analyses may
have yielded more meaningful answers to questions concerning the role of individual differences
in the rated frequency of autobiographical memory content for the functions under review.
However, adding potentially informative, but essentially subordinate, analyses to the current
paper would have been excessive for a study primarily focused on the validation of new
autobiographical memory functions. Thus future autobiographical memory studies with a
primary objective of testing individual differences should strongly consider the incorporation of
such tests.
Contingently, future research should develop paradigms for testing each step of the
simulation theory cognitive process, as well as the components of the Expanded Simulation
Model. The current paper did not empirically test Chapter 1’s Hypothesis 1.1 (that mental
simulation is the mechanism by which autobiographical memory content is used for perspective
taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking), Hypothesis 1.3 (that the search and retrieval
process for relevant autobiographical memory content for perspective taking, prospection, and
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counterfactual thinking is as proposed by the Self-Memory System according to Conway and
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), or Hypothesis 1.4 (that the activation and retrieval of relevant
autobiographical memory content for autobiographical memory content for perspective taking,
prospection, and counterfactual thinking is as proposed by the Source Activation Confusion
computational model according to Reder et al., 2002, and Reder et al., 2000), because such
would require neuroimaging or other cognitive tests beyond the current study’s scope. However,
it is important to test each stage of the simulation process, both upstream and downstream from
the long-term memory component, in order to empirically validate and expand upon current
theory.
4.6 Conclusion
In the late 1980s, memory researcher Alan Baddeley asked, “What the hell is it for?”, and
a new domain of autobiographical memory research was born. Research began to identify the
everyday purposes for which humans use autobiographical memory; that is, the functions of
autobiographical memory (Baddeley, 1988; Bluck & Alea, 2002, 2011; Neisser, 1982). The
current paper aimed to add to that growing body of research by theoretically and empirically
substantiating the autobiographical memory functions of perspective taking, prospection, and
counterfactual thinking.
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APPENDIX A
Studies 1 & 2: Mechanical Turk Worker’s Agreement
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APPENDIX B
Studies 1 & 2: MTurk Synopsis Page
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APPENDIX C
Studies 1 & 2: Behavioral Research Information Sheet
Title of Study 1: Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation
Title of Study 2: The Role of Autobiographical Memory in Interpersonal and Intrapersonal
Simulation: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration
Principal Investigator (PI):

Jana Ranson
Psychology
313-310-0041

Funding Source:

Jana Ranson

When we say “you” in this consent form, we mean you; “we” means the researchers and other
staff.
Purpose
You are being asked to be in a research study of the characteristics associated with the
recollection of past events and the imagining of future scenarios because you are at least 18 years
of age and hold an active Mechanical Turk Worker’s account. This study is being conducted at
Wayne State University. The estimated number of study participants to be enrolled at Wayne
State University is about 100. Please read this form and ask any questions you may have
before agreeing to be in the study.
In this research study, we are interested in understanding the purposes for which people use
autobiographical memory. Autobiographical memories are the memories of one’s personal past.
They include factual information (e.g., “I went to the Bahamas when I was 12”) as well as the
emotions, images, and details of events (e.g., “I remember feeling so happy when I saw my cat’s
cute little black and white face for the first time.”) Autobiographical memories are important
because, when considered over a lifetime, provide us with the story of who we are and give us a
sense of “self.”
Autobiographical memories are also used for a number of purposes, especially in social
situations. For example, we share memories with others to feel closer (e.g., “remember how
much fun we had on the roller coaster at the fair last year?”), to help problem solve (e.g., “when
that happened to me as a teenager, I did… maybe that will work for you, too”), and to encourage
conversation (e.g., “I love talking about old times with you; we always end up laughing!”).
Research in this area is fairly new, so memory researchers continue to consider novel ways in
which we might use autobiographical memory. We then create surveys and ask individuals like
yourself to estimate how often, if at all, they do use autobiographical memories in those ways.
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Study Procedures
If you agree to take part in this research study, you will be asked to complete an online
questionnaire regarding the purposes for which you use autobiographical memory in everyday
situations. You will also be asked to provide general demographic information (age, gender,
ethnicity), although you may choose to not provide that information. You will also be asked to
complete a few survey questions regarding personality traits, emotional intelligence, selfefficacy, and cognitive style. The study procedures are as follows:
1. Once you have clicked the survey link in Mechanical Turk, you are directed to this online
questionnaire.
2. After reading this informed consent, you will be asked if you wish to participate. If you
choose to participate, you will be instructed to click the ACCEPT button at the bottom of
the informed consent page. Clicking the ACCEPT button begins the survey. If you
choose not to participate, click the DECLINE button and you will be exited from the
survey.
3. Once you have finished answering the questions on a page, you will be instructed to click
the NEXT button. At the bottom of every page is an EXIT button should you wish to quit
the survey. You may quit the survey at any time.
4. The online questionnaire will take approximately 4566 minutes to complete.
5. Questions will consist of statements followed by a rating scale. For example, you may be
asked to estimate how frequently you talk about the past with others to increase intimacy.
You then rate how often you estimate you talk about the past for this reason on a scale of
1 (not at all) to 6 (almost always). Information about the rating scale will be included at
the top of each page.
6. Participants’ identity is concealed from the researcher. The survey software will assign a
random ID code to each participant’s survey.
7. At the end of the survey, you will be given a completion code. You must enter this code
in the space provided on the MTurk page where you accessed the survey link. Once you
enter this code, your survey data will be submitted to the researcher. Once the researcher
verifies that all attention checks were successfully passed, the researcher will release the
$2.0067 compensation to the participant’s MTurk account. Note again that the researcher
will only be able to release the compensation if the survey completion code is entered and
submitted through MTurk.
Benefits
As a participant in this research study, there will be no direct benefit for you; however,
information from this study may benefit other people now or in the future.
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This version of the Informed Consent has been modified from the original, which indicated that the survey would
take about 30 minutes to complete. However, early MTurk metrics indicated that the survey was taking closer to 45
minutes to complete.
67
Due to the additional 15 minutes beyond the original estimate of 30 minutes that participants were on average
taking to complete the survey, the compensation was increased from the original value of $1.00 in Amazon credit to
$2.00.
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Risks
There are no known risks at this time to participation in this study.
Study Costs
o Participation in this study will be of no cost to you.
Compensation
For taking part in this research study, you will be paid for your time and inconvenience. A total
of $1.6068 will be paid to the participant’s MTurk Worker account after the researcher has
verified that all attention checks were successfully passed in accordance with the MTurk
Worker’s Agreement.
Confidentiality
All information collected about you during the course of this study will be kept confidential to
the extent permitted by law. You will be identified in the research records by a code name or
number. Information that identifies you personally will not be released without your written
permission. However, the study sponsor, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Wayne State
University, or federal agencies with appropriate regulatory oversight [e.g., Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), Office of Civil Rights
(OCR), etc.) may review your records.
When the results of this research are published or discussed in conferences, no information will
be included that would reveal your identity.
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose not to take part in this study.
You are free to only answer questions that you want to answer. You are free to withdraw from
participation in this study at any time. Your decisions will not change any present or future
relationship with Wayne State University or its affiliates, or other services you are entitled to
receive.
The PI may stop your participation in this study without your consent. The PI will make the
decision and let you know if it is not possible for you to continue. The decision that is made is to
protect your health and safety, or because you did not follow the instructions to take part in the
study
The data that you provide may be collected and used by Amazon as per its privacy agreement.
Additionally, participation in this research is for residents of the United States over the age of 18;
68

The compensation paid for Study 1 was $2.00 for a 45-minute survey plus 10% MTurk fee. Due to an increase in
the MTurk Fee as of January 2016 from 10% to 40%, Study 2 participants earned $1.60 for a 30 minute survey.
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if you are not a resident of the United States and/or under the age of 18, please do not complete
this survey.
Questions
If you have any questions about this study now or in the future, you may contact Jana Ranson at
eh9405@wayne.edu or Joseph Fitzgerald, PhD at 313-577-2811. If you have questions or
concerns about your rights as a research participant, the Chair of the Institutional Review Board
can be contacted at (313) 577-1628. If you are unable to contact the research staff, or if you want
to talk to someone other than the research staff, you may also call the Wayne State Research
Subject Advocate at (313) 577-1628 to discuss problems, obtain information, or offer input.
Participation
By completing this questionnaire, you are agreeing to participate in this study.
The data that you provide may be collected and used by Amazon.com as per its privacy
agreement. Additionally, participation in this research is for individuals over the age of 18; if you
are under the age of 18, you may not complete this survey.
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APPENDIX D
Studies 1 & 2: Qualtrics Validation Code Assignment Page
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APPENDIX E
Studies 1 & 2: Formulae for CFA Computations
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is a widely
reported absolute fit index based on the non-centrality parameter.
RMSEAs ≤ .08 are considered mediocre; ≤ .05 good, and ≤ .01 adequate.
However, the RMSEA tends to be inflated with small samples and/or
small degrees of freedom (df)—due to the tendency for greater sampling
error in such models—so the RMSEA should be used as on of several
indications of model suitability (Kenny, 2015).
Tucker-Lewis Index of Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI; TLI in AMOS)
is an incremental fit index dependent on the average size of the correlations;
i.e., the higher the correlations, the higher the NNFI. It is preferred over
the Bentler-Bonnet Non-Nonormed Fit Index (NFI), which penalizes
nonparsimonious models. To use the NNFI, the null model’s RMSEA
should be ≥ .158 in order to be informative. NNFI values ≥ .90 are
considered adequate; values ≥ .95 are considered excellent. Note that
“null” model referred to in the formula is also known as the “independence”
model (Kenny, 2015).
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) is another recommended incremental
fit index based on the non-centrality measure. Like the NNFI, CFI values
≥ .90 are considered adequate while values ≥ .95 are considered excellent.
Also, like the NNFI, the CFI should not be used when the RMSEA of the
null model is ≥ .158. Note that “null” model referred to in the formula
is also known as the “independence” model (Kenny, 2015).
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) Reliabilities (Jöreskog’s Rho) are
not provided by LISREL, but can be computed using the formula below.
Note that lambda (λ) = factor loading, and δ = standardized error variance
(1 – λ). Reliabilities in the SEM context should be ≥ .70 to indicate acceptable
internal validity (Werts, et al., 1978).
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APPENDIX F
Study 2: Personality Facets of the AMFS
The following details the results of the simple linear regressions conducted for the
purpose of exploring facet-level personality effects on the functions of the AMFS. As was done
for the results of Hypothesis 3.6, which concerned only personality dimensions, reported results
were limited to those that were significant at p < .05 or less. In addition, only effect sizes in the
form of squared semi-partial coefficients (i.e., the amount of variance that the predictor uniquely
explains in the outcome) were reported. Full results of the significant regression analyses (e.g.,
zero-order correlation coefficient, t-statistic, unstandardized regression coefficients, and p-value
(* = .05, ** = .01, and *** = .001) are detailed in Table 37.
Results
Perspective Taking
Although Perspective TakingAMFS was not significantly predicted by the HonestyHumility dimension in either Study 1 or Study 2, Study 2 found that Perspective TakingAMFS was
significantly predicted by the inverse of the Honesty-Humility facet concerning GreedAvoidance—i.e., desiring to display wealth and privilege (R2

= 3.9%). Of the

Emotionality/Neuroticism facets, Perspective TakingAMFS was predicted by Anxiety—i.e., the
tendency to dwell on minor issues (R2 = 0.9%), Dependence—i.e., a high need to seek
encouragement and comfort (R2 = 3.4%), and Sentimentality—i.e., possessing a strong empathic
sensitivity toward others (R2 = 6.0%).
All four facets of the Extraversion dimension were significant predictors of Perspective
TakingAMFS: Social Self-Esteem—i.e., having high positive self regard (R2 = 1.0%), Social
Boldness—i.e., a tendency toward high social confidence (R2 = 1.6%), Sociability—i.e., an
affinity for social conversation and interaction (R2 = 5.0%), and Liveliness—i.e., a tendency
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toward optimism and cheerfulness (R2 = 0.5% variance explained). Two facets belonging to
Agreeableness significantly predicted Perspective TakingAMFS: Forgiveness—i.e., a willingness
to trust and not hold grudges (R2 = 0.5%) and Gentleness—i.e., the tendency to be mild and
lenient in dealings with others (R2 = 2.9%). Likewise, two facets from the Conscientiousness
dimension were significant predictors: Diligence—i.e., possessing a strong work ethic and a
desire to achieve (R2 = 3.0%) and Perfectionism—i.e., the tendency to be thorough and careful
(R2 = 3.0%). Finally, all four facets of Openness to Experience significantly predicted
Perspective TakingAMFS: Aesthetic Appreciation—i.e., possessing a high appreciation of beauty
in art and nature (R2 = 1.2%), Inquisitiveness—i.e., tending to have a high curiosity in the natural
and social sciences (R2 = 1.9%), Creativity—i.e., a strong desire to innovate and experiment (R2
= 1.6%), and Unconventionality—i.e., tending to be nonconformist and open to the unfamiliar
and eccentric (R2 = 5.1%).
Prospection
A total of 16 facets were significant predictors of Prospection: From Honesty-Humility,
the inverse of Greed-Avoidance (R2 = 1.5%). From Emotionality/Neuroticism, Anxiety (R2 =
1.6%), Dependence (R2 = 1.2%), and Sentimentality (R2 = 1.6%). From Extraversion, Sociability
(R2 = 1.6%). From Agreeableness, Gentleness (R2 = 0.6%), and the inverse of Flexibility—i.e.,
tending to be stubborn and argumentative (R2 = 0.6%). From Conscientiousness, Diligence (R2 =
1.9%) and Perfection (R2 = 3.3%). Finally, all four facets from Openness to Experience were
significant: Aesthetic Appreciation (R2 = 1.9%), Inquisitiveness (R2 = 2.8%), Creativity (R2 =
3.1%), and Unconventionality (R2 = 3.5%).
Counterfactual Thinking
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Although the dimension of Openness to Experience was a significant predictor of the
function of Counterfactual Thinking, two of its facets were: Creativity (R2 = 0.6% variance
explained) and Unconventionality (R2 = 0.8%). Additionally, the inverse of all four HonestyHumility facets significantly predicted Counterfactual Thinking: Sincerity—i.e., a tendency to
manipulate and inveigle (R2 = 1.9%), Fairness—i.e., a willingness to cheat or steal to get ahead
(R2 1.5%), Greed-Avoidance (R2 = 3.9%), and Modesty (R2 = 0.7%). Two facets from
Emotionality/Neuroticism were predictive: Anxiety (R2 = 3.4%) and Dependence (R2= 0.9%).
From Extraversion, significantly predictive facets included the inverse of Social Self-Esteem—
i.e., a tendency to feel unpopular and possessing low social self-worth (R2 = 2.8%), Sociability
(R2 = 1.2%), and the inverse of Liveliness—i.e., a lack of cheerfulness and a tendency to be
nondynamic (R2 = 2.3%). Just as the inverse Agreeableness significantly predicted
Counterfactual Thinking, so did the inverse of two of its facets: the inverse of Flexibility (R2 =
1.1%), and the inverse of Patience—tending to be quick tempered (R2 = 0.6%). Finally, three
facets from Conscientiousness were significant predictors: the inverse of Organization—a
tendency toward sloppiness (R2 = 1.9%), Perfectionism (R2 = 0.7%), and the inverse of
Prudence—i.e., the tendency toward impulsivity and disregard of consequences (R2 = 4.8%). A
complete summary of significant simple regression results regarding AMFS dimensions and
facets can be found in Table 37.
Discussion
Perspective TakingAMFS
Results showed that, in addition to being predicted by all six HEXACO (Ashton & Lee,
2005, 2009) dimensions and the interstitial facet of Altruism, Perspective TakingAMFS was further
predicted by all four Extraversion facets: Social Self-Esteem, Social Boldness, Liveliness, and
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Sociability, with the latter yielding the largest effect. These findings align with the idea that
people who use autobiographical memory content with the greatest frequency are likely
motivated to not only socialize with others, but to understand others. This interpretation is
supported by findings that, in addition to Openness to Experience, rated frequency of functional
use of autobiographical memory content for Perspective TakingAMFS is also predicted by the
Openness facets of Aesthetic Appreciation, Inquisitiveness, Creativity, and Unconventionality.
Thus, such individuals are curious about others, and may creatively recombine own past
experiences with imagination to infer other minds. Additionally, both Extraversion and Openness
are associated with social self-efficacy (Cavanaugh, 2013), which is linked to behavioral
perspective taking (e.g., Gehlbach et al., 2008). This may be account for the association between
Perspective Taking, Conscientiousness, and the latter’s facets of Diligence and Perfection. These
findings align with the idea that self-efficacy relates to thoughtful persistence of the meeting of
goals (e.g., Judge et al., 2002), which, with respect to Perspective TakingAMFS, could be thought
of as the careful application of one’s own experiences toward the inferring others’ mental states.
Such implies that people who use autobiographical memory content for the purpose of
Perspective TakingAMFS are also high in empathy. Per the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) by
Davis (1980, 1983), perspective taking is defined as a form of “cognitive” (compared to
“emotional”) empathy. Coupled with research showing that highly conscientious people are
motivated to understanding ideas and people as accurately and thoroughly as possible (Howe,
2012), results suggest that people high in Conscientiousness draw more upon personal past
experience in their attempt to attain empathic accuracy in their attributions of others mental
states.
Prospection
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Study 2 also found that the Emotionality/Neuroticism facets of Anxiety, Dependence, and
Sentimentality predicted the Prospection function. This may imply that, as research shows,
anxious, neurotic individuals’ negative worldviews can bias perceptions of personal experiences
such that the autobiographical memory content encoded into memory storage is subsequently
similarly biased (e.g., Murray, Holland, Kensinger, 2013). Related research also shows that the
recall of negatively biased emotions can modify affect at the state and trait levels (e.g., Murray et
al., 2013). As such, downward-biased prospections may reflect either the emotional valence of
the autobiographical memory content on which the prospection is based, the downward biasing
of autobiographical memory content during the simulation of the imagined future scenario, or a
combination of both.
That the dimension of Openness to Experience has been empirically linked to prospection
(e.g., Allen et al., 2014; Prenda & Lachman, 2001) supports the Study 2 finding that both the
Creativity and Inquisitiveness facets of Openness to Experience likewise predict rated frequency
of functional use of autobiographical memory content for Prospection. The other two facets of
Openness—Aesthetic Appreciation and Unconventionality—were also found to predict the
Prospection function. Both facets are supported by research showing links between future
thinking and divergent thinking—the ability to creatively generate and consider a number of
possible solutions or outcomes (e.g., Furnham & Bachtiar, 2008; Gelade, 2002; George & Zhou,
2001). Together these findings may align with research indicating that people low in Openness to
Experience prefer the status quo (McCrae, 1996), with a tendency toward resistance to change
(McCrae, 1987).
Study 2 results also that showed the Conscientiousness facets of Diligence and Perfection
were predictive of Prospection, such that individuals high in these traits may be motivated to
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accomplish goals by carefully weighing all possible (i.e., imagined) outcomes. As such, these
findings may imply that the frequency with which Conscientious individuals use
autobiographical memory content for prospection reflects either the deliberate and strategic
voluntary recall of relevant autobiographical memory content, the thoughtful imaginative
simulation of future scenarios, or both (e.g., Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Tulving 1983).
A slightly larger effect (~ 2.0%) was found for the Extraversion facet of Sociability
than—the tendency to seek out social interaction and conversation (Lee & Ashton, 2009) than
was found for the Extraversion dimension. The facet effect may corresponds to related research
in which the relation between behavioral prospection and Extraversion was thought to
specifically reflect a tendency in individuals motivated to imagine future scenarios toward
“social gregariousness” (Fortunato & Furey, 2011, p. 21). This idea comes from brain research
indicating that extraverts show a greater degree of cortical activity during creative, imaginationbased tasks (Fink & Neubauer, 2008) than do introverts, whose cortical activity is higher during
mental reasoning tasks (e.g., Fink & Neubauer, 2008). Thus, as extraverts are more sociable,
sociability predicts behavioral future thinking (Fortunato & Furey, 2009, 2011).
Study 2 also found that neither Agreeableness nor Honesty-Humility were predictive of
Prospection; however, these dimensions’ associated facets were predictive. Study 2 found that
rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content for Prospection was
inversely predicted by Flexibility. This finding suggests that people who tend to be
uncompromising, uncooperative, and argumentative (Lee & Ashton, 2009) use autobiographical
memory content with high frequency for the purpose of Prospection compared to people high in
Flexibility, whose function use of autobiographical memory content for imagining future
scenarios is low. This finding aligns with related research that also yielded a negative association
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between the Agreeableness dimension and future thinking. Such studies claim that, because
people high in Agreeableness prefer social harmony to rivalry, they are less motivated to engage
in proactive future planning lest it might conflict with others’ future goals and agendas
(Graziano, Hair, & Finch, 1997; Prenda & Lachman, 2001). As such, a high score in Flexibility
may manifest as the kind of social complicity to which previous findings are attributed, and
which may suggest an infrequent use of autobiographical memory content for the function of
Prospection. This interpretation is further supported by the Study 2 findings that Prospection was
positively predicted by the Agreeableness facet of Gentleness—i.e., a tendency to be lenient
toward others (Lee & Ashton, 2009), as well as the interstitial facet of Altruism. Thus,
individuals who are not motivated to use autobiographical memory content for the function of
Prospection may prefer instead to “keep the peace,” either by yielding creative control of their
future plans to others, or by granting others the authority to guide the future on their behalf.
Whereas the Honesty-Humility dimension was not predictive of Prospection in either
Study1 or Study 2, its facet of Greed-Avoidance—i.e., a preoccupation with social status (Lee &
Ashton, 2009)—was inversely predictive of Prospection. Similar to the implied meaning of this
effect with respect to Perspective Taking, individuals not satisfied with the social status quo may
be more motivated to imagine future scenarios involving progress, change, nonconformity, and
the challenging of social norms. This may also tie in with Study 2 results that Openness to
Experience predicts Prospection. People who are not resistant to—i.e., are open to—change, are
more likely to consider the possibilities that change can bring (McCrae, 1987).
Counterfactual Thinking
Study
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Emotionality/Neuroticism dimension, rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical
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memory for Counterfactual Thinking was also predicted by the Emotionality/Neuroticism facets
of Anxiety—a tendency toward preoccupation of and excessive worry over minor issues—and
Dependence—a high need for social support and approval (Lee & Ashton, 2009). Although
Study 2 did not includes measures yielding information about respondents’ trait procrastination
or tendency toward upward or downward counterfactuals, the known personality effects suggest
an alignment with the procrastination literature (e.g., Schouwenburg & Lay, 1995; Sirois, 2004)
such that people who use autobiographical memory content frequently for the purpose of
generating counterfactual thinking may do so to avoid the distressing consideration of what else
might have been.
Although Study 1 did not find Agreeableness or Conscientiousness to be predictive of
Counterfactual Thinking, Study 2 results showed that the inverse of both were predictive.
Indirect support comes from studies indicating that people low in Agreeableness are prone to
negative emotionality and emotional intensity, which are associated with the generation of
downward (e.g., Allen et al., 2014). This may explain additional Study 2 results showing that the
Counterfactual Thinking function was predicted by the Agreeableness facets of Flexibility and
Patience to imply that people who use autobiographical memory content with the greatest
frequency for counterfactual thinking are argumentative, unyielding, and quick-tempered (Lee &
Ashton, 2009). The Conscientiousness facets of Organization and Prudence inversely predicted
the use of autobiographical memory content for Counterfactual Thinking, while a third
Conscientiousness facet, Perfection, positively predicted Counterfactual Thinking. Although
Perfectionism can be defined as desiring order and accuracy (Lee & Ashton, 2009), it may be
that, given the other personality traits associated with the function of Counterfactual Thinking,
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Perfectionism here may have neurotic overtones, such that the trait is a way of compensating for
feelings of failure or inadequacy—i.e., an inferiority complex (e.g., Adler, 1930).
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Table 1
Chapter 1: Hypotheses and Corresponding Figures
Hypothesis 1.1: The mechanism by which long-term memory content is
used for the purpose of perspective taking is mental simulation as defined
by simulation theory (Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Shanton, in press;
Shanton & Goldman, 2010).
Hypothesis 1.2: Autobiographical memory content in particular—rather
than long-term memory in general—can be used as simulation output for
simulation-based perspective taking.
Hypothesis 1.3: The “search and retrieval” procedure that operates
“within” the long-term memory component could be explained by the
self-memory system (SMS) as detailed in Conway (2005) and Conway
and Pleydell-Pearce (2000).
Hypothesis 1.4: Simulation occurs in response to heightened neural
activation of predominantly episodic memory content as predicted by the
source activation confusion (SAC) model per Reder et al. (2002) and
Reder et al. (2009). When used to support the “search and retrieval” of
autobiographical memory content specifically as delineated by the SMS
(Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), the SAC can explain
how, at the neural level, autobiographical episodic memory content
specifically, rather than episodic long-term memory content generally,
can be used for simulation-based perspective taking.
Hypothesis 1.5: In addition to perspective taking, the Expanded
Simulation Model can also be used to explain mental time travel
(operationalized as reminiscence, prospection, and counterfactual
thinking).
Hypothesis 1.6: Because perspective taking, prospection, and
counterfactual thinking are purposes for which autobiographical memory
is used, then perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking
are functions of autobiographical memory.
Hypothesis 1.7: The autobiographical memory function of perspective
taking reflects interpersonal simulation, whereas the autobiographical
memory functions of prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect
intrapersonal simulation (Shanton & Goldman, 2010).

Figures 1, 2

Figure 3
Figure 3

Figures 4, 5, 6

Figure 7, 8

Figure 8

Figure 8
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Table 2
Study 1: Demographics
Gender
1.
2.
3.

Male
Female
Prefer not to answer

Race/Ethnicity
1. Caucasian
2. African American/Black
3. American Indian/Native American
4. Other
5. Asian
6. Multiracial
7. Arab
8. Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
9. Prefer not to answer
10. Hispanic

Age
1.
2.

Select option in years (18 through 65+)
Prefer not to answer

Frequency (Percent)
50 (45.50%)
60 (54.50%)
0 (0.00%)
64 (58.2%)
29 (26.4%)
7 (6.4%)
3 (2.7%)
2 (1.80%)
2 (1.80%)
1 (0.90%)
1 (0.90%)
1 (0.90%)
0 (0.00%)

Mean (SD)
39.06 (12.96)
N/A
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Table 3
Studies 1 & 2: Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) Scale
Perspective Taking (Interpersonal Simulation)
1.* I think about my own past experiences to help me understand others.
2.* I think about my own past to help me better understand what another is thinking or feeling.
3. I use my own past experiences as examples of why others might do what they do.
4. I refer to my own past experiences when trying to figure out another’s behaviors.
Prospection (Intrapersonal Simulation)
I think about my own past experiences when imagining how an upcoming event might or
5.
might not unfold.
6. I think about my own past experiences when I believe that doing so can help guide my future.
7. I think about my own past experiences to help me predict what will occur in the future.
Counterfactual thinking (Intrapersonal Simulation)
I spend time imagining specific past events with different details or outcomes than what
8.
actually occurred.
I spend time imagining what I would do differently if I could travel back in time to a specific
9.
event.
I spend time imagining what would have happened in the past if certain circumstances had
10.
been different
I spend time reading survey questions so carefully that I will follow the instruction here to
11.✓
choose the number two rating option.

*Items are adapted from the CRS-A function of Perspective Taking.
✓Attention check item. Respondents who do not answer correctly are booted out of the survey.
Note. Respondents are presented with the statement, “The next section features a series of
statements about the reasons why you might think about the past. On a scale of 1 to 6 (1 =
Almost Never, 6 = Almost Always), please rate how frequently you engage in each of the
following recollection-related behaviors and activities.”
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Table 4
Studies 1 & 2: Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ)
Cognitive Reappraisal
1. I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in.
2. When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation.
3. When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation.
4. When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what I’m
thinking about.
5. When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change what I’m thinking
about.
6. When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way that helps me
stay calm.
Expressive Suppression
7. I control my emotions by not expressing them.
8. When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them.
9. I keep my emotions to myself.
10. When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them.

Note. Per Gross and John (2003). Respondents were presented with the following instruction:
“We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how you
control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions below involve two distinct
aspects of your emotional life. One is your emotional experience, or what you feel like inside.
The other is your emotional expression, or how you show your emotions in the way you talk,
gesture, or behave. Although some of the following questions may seem similar to one another,
they differ in important ways.” Respondents were then asked to rate how strongly they agreed (or
disagreed) with each statement on a 6-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree).
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Table 5
Studies 1: HEXACO 60-Item Personality Inventory
Honesty-Humility
Sincerity
30. I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would succeed.
54R. If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person's worst jokes.
78. I wouldn't pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.
Fairness
12R. If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars.
60. I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.
84R. I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it.
Greed-Avoidance
18. Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.
90R. I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods.
Modesty
72R. I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is.
96R. I want people to know that I am an important person of high status.
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Fearfulness
5. I would feel afraid if I had to travel in bad weather conditions.
53. When it comes to physical danger, I am very fearful.
77R. Even in an emergency I wouldn't feel like panicking.
Anxiety
11. I sometimes can't help worrying about little things.
35R. I worry a lot less than most people do.
Dependence
17. When I suffer from a painful experience, I need someone to make me feel comfortable.
41R. I can handle difficult situations without needing emotional support from anyone else.
Sentimentality
23. I feel like crying when I see other people crying.
71. I feel strong emotions when someone close to me is going away for a long time.
95R. I remain unemotional even in situations where most people get very sentimental.
Extraversion
Social Self-Esteem
4. I feel reasonably satisfied with myself overall.
52R. I feel that I am an unpopular person.
76R. I sometimes feel that I am a worthless person.
Social Boldness
10R. I rarely express my opinions in group meetings.
34 In social situations, I'm usually the one who makes the first move.
58. When I'm in a group of people, I'm often the one who speaks on behalf of the group.
Sociability
64. I prefer jobs that involve active social interaction to those that involve working alone.
88. The first thing that I always do in a new place is to make friends.
Liveliness
46. On most days, I feel cheerful and optimistic.
94R. Most people are more upbeat and dynamic than I generally am.
(continued next page)
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Agreeableness
Forgiveness
3. I rarely hold a grudge, even against people who have badly wronged me.
27. My attitude toward people who have treated me badly is "forgive and forget".
Gentleness
9R. People sometimes tell me that I am too critical of others.
57. I tend to be lenient in judging other people.
81. Even when people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative.
Flexibility
15R. People sometimes tell me that I'm too stubborn.
39. I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me.
63R. When people tell me that I’m wrong, my first reaction is to argue with them.
Patience
21R. People think of me as someone who has a quick temper.
69 Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do.
Conscientiousness
Organization
26. I plan ahead and organize things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute.
74R. When working, I sometimes have difficulties due to being disorganized.
Diligence
32. I often push myself very hard when trying to achieve a goal.
80R. I do only the minimum amount of work needed to get by.
Perfectionism
38R. When working on something, I don't pay much attention to small details.
62. I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense of time.
86. People often call me a perfectionist.
Prudence
20R. I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought.
44R. I make a lot of mistakes because I don't think before I act.
92R. I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather than stick to a plan.
Openness to Experience
Aesthetic Appreciation
1R. I would be quite bored by a visit to an art gallery.
49. If I had the opportunity, I would like to attend a classical music concert.
Inquisitiveness
7. I'm interested in learning about the history and politics of other countries.
79R. I’ve never really enjoyed looking through an encyclopedia.
Creativity
37. I would enjoy creating a work of art, such as a novel, a song, or a painting.
61. People have often told me that I have a good imagination.
85R. I don't think of myself as the artistic or creative type.
Unconventionality
19R. I think that paying attention to radical ideas is a waste of time.
43. I like people who have unconventional views.
91R. I find it boring to discuss philosophy.
99.✓ People who fail to select option five for this item will be removed from this survey.
“R” denotes reverse-scored item
✓Attention check item. Respondents who do not answer correctly are booted out of the survey.
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Note. Per Ashton & Lee (2005). Respondents were presented with the instruction, “The
following section addresses various personality traits. On a 1 to 6 scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 6
= Strongly Agree), please rate the extent to which you agree (or disagree) with each statement as
it describes your personality: Please click the NEXT button to continue.” Items above are
numbered in accordance with the HEXACO inventory, but were presented to respondents in
random order. Dimensions are denoted with boldface. Facets are denoted with italics.
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Table 6
Study 1: Content Examples from Mental Time Travel Conditions and Self-Descriptors
REMINISCENCE
Current
Self

Past
Episode

Active in a
good mood;
ready to work;
enthusiastic;
happy

Graduating
from
college;
family was
proud I
worked so
hard!

Tired;
eager;
curious;
worried;
irritable

Yesterday
my cat just
helped me
feel better
by purring in
my lap.
Warm and
so cute.

American;
mother;
Christian;
singer;
online
gamer

Great;
busy;
happy;
crazy;
engineer

Lazy;
apprehensive;
bored;
hungry;
frustrated

The day my
daughter
was born
was the
happiest day
ever. I
hoped I'd be
as good a
mother as
my mom.
My trip to
France in
college was
first time I
felt grown
up. Met a
cousin's
family who
made me
feel very
welcome.
Track meet
in high
school.
Expectations
were high. I
didn't
perform well

Actual
Past
Episode

COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING
ReReActual
constructed constructed
Past
Past
Past
Self
Episode
Self

Smart;
brisk;
intelligent;
multitasker;
struggling

Coworker tried
to take credit
for my idea. I
didn't know
what to say and
let her get away
with it.

Irritated;
tense;
enthusiastic;
restless;
eager

Spoke up and
said it was my
idea but
everyone
looked at me
like I was the
one lying.

Calm;
ashamed;
felt foolish;
careless;
rushed

Content;
relaxed;
savoring;
happy;
peaceful

Cat knocked
over the plant
and dirt was
everywhere. I
got mad and
yelled at her.

Irate;
helpless;
hurt;
impatient;
ashamed

Instead of
getting mad I
just cleaned it
up and realized
the cat wasn't
doing it to
make me mad.

Calm;
strong;
rational;
empathetic;
articulate

Mother;
daughter;
peaceful;
loving;
appreciative

Homeless
person asked
me for money.
I got mad and
was afraid if I
stopped I
would be
mugged

Upset;
afraid;
anxious;
angry;
resentful

This time as a
Christian I
asked how I
could help. He
was very
thankful.

Relieved;
strong;
influential;
caring;
wise

Nostalgic;
adult;
female;
familyoriented;
traveler

Tina's party
where I was in
a mad mood
and people
didn't like me

Lonely;
crazy;
negative;
active;
hesitant

I imagined I
was friendly
and outgoing
and people
liked me

Friendly;
crazy;
positive;
hesitant;
active

Teenager;
student;
insecure;
athletic;
unsatisfied

Too scared to
try out for
cheerleading
but thought I
was just as
good an athlete

Tried out and
won and felt
popular

Risk-taker;
curious;
encouraged;
optimistic;
selfconfident

Past
Self

Shy;
uncertain;
impertinent;
socially
awkward;
quiet

PROSPECTION
Future
Episode

Future
Self

AM
Elements*

Content;
at peace;
satisfied;
happy;
grateful

Conference
room,
wood table,
black suit,
ponytail,
notepad

Peaceful;
happy;
content;
relaxed;
joyful

Blush dress,
orchids,
Mark,
Our Savior
altar,
family

I am reading
Psalm 23 at
sister's
wedding. I
don't get
nervous and
sound
stupid.

Attendant;
joyful;
calm;
peaceful;
articulate

My
confirmation
bible,
bookmark
from Dad,
our church,
sister,
sunshine

10 year class
reunion. I'm
successful
and having a
good time.
Britney is
there.

Great;
engineer;
good;
social;
patriot

American
Legion,
Britney,
Jacob, Lexus,
songs from
mid 2000s

Working as
a bb coach
in cali where
kids like me

Nervous;
selfassured;
realistic;
aware;
apprehensive

Black track
pants, USC
lanyard,
sound of the
ball in the
gym, wood
floor,
bleachers

In staff
meeting I
bring up my
idea and
everyone
loves it.
Coworker is
mad but
that's okay.
I'm in the
wedding
dress from
the
magazine.
It's blush
and I'm
holding
orchids.

Note. The above examples reflect a random sample of five cases who provided at least five
autobiographical memory elements.
*The list features the first five autobiographical memory (AM) content elements out of a possible
12.
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Table 7
Study 1: AMFS Factor & Item Descriptives, Communalities, and MSAs per EPAF1
Item Number

Mean (SD)

UV ZSkew

UV ZKurtosis

Communalities

MSA Values

Perspective Taking
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4

3.97 (1.08)
4.05 (1.32)
3.87 (1.28)
3.74 (1.30)
4.25 (1.39)

–2.30*
–1.31
–1.87
–2.51*

–0.51
–0.85
–1.15
–0.79

.62
.57
.46
.77

.84
.75
.89
.72

Prospection
Item 5
Item 6
Item 7

4.05 (1.06)
4.04 (1.27)
4.27 (1.32)
3.85 (1.29)

–3.04**
–3.53***
–1.88

–0.16
+0.43
–0.74

.40
.48
.73

.86
.77
.74

Counterfactual Thinking
Item 8
Item 9
Item 10

3.70 (1.33)
3.21 (1.59)
3.96 (1.51)
3.94 (1.59)

+0.96
–1.79
–1.12

–2.40*
–1.74
–2.26*

.52
.91
.64

.66
.60
.73

Note. N = 110 for all items. *p ≤ .05 (Z ≥ |1.96|), **p ≤ .01 (Z ≥ |2.58|), ***p ≤ .001 (Z ≥ |3.29|).
Bolded values reflect the factor means (standard deviations).
For item content, see Table 3.
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Table 8
Study 1: EPAF1: AMFS Factor Correlations

PT
PRO
CFT

PTS
.85
.17
.56

PRO

CFT

.76
.22

.84

Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual
Thinking.
Bolded values denote correlations ≥ |.32|; i.e., that at least approximately 10% of the variance is
shared between those two factors.
Italicized values denote the ordinal alpha reliability coefficient per factor (shown on the
diagonal).

226
Table 9
Study 1: EPAF1: AMFS Sorted Pattern Matrix Using Geomin Q-Q Oblique Rotation
Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

PTS
.73
.78
.67
.75

PRO

CFT

.51
.65
.86
.58
.92
.72

Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual
Thinking. Factor loadings ≥ .30 were considered salient (Osborne & Costello, 2004) and
statistically significant (Kline, 2002). Loadings ≤ .40 were considered nonsalient and n.s., thus
were suppressed.
For item content, see Table 3.
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Table 10
Study 1: EPAF2: AMFS Rotated Factor Matrix Using Varimax Orthogonal Rotation
Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

PTS
.73
.73
.63
.78

PRO

CFT

.51
.62
.79
.64
.94
.76

Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual
Thinking. Factor loadings ≤ .40 were suppressed.
For item content, see Table 3.

228
Table 11
Study 1: CFA AMFS Factor Means (SDs) and Squared Multiple Correlations
Item Number

Mean (SD)

Multiple Squared Correlations

Perspective Taking
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4

3.97 (1.08)
4.05 (1.32)
3.87 (1.28)
3.74 (1.30)
4.25 (1.39)

.65
.51
.46
.75

Prospection
Item 5
Item 6
Item 7

4.05 (1.06)
4.04 (1.27)
4.27 (1.32)
3.85 (1.29)

.47
.48
.58

Counterfactual Thinking
Item 8
Item 9
Item 10

3.70 (1.33)
3.21 (1.59)
3.96 (1.51)
3.94 (1.59)

.60
.64
.69

Note. For item content, see Table 3.
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Table 12
Study 1: CFA: AMFS Factor Correlations

PTS
PRO
CFT

PTS
.91
.67***
.35**

PRO

CFT

.86
.49***

.94

Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual
Thinking.
Italicized values denote the ordinal alpha reliability coefficient per factor (shown on the
diagonal).
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 13
Study 1: CFA: AMFS Loadings Using RULS and Factors Allowed to Correlate
Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

PTS
.80***
.72***
.68***
.86***

PRO

CFT

.68***
.70***
.77***
.77***
.80***
.83***

Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual
Thinking. For item content, see Table 3.
Note: *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 14
Study 1: Correlations Between AMFS Scale Scores and ERQ Scale Scores

PTS
PRO
CFT

Cognitive Reappraisal
.38***
.35***
.49***

Expressive Suppression
.13
.08
–.01

Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual
Thinking.
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 15
Study 1: Functional Relations Between AMFS Functions and ERQ Dimensions: Cognitive
Reappraisal (Representing Simulation-Based Behavior) and Expressive Suppression
(Representing Social Behavior)
PTS

CR

PRO
2

CFT
2

r

b

t

p

sr %

r

b

t

p

sr %

r

b

t

p

sr2%

.38

1.14

2.28

*

3.4%

.35

.46

.88

n.s.

.05%

.49

1.66

4.44

***

12.9%

Note. CR = Cognitive Reappraisal; PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO =
Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual Thinking.
r = zero-order correlation; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; t = t-test statistic, sr2% =
unique variance explained based on squared multiple correlation; df for t = 106.
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 16
Study 1: Correlations Between AMFS Scale Scores and HEXACO Scale Scores

PTS
PRO
CFT

HH
–.56
.14
–.34***

EMO
–.28**
.22*
.37***

EXT
.22*
.06
–.21*

AGR
.13
.11
–.09

CSC
.26**
.33***
–.10

OPN
.36***
.44***
.09

Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual
Thinking; HH = Honesty-Humility; EMO = Emotionality/Neuroticism; EXT = Extraversion;
AGR = Agreeableness; CSC = Conscientiousness; OPN = Openness to New Experiences.
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 17
Study 2: HEXACO 100-Item Personality Inventory
Honesty-Humility
Sincerity
6R.
30*.
54R*.
78*.

If I want something from a person I dislike, I will act very nicely toward that person in
order to get it.
I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would
succeed.
If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person's worst jokes.
I wouldn't pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.

Fairness
12R*. If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars.
36R. I would be tempted to buy stolen property if I were financially tight.
60*. I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.
84R*. I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it.
Greed-Avoidance
18*. Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.
42R. I would like to live in a very expensive, high-class neighborhood.
66R. I would like to be seen driving around in a very expensive car.
90R*. I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods.
Modesty
24. I am an ordinary person who is no better than others.
48. I wouldn’t want people to treat me as though I were superior to them.
72R*. I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is.
96R*. I want people to know that I am an important person of high status.
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Fearfulness
5*. I would feel afraid if I had to travel in bad weather conditions.
29R. I don’t mind doing jobs that involve dangerous work.
53*. When it comes to physical danger, I am very fearful.
77R*. Even in an emergency I wouldn't feel like panicking.
Anxiety
11*. I sometimes can't help worrying about little things.
35R*. I worry a lot less than most people do.
59R. I rarely, if ever, have trouble sleeping due to stress or anxiety.
83. I get very anxious when waiting to hear about an important decision.
Dependence
17*. When I suffer from a painful experience, I need someone to make me feel comfortable.
41R*. I can handle difficult situations without needing emotional support from anyone else.
Whenever I feel worried about something, I want to share my concern with another
65.
person.
89R. I rarely discuss my problems with other people.
Sentimentality
23*. I feel like crying when I see other people crying.
47. When someone I know well is unhappy, I can almost feel that person's pain myself.
71*. I feel strong emotions when someone close to me is going away for a long time.
95R*. I remain unemotional even in situations where most people get very sentimental.
Extraversion
Social Self-Esteem
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4*.
28.
52R*.
76R*.
Social Boldness
10R*.
34*
58*.
82R.
Sociability
16R.
40.
64*.
88*.
Liveliness
22.
46*.
70R.
94R*.
Agreeableness
Forgiveness
3*.
27*.
51R.
75R.
Gentleness
9R*.
33.
57*.
81*.
Flexibility
15R*.
39*.
63R*.
87R.
Patience
21R*.
45.
69*
93R.
Conscientiousness
Organization
2.
26*.
50R.
74R*.
Diligence
8.
32*.
56R.
80R*.

I feel reasonably satisfied with myself overall.
I think that most people like some aspects of my personality.
I feel that I am an unpopular person.
I sometimes feel that I am a worthless person.
I rarely express my opinions in group meetings.
In social situations, I'm usually the one who makes the first move.
When I'm in a group of people, I'm often the one who speaks on behalf of the group.
I tend to feel quite self-conscious when speaking in front of a group of people.
I avoid making "small talk" with people.
I enjoy having lots of people around to talk with.
I prefer jobs that involve active social interaction to those that involve working alone.
The first thing that I always do in a new place is to make friends.
I am energetic nearly all the time.
On most days, I feel cheerful and optimistic.
People often tell me that I should try to cheer up.
Most people are more upbeat and dynamic than I generally am.
I rarely hold a grudge, even against people who have badly wronged me.
My attitude toward people who have treated me badly is "forgive and forget".
If someone has cheated me once, I will always feel suspicious of that person.
I find it hard to fully forgive someone who has done something mean to me.
People sometimes tell me that I am too critical of others.
I generally accept people’s faults without complaining about them.
I tend to be lenient in judging other people.
Even when people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative.
People sometimes tell me that I'm too stubborn.
I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me.
When people tell me that I’m wrong, my first reaction is to argue with them.
I find it hard to compromise with people when I really think I’m right.
People think of me as someone who has a quick temper.
I rarely feel anger, even when people treat me quite badly.
Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do.
I find it hard to keep my temper when people insult me.
I clean my office or home quite frequently.
I plan ahead and organize things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute.
People often joke with me about the messiness of my room or desk.
When working, I sometimes have difficulties due to being disorganized.
When working, I often set ambitious goals for myself.
I often push myself very hard when trying to achieve a goal.
Often when I set a goal, I end up quitting without having reached it.
I do only the minimum amount of work needed to get by.
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Perfectionism
14.
38R*.
62*.
86*.

I often check my work over repeatedly to find any mistakes.
When working on something, I don't pay much attention to small details.
I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense of time.
People often call me a perfectionist.

Prudence
20R*. I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought.
44R*. I make a lot of mistakes because I don't think before I act.
68. I don’t allow my impulses to govern my behavior.
92R*. I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather than stick to a plan.
Openness to Experience
Aesthetic Appreciation
1R*. I would be quite bored by a visit to an art gallery.
25R. I wouldn't spend my time reading a book of poetry.
49*. If I had the opportunity, I would like to attend a classical music concert.
73. Sometimes I like to just watch the wind as it blows through the trees.
Inquisitiveness
7*. I'm interested in learning about the history and politics of other countries.
31. I enjoy looking at maps of different places.
55R. I would be very bored by a book about the history of science and technology.
79R*. I’ve never really enjoyed looking through an encyclopedia.
Creativity
13R. I would like a job that requires following a routine rather than being creative.
37*. I would enjoy creating a work of art, such as a novel, a song, or a painting.
61*. People have often told me that I have a good imagination.
85R*. I don't think of myself as the artistic or creative type.
Unconventionality
19R*. I think that paying attention to radical ideas is a waste of time.
43*. I like people who have unconventional views.
67. I think of myself as a somewhat eccentric person.
91R*. I find it boring to discuss philosophy.
Altruism
97. I have sympathy for people who are less fortunate than I am.
98. I try to give generously to those in need.
99R. It wouldn’t bother me to harm someone I didn’t like.
100R. People see me as a hard-hearted person.
101.✓ People who fail to select option five for this item will be removed from this survey.
“R” denotes reverse-scored item
✓Attention check item. Respondents who do not answer correctly are booted out of the survey.
*Items included in the 60-item index

Note. Respondents will be presented with the instruction, “The following section addresses
various personality traits. On a 1 to 6 scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree), please
rate the extent to which you agree (or disagree) with each statement as it describes your
personality: Please click the NEXT button to continue.” Items above are numbered in accordance
with the HEXACO inventory (Ashton & Lee, 2005), but will be presented to respondents in
random order. Dimensions are denoted with boldface. Facets are denoted with italics.
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Table 18
Study 2: Autobiographical Memory Functions of Joint Reminiscence (AMFJR) Scale
Conversation (Social)
1. Give us something to talk about.
2. Entertain myself with stories of past experiences.
3. Entertain others with stories of past experiences.
4. Share my life experiences with others.
5. Have fun.
6. Bond with others.
Perspective Taking (Social)
7. Help me understand others.
8. Help me understand what others are thinking or feeling.
Relationship Maintenance (Social)
9. Remind myself that I am loved/that the other is loved.
10. Help myself feel close to family members.
11. Help myself understand family members better.
12. Help myself remember friends or family members.
13. Repair relations between myself and friends or family members.
14. Help resolve disputes between myself and friends or family members.
15. Help myself understand friends better.
16. Help myself feel close to friends.
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (Directive)
17. Emphasize the consequences of negative behavior.
18. Clarify moral lessons.
19. Bring to mind appropriate or preferred behavior.
20. Explain ongoing activities.
21. Prepare myself or others for an upcoming event.
22. Help myself or others problem solve.
23. So that I or another avoids repeating a past mistake at some later date.
24. To see how my or another’s strengths can help solve a present problem.
25. Help lessen my or another’s negative emotions.
Emotion Regulation (Directive)
26. Emphasize or clarify appropriate emotional responses.
27. Help me or another control emotions.
28. Help me cope with stressful or upsetting situations.
29. Help me make sense of my or another’s emotions.
30. Help me or another process an emotional experience.
31. Help me or another understand how to feel.
Self Identity (Self)
32. Help me feel good about myself.
33. Build or maintain my sense of self.
34. Build a unique individual identity for myself.
35. Help me to feel or recognize that I am part of a larger group.
36. Remind myself of what I was like when I was younger.

Note. Per Kulkofsky & Koh (2009) and adapted by Ranson & Fitzgerald (in preparation).
Respondents are presented with the instruction, “We are interested in how and why people
engage in past-talk. Past-talk is conversation about events that you have experienced with the
person(s) you are speaking to or that you have experienced but your conversational partner(s)
have not. Please keep past-talk conversations in mind when rating how often you engage in each
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of the situations below using a 1 to 6 scale (1 = Almost never; 6 = Almost always). Please click
the NEXT button to continue.” On the next page, the items follow the stem statement,
“I engage in past-talk with another or others in order to...”
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Table 19
Study 2: Thinking About Life Experiences (TALE) Scale
Social Function
1. When I hope to also find what another personal is like.
2. When I want to develop some more intimacy in a relationship.
3. When I want to develop a closer relationship with someone.
4. When I want to maintain a friendship by sharing memories with friends.
5. When I hope to also learn more about another person’s life.
Directive Function
6. When I want to remember something that someone else said or did that might help me now.
7. When I believe that thinking about the past can help guide my future.
8. When I want to try to learn from my past mistakes.
9. When I need to make a life choice and I am uncertain which path to take.
10. When I want to remember a lesson I learned in the past.
Self Function
11. When I want to feel that I am the same person that I was before.
12. When I am concerned about whether I am still the same type of person that I was earlier.
13. When I am concerned about whether my values have changed over time.
14. When I am concerned about whether my beliefs have changed over time.
15. When I want to understand how I have changed from who I was before.

Note. Per Bluck & Alea (2011). Respondents are presented with the instruction, “Sometimes
people think back over their life or talk to other people about their life: It may be about things
that happened quite a long time ago or more recently. We are not interested in your memory for a
particular event, but more generally in how you bring together and connect the different events
and periods of your life. Please rate how often you do the following on a 1 to 6 scale (1 = Almost
Never; 6 = Almost Always). Please click the NEXT button to continue.” On the following page,
the items follow the stem statement, “I think back over or talk about my life or certain periods of
my life...”
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Table 20
Study 2: Demographics
Gender
1.
2.
3.
4.

Male
Female
Transgender
Prefer not to answer

Race/Ethnicity
1. Caucasian
2. South Asian
3. African-American/Black
4. East Asian
5. Hispanic
6. Other
7. Multiracial
8. Arab/Middle Eastern
9. Prefer not to answer

Age
1.
2.

Select option in years (18 through 66+)
Prefer not to answer

Groups
18–24
25–34
35–44
45–54
55–64
65 + >

Frequency (Percent)
450 (49.8%)
449 (49.7%)
3 (0.3%)
1 (0.1%)
584 (64.7%)
157 (17.4%)
51 (5.6%)
43 (4.8%)
35 (3.9%)
14 (1.6%)
10 (1.1%)
2 (0.2%)
7 (0.8%)

Mean (SD)
34.92 (11.21)
N/A
Frequency (Percent)
144 (15.9%)
382 (42.4%)
206 (22.9%)
103 (11.4%)
54 (6.0%)
14 (1.5%)
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Table 21
Study 2: Scale Score Descriptives: AMFS, ERQ, HEXACO, AMFJR, and TALE
Scale/Dimension
AMFS
Perspective Taking
Prospection
Counterfactual Thinking
ERQ
Cognitive Reappraisal
Expressive Suppression
HEXACO
Honesty-Humility
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Openness to Experience
Altruism
AMFJR
Conversation
Perspective Taking
Relationship Maintenance
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control
Emotion Regulation
Self
TALE
Social
Directive
Self

Mean (SD)

UV ZSkew

UV ZKurtosis

4.31 (1.02)
4.36 (0.96)
4.07 (1.26)

–8.70***
–8.05***
–6.52***

+3.20**
+4.21***
–2.36**

4.25 (0.97)
3.36 (1.20)

–6.65***
–1.02

+2.33*
–4.23***

4.10 (0.87)
3.78 (0.77)
3.74 (0.88)
3.54 (0.81)
4.31 (0.74)
4.18 (0.81)
4.48 (0.93)

–0.98
–1.60
–2.99**
–1.90
–1.84
–2.37*
–6.05***

–2.94**
+1.67
–0.23
+2.24*
–0.40
–1.69
+0.52

4.50 (1.01)
4.19 (1.18)
4.12 (1.02)
4.09 (0.93)
4.01 (1.05)
3.92 (1.07)

–11.40***
–8.57***
–6.65***
–7.46***
–7.06***
–6.56***

+6.37***
+1.37
+2.24*
+3.40***
+1.59
+0.31

4.30 (1.04)
4.49 (0.98)
3.95 (1.22)

–8.62***
–10.09***
–5.99***

+2.55*
+6.12***
–1.76

Note. N = 110 for all items. Bolded values reflect the factor means (standard deviations). For
item content, see Table 3.
*p ≤ .05 (Z ≥ |1.96|), **p ≤ .01 (Z ≥ |2.58|), ***p ≤ .001 (Z ≥ |3.29|).
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Table 22
Study 2: Inter-Item Correlations for the Functions of the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE
AMFS: Perspective Taking (PTS), Prospection (PRO), Counterfactual Thinking (CFT)
PTS01
PTS02
PTS03
PTS04
PRO05
PRO06
PRO07
CFT08
CFT09
CFT10

PTS01

PTS02

PTS03

PTS04

PRO05

PROS06

PRO07

CFT08

CFT09

.64
.62
.66
.42
.49
.41
.21
.20
.22

.60
.68
.42
.51
.41
.23
.20
.21

.59
.42
.47
.42
.22
.21
.24

.44
.46
.41
.25
.21
.25

.42
.51
.28
.28
.29

.46
.22
.21
.23

.23
.28
.24

.79
.87

.89

CFT10

AMFJR: Conversation (C), Perspective Taking (PTJR), Relationship Maintenance (R)

C01
C02
C03
C04
C05
C06
PJR07
PJR08
R09
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
T17
T18
T19
T20
T21
T22
T23
T24
T25
E26
E27
E28
E29
E30
E31
SJR32
SJR33
SJR34
SJR35
SJR36

C01

C02

C03

C04

C05

C06

PJR07

PJR08

R09

R10

R11

R12

R13

R14

R15

R16

.50
.51
.41
.52
.44
.22
.22
.23
.29
.23
.41
.21
.21
.25
.42
.14
.17
.23
.31
.26
.27
.20
.22
.18
.21
.17
.18
.23
.25
.24
.32
.31
.24
.26
.31

.63
.44
.56
.44
.28
.30
.33
.32
.27
.42
.27
.26
.33
.40
.19
.21
.26
.29
.24
.23
.26
.24
.22
.26
.22
.28
.27
.26
.29
.40
.36
.33
.25
.45

.58
.51
.51
.31
.35
.31
.34
.27
.39
.24
.24
.31
.40
.20
.20
.25
.33
.25
.27
.29
.28
.22
.24
.17
.23
.29
.31
.24
.32
.31
.26
.26
.38

.40
.52
.37
.37
.35
.36
.32
.39
.27
.32
.39
.42
.26
.25
.30
.34
.29
.35
.30
.32
.30
.31
.22
.32
.39
.41
.37
.33
.36
.30
.31
.35

.46
.27
.25
.32
.37
.24
.37
.26
.29
.29
.47
.14
.19
.24
.34
.33
.24
.18
.24
.22
.22
.19
.20
.19
.19
.24
.43
.35
.32
.33
.36

.37
.39
.39
.43
.35
.34
.36
.33
.39
.56
.21
.22
.28
.34
.29
.35
.28
.32
.32
.33
.27
.35
.38
.38
.34
.33
.35
.28
.35
.28

.64
.48
.36
.53
.27
.43
.44
.63
.44
.38
.43
.48
.42
.41
.47
.40
.54
.43
.51
.48
.48
.61
.55
.57
.35
.45
.37
.45
.33

.46
.37
.54
.31
.44
.45
.58
.42
.37
.42
.47
.43
.43
.45
.43
.53
.44
.56
.47
.47
.61
.56
.58
.37
.42
.37
.39
.33

.51
.51
.45
.46
.46
.49
.47
.34
.43
.45
.35
.38
.35
.35
.43
.40
.48
.44
.45
.48
.43
.50
.45
.50
.40
.48
.41

.60
.57
.48
.44
.42
.52
.24
.34
.35
.35
.31
.29
.38
.34
.30
.37
.37
.32
.39
.38
.42
.43
.43
.34
.45
.36

.44
.51
.47
.57
.43
.35
.41
.43
.37
.39
.33
.46
.40
.32
.48
.39
.42
.53
.46
.50
.38
.43
.36
.43
.37

.41
.34
.37
.42
.25
.31
.31
.34
.33
.30
.31
.28
.28
.31
.28
.30
.31
.32
.34
.35
.42
.35
.35
.46

.60
.46
.40
.32
.40
.41
.40
.39
.33
.41
.41
.33
.44
.43
.46
.48
.40
.45
.36
.36
.31
.43
.30

.52
.41
.41
.46
.49
.43
.44
.38
.44
.44
.36
.44
.46
.46
.49
.40
.49
.39
.38
.31
.41
.31

.53
.37
.42
.48
.41
.45
.38
.46
.46
.39
.51
.50
.50
.63
.51
.57
.40
.43
.41
.45
.35

.24
.28
.36
.38
.31
.25
.37
.34
.34
.42
.39
.34
.44
.42
.41
.46
.42
.36
.46
.33
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AMFJR: Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (TPB), Emotion Regulation (ER)

C01
C02
C03
C04
C05
C06
PJR07
PJR08
R09
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
T17
T18
T19
T20
T21
T22
T23
T24
T25
E26
E27
E28
E29
E30
E31
SJR32
SJR33
SJR34
SJR35
SJR36

T17

T18

T19

T20

T21

T22

T23

T24

T25

E26

E27

E28

E29

E30

E31

.14
.19
.20
.26
.14
.21
.38
.37
.34
.24
.35
.25
.33
.41
.37
.24

.17
.21
.20
.25
.19
.22
.43
.42
.43
.34
.41
.31
.40
.46
.42
.28

.23
.26
.25
.30
.24
.28
.48
.47
.45
.35
.43
.31
.41
.49
.48
.36

.31
.29
.33
.34
.34
.34
.42
.43
.35
.30
.32
.28
.33
.36
.39
.34

.26
.24
.25
.28
.33
.29
.41
.43
.38
.35
.37
.40
.43
.41
.38
.38

.27
.23
.27
.35
.24
.35
.47
.45
.35
.31
.39
.33
.39
.44
.45
.31

.20
.26
.29
.30
.18
.28
.40
.43
.35
.29
.33
.30
.33
.38
.38
.25

.22
.24
.28
.32
.24
.32
.54
.53
.43
.38
.46
.31
.41
.44
.46
.37

.18
.22
.22
.30
.22
.32
.43
.44
.40
.34
.40
.28
.41
.45
.46
.34

.21
.26
.24
.31
.22
.33
.50
.56
.48
.37
.48
.30
.44
.44
.51
.42

.17
.22
.17
.22
.19
.27
.48
.47
.44
.37
.39
.28
.43
.46
.50
.40

.18
.27
.23
.32
.20
.35
.48
.47
.45
.32
.42
.30
.46
.46
.51
.34

.23
.27
.29
.39
.19
.38
.62
.61
.48
.39
.53
.31
.48
.49
.63
.44

.25
.26
.31
.41
.19
.39
.55
.56
.43
.38
.46
.32
.40
.40
.51
.42

.24
.29
.24
.37
.24
.34
.57
.58
.50
.42
.50
.34
.45
.49
.57
.41

.52
.46
.36
.46
.42
.45
.36
.32
.44
.39
.41
.45
.37
.39
.25
.29
.29
.32
.28

.53
.41
.47
.46
.49
.36
.36
.48
.46
.43
.50
.42
.48
.31
.40
37
.36
.33

.45
.43
.46
.46
.44
.41
.57
.46
.47
.53
.44
.52
.43
.51
.44
.43
.35

.44
.45
.32
.43
.37
.42
.38
.37
.39
.37
.39
.34
.41
.37
.38
.25

.44
.40
.43
.38
.43
.46
.35
.37
.36
.40
.39
.43
.38
.39
.25

.47
.54
.41
.42
.40
.47
.49
.42
.46
.30
.38
.32
.39
.28

.47
.38
.40
.32
.41
.45
.39
.42
.26
.30
.27
.22
.35

.43
.48
.42
.46
.51
.48
.51
.36
.42
.35
.39
.31

.47
.47
.48
.47
.42
.45
.32
.37
.34
.36
.27

.57
.48
.57
.51
.57
.40
.48
.41
.43
.33

.50
.53
.48
.53
.43
.47
.41
.48
.28

.53
.51
.52
.38
.45
.38
.41
.30

.61
.64
.38
.47
.39
.45
.34

.57
.39
.45
.35
.41
.32

.39
.48
.43
.45
.35

AMFJR: Self (SJR)

C01
C02
C03
C04
C05
C06
PJR07
PJR08
R09
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
T17
T18

SJR32

SJR33

SJR34

SJR35

SJR36

.32
.40
.32
.33
.43
.38
.35
.37
.45
.43
.38
.35
.36
.39
.40
.46
.25
.31

.31
.36
.31
.36
.35
.35
.45
.42
.50
.43
.43
.42
.36
.38
.43
.42
.29
.40

.24
.33
.26
.30
.32
.28
.37
.37
.40
.34
.36
.35
.31
.31
.41
.36
.29
.37

.26
.25
.26
.31
.33
.35
.45
.39
.48
.46
.43
.35
.43
.41
.45
.46
.32
.36

.31
.46
.38
.35
.36
.26
.33
.33
.41
.36
.37
.46
.30
.31
.35
.33
.28
.33
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T19
T20
T21
T22
T23
T24
T25
E26
E27
E28
E29
E30
E31
SJR32
SJR33
SJR34
SJR35
SJR36

.43
.39
.30
.26
.36
.32
.34
.40
.43
.38
.38
.39
.39

.51
.43
.38
.30
.42
.37
.41
.48
.47
.48
.47
.45
.48

.44
.38
.32
.27
.35
.34
.37
.41
.41
.38
.39
.35
.43

.43
.39
.39
.22
.39
.39
.38
.43
.48
.41
.45
.41
.45

.58
.45
.48
.40

.59
.49
.44

.42
.33

.34

.35
.25
.28
.35
.31
.27
.25
.33
.28
.30
.34
.32
.35

TALE: Social (SC), Directive (D), Self (ST)

SC01
SC02
SC03
SC04
SC05
D06
D07
D08
D09
D10
ST11
ST12
ST13
ST14
ST15

SC01

SC02

SC03

SC04

SC05

D06

D07

D08

D09

D10

ST11

ST12

ST13

ST14

.46
.51
.45
.62
.38
.37
.30
.35
.33
.38
.34
.33
.35
.36

.66
.49
.48
.32
.31
.25
.27
.27
.33
.26
.26
.29
.31

.57
.52
.40
.37
.28
.31
.29
.31
.29
.26
.26
.33

.47
.37
.30
.20
.27
.25
.29
.26
.20
.20
.26

.40
.37
.30
.31
.34
.31
.29
.28
.30
.34

.52
.51
.49
.54
.35
.37
.41
.40
.45

.54
.50
.52
.37
.39
.45
.40
.51

.50
.67
.33
.39
.44
.41
.50

.49
.36
.38
.42
.40
.41

.33
.43
.44
.41
.52

.66
.55
.57
.47

.67
.69
.57

.74
.64

.61

Note. Bold denotes inter-item correlations within the function.
For item content, see Tables 3, 18, and 19.
All correlations significant at p < .001.

ST15
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Table 23
Study 2: Individual CFA Fit Indices and Diagnostics for AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE

Satorra-Bentler χ2 (df)
Independence model χ2 (df)
Hotelier’s Critical N
SB-adjusted RMSEA
SB-adjusted NNFI
SB-adjusted CFI
SMC range
SMC average
Factor loadings range
MV skew Z-score
MV kurtosis Z-score
Relative MV kurtosis
Condition Number
SEM factor reliability range

AMFS
74.74 (32)***
7116.03 (45)
314.54
.038
.991
.985
.49–.92
.69
.70–.98
21.90***
18.93***
1.29
11.05
.93–.99

AMFJR
1662.82 (579)***
21065.36 (630)
191.11
.046
.942
.914
.39–.68
.53
.62–.83
75.40***
44.47***
1.36
8.89
.83–.91

TALE
354.24 (87)***
8492.10 (105)
154.08
.058
.962
.950
.46–.73
.61
.68–.85
35.43***
28.91***
1.39
6.10
.91–.95

Note. MV skew, MV kurtosis, and relative MV kurtosis were computed on data designated as
continuous.
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 24
Study 2: Individual CFA Factor Correlations
AMFS
PTS
PRO
CFT

PTS
.95
.82***
.31***

AMFJR
CONVO
PTJR
RM
TPB
ER
SELFJR

CONVO
.89
.56***
.70***
.58***
.54***
.70***

TALE
SOC
DIR
SELFT

SOC
.91
.64***
.55***

PRO

CFT

.86
.40***

.99

PTJR

RM

TPB

ER

SELFJR

.96
.83***
.86***
.92***
.72***

.87
.84***
.89***
.86***

.83
.91***
.80***

.92
.82***

.85

DIR

SELFT

.91
.75***

.95

Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual
Thinking; CONVO = Conversation (Social); PTJR = Perspective Taking (socially situated:
Social); RM = Relationship Maintenance (Social); TPB = Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral
Control (Directive); ER = Emotion Control (Directive); SELFJR = Self (socially situated; Self);
SOC = Social; DIR = Directive; SELFT = Self (TALE).
Bolded values denote correlations ≥ |.32|; i.e., that at least approximately 10% of the variance is
shared between those two factors.
Italicized values denote the ordinal alpha reliability coefficient per factor (shown on the
diagonal).
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 25
Study 2: Comparisons Between Select LISREL and AMOS Estimates and Fit Indices for
Individual CFAs Run on the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE
AMFS

AMFJR

TALE

LISREL§
AMOS

74.74 (32) ***
67.13 (32)***

1662.82 (579)***
2343.55 (579)***

354.24 (87)***
354.70 (87)***

LISREL§
AMOS

.038
.035

.046
.048

.058
.058

LISREL§
AMOS

.991
.991

.942
.904

.962
.929

LISREL§
AMOS

.985
.983

.914
.872

.950
.915

LISREL
AMOS

.49–.92
.45–.93

.39–.68
.36–.69

.46–.73
.45–.71

.69
.65

.53
.51

.61
.56

.70–.98
.67–.98

.62–.83
.57–.80

.68–.85
.67–.84

.93–.99
.93–.99

.83–.91
.78–.94

.91–.95
.89–.94

2

χ Test Statistic

RMSEA

NNFI

CFI

SMC range

SMC average
LISREL
AMOS
Factor loadings range***
LISREL
AMOS
SEM factor reliability range
LISREL
AMOS

Note. AMOS denotes NNFI as TLI (Tucker-Lewis Non-normed Fit Index).
§

For LISREL, value denotes the computed value using the Satorra-Bentler chi-square; for
AMOS, value denotes the computed value using the ML Ratio chi-square.
All factor loadings in LISREL and AMOS were significant at the p < .001 level.
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Study 2: CFA of 8-Factor Model: First- and Second-Order Standardized Regression Weights,
Squared Multiple Correlations, and SEM Reliabilities
ITEM
AMFS01
AMFS02
AMFS03
AMFS04
JR07
JR08
AMFS05
AMFS06
AMFS07
AMFS08
AMFS09
AMFS10
JR01
JR02
JR03
JR04
JR05
JR06
JR09
JR10
JR11
JR12
JR13
JR14
JR15
JR16
JR17
JR18
JR19
JR20
JR21
JR22
JR23
JR24
JR25
JR26
JR27
JR28
JR29
JR30
JR31
JR32
JR33
JR34
JR35
JR36
PT
PRO
CFT
CON
RM

PTS&JR
.78
.78
.73
.80
.64
.65

PRO

CFT

CON

RM

TPB

ER

SELF

2ND

.66
.66
.73
.88
.90
.99
.66
.74
.79
.68
.69
.68
.70
.69
.74
.59
.68
.69
.74
.65
.62
.69
.72
.60
.63
.69
.63
.71
.62
.74
.69
.69
.80
.72
.78
.70
.79
.67
.67
.56
.75
.63
.32
.62
.91

SMCs
.61
.61
.53
.59
.41
.42
.43
.44
.53
.78
.81
.98
.43
.55
.62
.46
.47
.46
.50
.48
.54
.35
.47
.47
.55
.43
.38
.47
.52
.36
.39
.47
.39
.51
.39
.55
.48
.47
.64
.52
.61
.49
.63
.45
.44
.31
.57
.40
.10
.39
.82

REL

.87
.82
.99
.85
.83
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TPB
ER
SELF

.93
.95
.85

.86
.90
.73

.78
.89
.82

Note. PTS&JR = Perspective Taking (simulation based + socially situated); PRO = Prospection;
CFT = Counterfactual Thinking; CON = Conversation; RM = Relationship Maintenance; TPB =
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control; ER = Emotion Regulation; SELFJR = Self
(socially situated). For item content, see Tables 3 and 18.
For item content, see Tables 3 and 18.
All regression weights significant at p ≤ .001.
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Table 27
Study 2: Bivariate Correlations Between the Functions of the AMFS and AMFJR
PTS

AMFS
PRO

PTS
PRO
CFT

.64
.27

.32

CON
PTJR
RM
TPB
ER
SELFJR

.33
.54
.44
.53
.52
.38

.34
.39
.40
.48
.43
.38

CFT

CON

PTJR

.17
.19
.23
.25
.28
.27

.44
.59
.47
.44
.57

.67
.69
.75
.56

AMFJR
RM
TPB

ER

.71
.75
.72

.68

.79
.66

SELFJR

Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual
Thinking; CON = Conversation; PTJR = Perspective Taking (socially situated); RM =
Relationship Maintenance; TPB = Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control; ER = Emotion
Regulation; SELF = Self (socially situated).
Coefficient in bold is correlation between simulation-based and socially situated Perspective
Taking functions.
All correlations significant at p < .001.
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Table 28
Study 2: The Use of Autobiographical Memory for Simulation-Based Versus Socially
Situated Perspective Taking: Functional Relations and Correlations
PTS

PTJR
2

r

b

t

p

sr %

r

b

t

p

sr2%

ZDBP

CR

.29

.19

5.40

***

2.9%

.26

.13

4.14

***

1.7%

.69

ES

.24

.13

2.40

*

0.6%

.33

.36

7.59

***

5.6%

2.08**

Testing Difference between Correlation Coefficients
AMFJR(2) × AMFS(4)

r1
.54***

ρ (rho)
.51***

ZDBP
.88

p-value
.190

AMFJR(2) × AMFS(2)

.51***

.48***

.84

.200

AMFJR(2) × AMFS(2)
AMFJR(2) × AMFS(4)

.51***
.54***

---

.88

.190

Testing Differential Use of Autobiographical Memory Content for AMFS vs. AMFJR
Perspective Taking Subscales

AMFJR(2) vs. AMFS(4)

MJR (SD)
4.19 (1.18)

MS (SD)
4.31 (1.02)

Z
–3.26

p-value
< .001

AMFJR(2) vs. AMFS(2)

4.19 (1.18)

4.05 (1.26)

–4.85

< .001

Note. CR = Cognitive Reappraisal; ES = Expressive Suppression; PTS = Perspective Taking
(simulation based); PTJR = Perspective Taking (socially situated); AMFS(2) = Scale score for the
two items that directly correspond to the two items from the AMFJR; MJR = Mean of AMFJR
Perspective Taking subscale; MS = Mean of AMFS Perspective Taking Subscale
r = zero-order correlation; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; t = t-test statistic, sr2% =
unique variance explained based on the squared semi-partial correlation; df for t = 899.
ZDBP = Z-score yielded in one-tailed significance test of difference between proportions
(Preacher, 2002); ZT = Z-score yielded in two-tailed significance test of differences between
mean ranks
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 29
Study 2: CFA of 9-Factor Model: First- and Second-Order Standardized Regression Weights,
Squared Multiple Correlations, and SEM Reliabilities
ITEM
AMFS01
AMFS02
AMFS03
AMFS04
AMFS05
AMFS06
AMFS07
AMFS08
AMFS09
AMFS10
JR01
JR02
JR03
JR04
JR05
JR06
JR07
JR08
JR09
JR10
JR11
JR12
JR13
JR14
JR15
JR16
JR17
JR18
JR19
JR20
JR21
JR22
JR23
JR24
JR25
JR26
JR27
JR28
JR29
JR30
JR31
JR32
JR33
JR34
JR35
JR36
PTS
PRO
CFT
CON

PTS
.82
.82
.74
.81

PRO

CFT

CON

PTJR

RM

TPB

ER

SELFJR

2ND

.65
.66
.73
.88
.90
.99
.66
.74
.79
.68
.69
.68
.80
.80
.70
.68
.74
.59
.68
.69
.75
.65
.62
.68
.72
.60
.63
.69
.63
.72
.62
.74
.69
.68
.80
.72
.78
.70
.80
.67
.67
.55
.64
.62
.31
.62

SMCs
.66
.67
.55
.66
.43
.44
.53
.77
.81
.98
.43
.55
.62
.46
.47
.46
.63
.64
.49
.47
.55
.34
.47
.47
.56
.43
.38
.47
.51
.36
.39
.47
.39
.52
.39
.54
.48
.47
.64
.52
.61
.49
.63
.45
.44
.31
.41
.38
.10
.38

REL

.94
.82
.99
.85
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PTJR
RM
TPB
ER
SELFJR

.92
.91
.93
.96
.84

.85
.82
.86
.92
.70

.94
.83
.78
.89
.82

Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual
Thinking; PTJR = Perspective Taking (socially situated); CON = Conversation; RM =
Relationship Maintenance; TPB = Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control; ER = Emotion
Regulation; SELFJR = Self (socially situated). For item content, see Tables 3 and 18.
2ND = Second-order standardized regression coefficients; SMCs = Squared multiple
correlations; REL = SEM reliabilities.
For item content, see Tables 3, 18, and 19.
All regression weights significant at p ≤ .001.
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Table 30
Study 2: CFA of AMFJR Mapped onto the TALE: First- and Second-Order Standardized
Regression Weights, Squared Multiple Correlations, Factor Correlations, and SEM
Reliabilities
ITEM
JR01
JR02
JR03
JR04
JR05
JR06
JR07
JR08
JR09
JR10
JR11
JR12
JR13
JR14
JR15
JR16
JR17
JR18
JR19
JR20
JR21
JR22
JR23
JR24
JR25
JR26
JR27
JR28
JR29
JR30
JR31
JR32
JR33
JR34
JR35
JR36
TALE01
TALE02
TALE03
TALE04
TALE05
TALE06
TALE07
TALE08
TALE09
TALE10
TALE11
TALE12
TALE13

CON
.65
.73
.78
.69
.68
.69

PTJR

RM

TPB

ER

SELFJR

SOC

DIR

SELFT

.79
.81
.70
.70
.73
.61
.68
.69
.74
.68
.63
.69
.71
.58
.61
.70
.65
.72
.61
.74
.69
.70
.80
.72
.78
.71
.81
.67
.64
.57
.71
.64
.72
.64
.70
.67
.67
.68
.63
.68
.72
.81
.83

2ND

SMCs
.42
.53
.62
.48
.47
.47
.62
.66
.49
.49
.53
.37
.46
.45
.54
.46
.40
.47
.50
.33
.37
.49
.42
.52
.37
.55
.48
.49
.63
.52
.60
.50
.65
.45
.41
.32
.50
.41
.51
.41
.48
.44
.45
.46
.39
.47
.51
.66
.68

REL
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TALE14
TALE15
CON
PTJR
RM
TPB
ER
SELFJR
SOC
DIR
SELFT

.74
.92
.73
.87
.89
.92
.91
.71
.85
.64

.77

.69
.55
.53
.74
.79
.85
.83
.50

.85
.94
.83
.78
.89
.82
.99
.99
.99

Note. CON = AMFJR Conversation; PTJR = AMFJR Perspective Taking; RM = AMFJR
Relationship Maintenance; TPB = AMFJR Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control; ER =
AMFJR Emotion Regulation; SELFJR = AMFJR Self; SOC = TALE Social; DIR = TALE
Directive; SELFT = TALE Self. For item content, see Tables 18 and 19.
2ND = Second-order standardized regression coefficients; SMCs = Squared multiple
correlations; REL = SEM reliabilities.
For item content, see Tables 18 and 19.
All regression weights significant at p ≤ .001.
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Table 31
Study 2: CFA of AMFS Mapped onto the TALE: First- and Second-Order Standardized
Regression Weights, Squared Multiple Correlations, Factor Correlations, and SEM Reliabilities
ITEM
AMFS01
AMFS02
AMFS03
AMFS04
AMFS05
AMFS06
AMFS07
AMFS08
AMFS09
AMFS10
TALE01
TALE02
TALE03
TALE04
TALE05
TALE06
TALE07
TALE08
TALE09
TALE10
TALE11
TALE12
TALE13
TALE14
TALE15
PTS
PRO
CFT
SOC
DIR
SELFT
2ND Order

PTS
.81
.82
.74
.82

PRO

CFT

SOC

DIR

SELFT

2ND

.66
.69
.69
.88
.90
.99
.72
.71
.78
.66
.73
.71
.74
.74
.69
.76
.70
.82
.84
.84
.74
.59
.62
.36
.65
.52

.71

SMCs
.66
.68
.55
.67
.43
.48
.48
.78
.81
.98
.52
.50
.61
.44
.53
.50
.55
.55
.45
.58
.49
.67
.71
.71
.55
.34
.38
.13

REL

.94
.82
.99
.99
.99
.99
.84

Note. PTS = AMFS Perspective Taking; PRO = AMFS Prospection; CFT = AMFS
Counterfactual Thinking; SOC = TALE Social; DIR = TALE Directive; SELFT = TALE Self.
For item content, see Tables 3 and 19.
2ND = Second-order standardized regression coefficients; SMCs = Squared multiple
correlations; REL = SEM reliabilities.
For item content, see Tables 3 and 19.
All regression weights significant at p ≤ .001.
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Table 32
Study 2: CFA of AMFJR and AMFS Mapped onto the TALE: First- and Second-Order
Standardized Regression Weights, Squared Multiple Correlations, Factor Correlations, and
SEM Reliabilities
ITEM
AMFS01
AMFS02
AMFS03
AMFS04
AMFS05
AMFS06
AMFS07
AMFS08
AMFS09
AMFS10
JR01
JR02
JR03
JR04
JR05
JR06
JR07
JR08
JR09
JR10
JR11
JR12
JR13
JR14
JR15
JR16
JR17
JR18
JR19
JR20
JR21
JR22
JR23
JR24
JR25
JR26
JR27
JR28
JR29
JR30
JR31
JR32
JR33
JR34
JR35
JR36
TALE01
TALE02
TALE03
TALE04
TALE05
TALE06
TALE07
TALE08

PTS
.82
.82
.74
.81

PRO

CFT

CON

PTJR

RM

TPB

ER

SELFJR

SOC

DIR

.68
.68
.71
.88
.90
.99
.65
.73
.79
.69
.68
.69
.79
.81
.70
.70
.73
.60
.68
.67
.74
.68
.63
.69
.71
.58
.61
.70
.65
.72
.61
.74
.69
.70
.80
.72
.78
.71
.81
.67
.64
.57
.71
.63
.71
.63
.69
.66
.68
.67

SELFT

2ND

SMCs
.66
.68
.55
.66
.43
.46
.50
.78
.81
.98
.42
.54
.62
.48
.47
.47
.62
.66
.49
.49
.53
.36
.46
.45
.55
.46
.40
.47
.50
.34
.37
.49
.41
.52
.37
.55
.48
.48
.64
.52
.60
.50
.63
.45
.41
.32
.50
.40
.50
.39
.48
.48
.46
.45

REL
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TALE09
TALE10
TALE11
TALE12
TALE13
TALE14
TALE15
PTS
PRO
CFT
CON
PTJR
RM
TPB
ER
SELFJR
SOC
DIR
SELFT

.62
.68
.72
.81
.82
.83
.74
.64
.64
.37
.71
.88
.88
.92
.91
.71
.87
.65

.40
.46
.52
.66
.68
.69
.55
.41
.41
.13
.51
.78
.78
.85
.83
.50

.94
.82
.99
.85
.94
.83
.78
.87
.82

.77

Note. Note: PTS =AMFS Perspective Taking; PRO = AMFS Prospection; CFT = AMFS
Counterfactual Thinking; CON = AMFJR Conversation; PTJR = AMFJR Perspective Taking;
RM = AMFJR Relationship Maintenance; TPB = AMRJR Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral
Control; ER = AMFJR Emotion Regulation; SELFJR = AMFJR Self; SOC = TALE Social; DIR
= TALE Directive; SELFT = TALE Self. For item content, see Tables 3, 18, and 19.
2ND = Second-order standardized regression coefficients; SMCs = Squared multiple
correlations; REL = SEM reliabilities.
For item content, see Tables 3, 18, and 19.
All regression weights significant at p ≤ .001.
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Table 33
Study 2: Correlations Between AMFS Scale Scores and EQR Scale Scores

Perspective Taking (simulation based)
Prospection
Counterfactual Thinking

Cognitive Reappraisal
.29***
.24***
.15***

Expressive Suppression
.24***
.20***
.12***

ZDBP
1.14
.89
1.08

Note. ZDBP = Z-score yielded in one-tailed significance test of difference between proportions
(Preacher, 2002).
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 34
Study 2: Functional Relations Between AMFS Functions and ERQ Dimension of Cognitive
Reappraisal (Representing Simulation-Based Behavior)
PTS

CR

PRO
2

CFT
2

r

b

t

p

sr %

r

b

t

p

sr %

r

b

t

p

sr2%

.29

.21

5.31

***

2.86%

.26

.07

1.67

n.s.

.28%

.15

.06

2.11

*

.45%

Note. CR = Cognitive Reappraisal; PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO =
Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual Thinking.
r = zero-order correlation; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; t = t-test statistic, sr2% =
unique variance explained based on the squared semi-partial correlation; df for t = 899).
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 35
Study 2: Correlations Between AMFJR Emotion Regulation Scale Score and ERQ Scale Scores

Emotion Regulation

Cognitive Reappraisal
.26***

Expressive Suppression
.45***

ZDBP
4.64***

Note. ZDBP = Z-score yielded in one-tailed significance test of difference between proportions
(Preacher, 2002).
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 36
Study 2: Significant Use of Autobiographical Memory for TALE Functions as Predicted by
HEXACO Personality Traits (Dimensions Only)
Social
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Openness to Experience
Altruism
Directive
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Openness to Experience
Altruism
Self
Honesty-Humility
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Extraversion
Openness to Experience
Altruism

R

b

t

p

R 2%

.25
.23
.09
.13
.22
.22

.37
.28
.11
.19
.28
.25

7.69
7.20
2.59
4.03
6.71
6.90

***
***
**
***
***
***

6.2%
5.4%
0.7%
1.8%
4.6%
4.9%

.26
.18
.08
.20
.19
.26

.33
.20
.10
.28
.23
.27

8.10
5.48
4.00
5.98
5.91
8.15

***
***
***
***
***
***

6.8%
3.2%
1.7%
3.8%
3.7%
6.9%

–.11
.26
.09
.11
.10

–.15
.41
.12
.16
.13

–3.29
8.06
2.67
3.21
3.00

**
***
**
**
**

1.2%
6.7%
.8%
1.1%
1.0%

Note. R = zero-order correlation; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; t = t-test statistic,
R2% = variance explained; df for t = 901.
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 37
Study 2: Significant Use of Autobiographical Memory for AMFS Functions as Predicted by
HEXACO Personality Traits (Dimensions and Facets)
Perspective Taking
Honesty-Humility
Greed-Avoidance
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Anxiety
Dependence
Sentimentality
Extraversion
Social Self Esteem
Social Boldness
Sociability
Liveliness
Agreeableness
Forgiveness
Gentleness
Conscientiousness
Diligence
Perfection
Openness to Experience
Aesthetic Appreciate
Inquisitive
Creativity
Unconventionality
Altruism
Prospection
Honesty-Humility
Greed Avoidance
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Anxiety
Dependence
Sentimentality
Extraversion
Sociability
Agreeableness
Gentleness
Flexibility
Conscientiousness
Diligence
Perfection
Openness to Experience
Aesthetic Appreciate
Inquisitive
Creativity
Unconventionality
Altruism
Counterfactual Thinking
Honesty-Humility
Sincerity
Fairness
Greed-Avoidance

R

b

t

p

R 2%

-–.12
.20
.10
.19
.25
.24
.10
.13
.22
.07
.07
.07
.17
.12
.17
.17
.19
.11
.14
.13
.23
.16

-–.09
.19
.09
.18
.24
.18
.10
.12
.19
.07
.09
.07
.18
.16
.18
.20
.24
.10
.12
.12
.25
.17

-–3.47
6.06
2.93
5.67
7.61
4.28
3.06
3.83
6.90
2.15
2.17
2.08
5.17
3.54
5.27
5.24
5.92
3.32
4.21
3.77
6.99
4.77

-**
***
**
***
***
***
**
***
***
*
*
*
***
***
***
***
***
**
***
***
***
***

-1.3%
3.9%
.9%
3.4%
6.0%
2.7%
1.0%
1.6%
5.0%
.5%
.5%
.5%
2.9%
1.4%
3.0%
3.0%
3.7%
1.2%
1.9%
1.6%
5.1%
2.5%

–.07
–.12
.16
.13
.11
.18
.08
.13
-.08
–.07
.08
.14
.18
.22
.14
.17
.18
.19
.09

–.08
–.09
.20
.11
.10
.16
.09
.10
-.08
–.07
.11
.14
.20
.26
.12
.14
.16
.20
.09

–2.22
–3.75
4.79
3.83
3.32
5.38
2.40
3.88
-2.43
–2.10
2.53
4.14
5.55
6.74
4.21
5.07
5.34
5.74
2.66

*
***
***
***
**
***
*
***
-*
*
*
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
**

.5%
1.5%
2.5%
1.6%
1.2%
3.1%
.6%
1.6%
-.6%
.5%
.7%
1.9%
3.3%
4.8%
1.9%
2.8%
3.1%
3.5%
.8%

–.19
–.14
–.12
–.20

–.28
–.16
–.12
–.19

–5.87
–4.17
–3.74
–6.11

***
***
***
***

3.7%
1.9%
1.5%
3.9%
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Modesty
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Anxiety
Dependence
Extraversion
Social Self-Esteem
Sociability
Liveliness
Agreeableness
Flexibility
Patience
Conscientiousness
Organization
Perfection
Prudence

–.08
.13
.19
.10
–.07
–.17
.11
–.15
–.07
–.10
–.08
–.11
–.14
.08
–.22

–.10
.21
.21
.12
–.11
–.20
.12
–.18
–.11
–.13
–.09
–.19
–.16
.12
–.28

–2.53
3.80
5.65
2.91
–2.21
–5.05
3.26
–4.57
–2.04
–3.14
–2.30
–3.44
–4.20
2.46
–6.75

*
***
***
**
*
***
**
***
*
**
*
**
***
*
***

.7%
1.6%
3.4%
.9%
.5%
2.8%
1.2%
2.3%
.5%
1.1%
.6%
1.3%
1.9%
.7%
4.8%

Note. R = zero-order correlation; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; t = t-test statistic,
R2% = variance explained; df for t = 901).
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 38
Study 2: Significant Use of Autobiographical Memory for AMFJR Functions as Predicted by
HEXACO Personality Traits (Dimensions Only)
Conversation (Social)
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Extraversion
Conscientiousness
Openness to Experience
Altruism
Perspective Taking (Social)
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Openness to Experience
Altruism
Relationship Maintenance (Social)
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Openness to Experience
Altruism
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (Directive)
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Openness to Experience
Altruism
Emotion Regulation (Directive)
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Openness to Experience
Altruism
Self
Honesty-Humility
Emotionality/Neuroticism
Extraversion
Openness to Experience
Altruism

R

b

t

p

R 2%

.19
.24
.18
.19
.21

.25
.28
.24
.23
.23

5.93
7.49
5.37
5.65
6.59

***
***
***
***
***

3.7%
5.9%
3.1%
3.4%
4.6%

.20
.24
.13
.16
.22
.20

.30
.32
.19
.25
.31
.25

6.10
7.51
4.00
4.79
6.66
6.08

***
***
***
***
***
***

4.0%
5.9%
1.7%
2.5%
4.7%
3.9%

.31
.32
.12
.14
.17
.24

.41
.37
.15
.19
.21
.27

9.88
10.05
3.51
4.18
5.17
7.57

***
***
***
***
***
***

9.8%
10.0%
1.3%
1.9%
2.9%
6.0%

.22
.25
.07
.17
.18
.19

.27
.26
.08
.22
.21
.19

6.56
7.71
2.07
5.21
5.58
5.84

***
***
*
***
***
***

4.8%
6.2%
.5%
2.9%
3.3%
3.6%

.33
.21
.09
.12
.19
.23

.45
.26
.11
.17
.25
.26

10.52
6.59
2.66
3.64
5.80
7.08

***
***
**
***
***
***

10.9%
4.6%
.8%
1.4%
3.6%
5.3%

–.16
.22
.23
.17
.09

–.20
.31
.29
.22
.10

–4.86
6.82
7.12
5.14
2.57

***
***
***
***
**

2.6%
4.9%
5.2%
2.8%
.7%

Note. R = zero-order; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; R2% = variance explained; df for
t = 901.
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 39
Study 2: Significant Use of Autobiographical Memory for TALE, AMFS, and AMFJR Functions
as Predicted by Age and Gender (Female = Reference Group)
R

b

t

p

R 2%

TALE Self
AMFS Counterfactual Thinking

.09
.13

–.01
–.02

–2.70
–3.95

**
***

0.8%
1.7%

Gender (Male = 1; Female = 0)
TALE Social
AMFS Counterfactual Thinking
AMFJR Emotion Regulation

.10
.10
.07

–.21
.25
–.15

–2.97
3.04
–2.12

**
**
*

1.0%
0.2%
0.5%

Age

Note. R = zero-order correlation; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; t = t-test statistic,
R2% = variance explained; df for t = 901.
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Table 40
Study 2: Significant Differences in the Use of Autobiographical Memory for TALE, AMFS, and
AMFJR Functions by Ethnicity: Caucasian, African-American/Black and South Asian
χ2(2)KW
ZMWU
MRC
MRAAB
MRSA
r
TALE Self
Caucasian v AA/B
AA/B v South Asian
Caucasian v South Asian
AMFS CFT
Caucasian v AA/B
AA/B v South Asian
Caucasian v South Asian
AMFJR Self
Caucasian v AA/B
AA/B v South Asian
Caucasian v South Asian
AMFJR PT
Caucasian v AA/B
AA/B v South Asian
Caucasian v South Asian
AMFJR RM
Caucasian v AA/B
AA/B v South Asian
Caucasian v South Asian
AMFJR TPB
Caucasian v AA/B
AA/B v South Asian
Caucasian v South Asian
AMFJR ER
Caucasian v AA/B
AA/B v South Asian
Caucasian v South Asian

41.33***
n.s.
n.s.
–6.45*

344.75

n.s.
–2.82*
–3.94*

355.01

n.s.
–3.56*
–6.70*
n.s.
n.s.
–4.49*

468.66

.237

84.00

111.16
430.46

.195
.145

78.50
343.75

112.95
472.37

.247
.246

352.07

441.41

.172
.204
.214

17.00***

45.29***

23.08***

34.13***
n.s.
–2.93*
–5.84*

347.22

111.46
459.46

n.s.
n.s.
–5.64*

348.04

456.40

.207

n.s.
n.s.
–4.97*

350.76

446.29

.183

83.06

31.68***

25.64***

2

Note. χ (2)KW = Kruskal-Wallis chi-square (df = 2 for all KW models); ZMWU = Z-statistics for
Mann-Whitney U pairwise post-hoc tests; M = mean scale score for group; r% = variance
explained, where r = |Z|/√N (Field, 2005). For the Caucasian v African-American/Black
comparisons, N = 635; for African-American/Black v South Asian, N = 208; for Caucasian v
South Asian, N = 741.
AA/B = African-American/Black; CFT = Counterfactual Thinking; PT = Perspective Taking;
RM = Relationship Maintenance; TPB = Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control; ER =
Emotion Regulation.
For all Kruskal-Wallis χ2 tests: *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001; for all Mann-Whitney U
pairwise post-hoc tests: *p ≤ .0167 (α = .05/3).
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Figure 1. Low-level mind reading according to simulation theory (Goldman, 2006). Simulation
is automatic; stimuli elicit the mirror neuron system rather than long-term memory. The output is
an attribution, but one of emotion only. It is likely that low-level mind reading occurs concurrent
with high-level mind reading if the mirror neuron system is elicited by the target other.
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Figure 2. High-level mind reading per simulation theory (Goldman, 2006). The goal of reexperiencing the past in order to infer another mind activates long-term memory content
(“background information”) that serves that goal. The retrieved memories serve as simulation
process input, which triggers the “imaginative simulation”* process. Shanton and Goldman
characterize perspective taking as “other-directed”; therefore, the simulation form used for
perspective taking is interpersonal simulation.

*Goldman (2006) and Shanton and Goldman (2010) refer to this process as “simulation
proper.”
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Figure 3. An integrated view of the traditional taxonomies of long-term memory as they apply to
the long-term memory component of the simulation process. Broadly, long-term memory is
thought to be either declarative or nondeclarative (Cohen & Squire, 1980; depicted in yellow).
Declarative is comprised of semantic and episodic memory (Tulving, 1972; depicted in blue).
Later theories favored the view that semantic and episodic memories are not discrete systems but
extremes of a continuum (Conway, 2005; Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2012; Greenberg &
Verfaellie, 2010; Kihlstrom, 1984; Rubin, 2012). Declarative and nondeclarative can overlap
(depicted below with curved arrows) if doing so serves the goal for which the memory
information is retrieved (Gilboa, 2004).
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Figure 4. The source activation confusion computational model or SAC (Reder et al., 2002;
Reder et al., 2009) adapted for the current paper. In keeping with traditional long-term memory
taxonomies (Tulving, 1972), the SAC features nodes for concept (semantic) and episode
(episodic) information. When memory content need only be re-experienced for its semantic
properties, the node preferentially activated is a concept node. This activation results in the
assessment process of recognition, which produces the output of identification, knowing, or
believing. Memory content that leads to recognition processing does not instigate simulation.
When memory content needs to be re-experienced for its event and context properties the node
preferentially activated and episode node. The ensuing assessment process is thus recollection,
which results in remembering. Memory content that leads to remembering is submitted as input
for simulation. If the activation of a node and its bindings (connections) are strong enough,
spreading activation can occur. Because one type of node is activated preferentially, activation of
attendant nodes is subordinate. This explains how concept information is included in episodic
memories and vice versa, and also accounts for the instigation (or not) of simulation. Lines
extending from the general context node represent the contextual “fan” that occurs when the
general context is common to multiple episodes.
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Figure 5. The proposed Expanded Simulation Model (adapted from Shanton & Goldman, 2010)
when a goal necessitates predominantly semantic autobiographical memory content. The
diagram shows that “unpacking” the long-term memory component reveals the self-memory
system (SMS) (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and the source activation
confusion (SAC) model (Reder et al., 2009). An goal to produce a behavioral outcome such as
“identification,” “knowing,” or “believing,” prompts the activation of a relevant self-concept
stored in the SMS. This prompts the SMS’s “search and retrieval” procedure to activate the
associated semantic autobiographical memory content. At the neural level, the semantic
autobiographical memory content is stored in a concept node. The predominant activation of a
concept node results in the assessment process of recognition, which yields the behavioral
outcomes of identification, knowing, or believing. Because such behavioral outcomes do not
require the use of imagination, simulation does not occur.

Unpacking à
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Figure 6. The proposed Expanded Simulation Model for perspective taking, which was adapted
from Goldman (2006) and Shanton & Goldman (2010). The “unpacking” of the long-term
memory component reveals the components of the Self-Memory System (SMS) (Conway, 2005;
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and the Source Activation Confusion (SAC) model (Reder et
al., 2009). The current paper hypothesizes that a form of long-term memory content used for
perspective taking is autobiographical episodic memory content. This content is extracted upon
the setting of a perspective-taking goal, which then prompts the activation of the corresponding
self-concept stored in the SMS (depicted in pink). This triggers the SMS’s “search and retrieval”
procedure to activate the autobiographical episodic memory content at the neural level. Per the
SAC (depicted in blue), this content is stored in an episode node. The illustration shows that,
although episodic (and contextual) memory content is predominantly activated in response to a
perspective-taking goal, any associated semantic memory content can be activated as well. The
predominant activation of an autobiographical memory episode node prompts the assessment
process of recollection, which requires the use of imaginative simulation (depicted in light
green). The behavioral outcome is the inferring of another’s mind; i.e., perspective taking.
Shanton and Goldman characterize perspective taking as “other-directed”; therefore, the form of
simulation used for perspective taking is intrapersonal simulation.
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Figure 7. A possible simulation process model for mental time travel as adapted from Shanton
and Goldman (2010). As with high-level mind reading (perspective taking), long-term memory
content (“background information”) serves as simulation input. The current paper operationalizes
mental time travel as the behavioral outcomes of reminiscence (“re-experiencing” the past by
retrieving and subjectively reliving predominantly episodic memory content), prospection (“preexperiencing” the future by retrieving and imaginatively employing predominantly episodic
memory content for the purpose of subjectively envisioning potential scenarios), and
counterfactual thinking (“reframing” the past by retrieving and imaginatively employing
predominantly episodic memory content for the purpose of subjectively changing or augmenting
a past event). Shanton and Goldman characterize mental time travel as “self-directed”; therefore,
the simulation form used for mental time travel is intrapersonal simulation.

275
Figure 8. The complete proposed Expanded Simulation Model, which was adapted from
Goldman (2006) and Shanton & Goldman (2010), and incorporates the components of the SelfMemory System (SMS) (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and the Source
Activation Confusion (SAC) model (Reder et al., 2009). The path that leads to perspective taking
reflects interpersonal simulation processing, while the past leading to the mental time travel
behavioral outcomes reflects intrapersonal simulation processing.
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Figure 9. The model of autobiographical functions as validated by Ranson & Fitzgerald (in
preparation). All functions emerged from the broad three-function model of Self, Social, and
Directive (e.g., Neisser, 1982; Tulving, 2002b). Consistent with the model by Kulkofsky and
Koh (2009) that the Ranson and Fitzgerald study attempted to replicate with a diverse adult
sample, the Directive function split into the subfunctions of Teaching/ProblemSolving/Behavioral Control and Emotion Regulation, and the subfunctions of Conversation and
Relationship Maintenance emerged from the Social function. Although the current paper found
evidence that two Relationship Maintenance items were actually tapping into the use of
autobiographical memory for perspective taking (PT), no other study has reported a PT function.
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Figure 10. Graphic representations of Study 1’s EPAF1 extraction diagnostics. The fit to
comparison data test (a) supported a three-factor structure as hypothesized, as did the Kaiser
eigenvalue rule (b). However, the parallel analysis (PA), optimal coordinates (OC), and
acceleration factor (AF), all shown (b), as well as the scree plot (c) were inconclusive, predicting
2–3 factors. Note that AC is reflects the optimal number of factors minus 1; thus the number of
factors it recommended was two.
a.

c.

b.
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Figure 11. Study 1 EPAF1 factor diagram illustrates the loading strength and patterns when
applying geomin Q-Q oblique rotation.
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Figure 12. Study 1 EPAF1 factor diagram illustrates the loading strength and patterns when
applying varimax orthogonal rotation.
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Figure 13. Study 1 path diagram per the SEM-CFA of EPAF1. Loadings are standardized
estimates. All were significant and positive.
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Figure 14. The hypothesized eight-function structure when the AMFS and AMFJR (Ranson &
Fitzgerald, in preparation) scales are combined. As predicted by the theoretical Expanded
Simulation Model, the three “simulation-based” AMFS functions of Prospection (PRO) and
Counterfactual Thinking (CFT) will be shown in CFA to be independent and unique
autobiographical memory functions in the presence of the “socially situated” AMFJR functions
of Conversation (CON), Relationship Maintenance (RM), Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral
Control (TPB), Emotion Regulation (ER), and Self (S). However, in the hypothesized eightfunction model, the Perspective Taking function comprises the Perspective Taking subscales of
the AMFS and AMFJR.
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Figure 15: The expected relations between the functions of the AMFS and AMFJR, and the
TALE’s three broad Social, Self, and Directive functions (Bluck & Alea, 2011). CRS-A (aka
AMFJR; Ranson & Fitzgerald, in press) validation showed that Conversation (CON),
Perspective Taking (PT), and Relationship Maintenance (RM) mapped onto the broad Social
function; Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (TPB) and Emotion Regulation (ER)
mapped on to the broad Directive function; and Self (S) mapped onto the broad Self function.
Study 2 hypotheses state that, although the AMFS PT function is characterized as a simulationbased function, it will also map onto the TALE Social function because it reflects interpersonal
simulation, which is driven by social goals (see Chapter 1, Hypothesis 1.7). It is also
hypothesized that the Prospection (PRO) and Counterfactual Thinking (CFT) functions will map
onto the TALE Self function because they reflect intrapersonal simulation, which is driven by
self goals (see Chapter 1, Hypothesis 1.7). Because the Directive function has been shown to
concern the guiding of present and future thoughts and actions (Williams et al., 2008), the PRO
and CFT functions may also map onto the TALE’s Directive function.
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Figure 16: Results of the power analysis for Study 2’s most complex model, which includes 61
observed variables (10 AMFS, 36 AMFJR, 15 TALE) and 11 latent variables (3 AMFS, 6
AMFJR, 3 TALE). Estimating a conservative effect size of .10, the recommended sample is at
least 766. The target sample size is 900. Online sample size calculator by Soper (2006).
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Figure 17: Results of the power analysis for a general multiple regression analysis using two
predictors. The analysis was run using G*Power (Erdfelder et al. 1996).
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Figure 18. The nine-function structure that emerged when testing Hypothesis 3.1 using a secondorder SEM CFA approach. Results showed that the AMFS function of Perspective Taking (PTS)
and the AMFJR function of Perspective Taking (PTJR) were independent functions from one
another, such that findings suggest there is a “simulation-based” function of Perspective Taking
and a “socially situated” function of Perspective Taking. Results also confirmed that the AMFS
“simulation-based” functions of Perspective Taking (PTS), Prospection (PRO), and
Counterfactual Thinking (CFT) are independent and unique autobiographical functions in the
presence of the “socially situated” AMFJR functions of Conversation (CON), Perspective Taking
(PTJR) Relationship Maintenance (RM), Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (TPB),
Emotion Regulation (ER), and Self (SELFJR).
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Figure 19. The Hypothesis 3.2 replication of the associations between the broad Social (SOCT),
Directive (DIRT), and Self (SELFT) functions of the TALE and the socially situated functions of
the AMFJR as previously reported by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation). As expected,
results of the second-order CFA showed that the AMFJR functions of Conversation (CON),
Perspective Taking (PTJR), and Relationship Maintenance (RM) mapped onto the TALE’s broad
Social function; the AMFJR Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (TPB) function
mapped onto the TALE’s broad Directive function, and the AMFJR’s Self (SELFJR) function
mapped onto the TALE’s broad Self function.
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Figure 20. Results of the Hypothesis 3.2 test for associations between the simulation-based
functions of the AMFS and the broad functions of the TALE supported the model shown below.
As expected, the AMFS Perspective Taking (PTS) function mapped onto the TALE’s broad
Social (SOCT) function. However, because there was theoretical evidence that the AMFS mental
time travel functions of Prospection (PRO) and Counterfactual Thinking (CFT) could be broadly
Directive (DIRT), Self (SELFT), or some combination of both, specific mappings were not
predicted. Results of the nine-function, second order CFA showed that the AMFS Prospection
function mapped onto the TALE’s broad Directive function, whereas the AMFS Counterfactual
Thinking function mapped onto the TALE’s broad Self (SELFT) function.
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Figure 21. Results of the Hypothesis 3.2 test of whether the results of the AMFJR-TALE CFA
and AMFS-TALE CFA would hold when examined as a single model. Results supported the
mappings found for the individual Hypothesis 3.2 CFAs. Specifically, the functions that mapped
onto the TALE’s broad Social (SOCT) function were the AMFS Perspective Taking (PTS), and
the AMFJR Conversation (CON), Perspective Taking (PTJR), and Relationship Maintenance
(RM functions. The functions that mapped onto the TALE’s broad Directive (DIRT) function
were the AMFS Prospection (PRO) function, and the AMFJR Teaching/Problem
Solving/Behavioral Control (TBP) and Emotion Regulation (ER) functions. The functions that
mapped onto the TALE’s broad Self (SELFT) function were the AMFS Counterfactual Thinking
(CFT) function and the AMFJR Self (SELFJR) function.
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Recent research seeking an expanded view of everyday autobiographical memory
functions found evidence for a new function: perspective taking (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in
preparation)—which is the inferring of others’ mental states (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997;
Ickes, 2003). Because no other study has implicated the social behavior of perspective taking as
a purpose for which autobiographical memory is used, Chapter 1 of the current paper proposes a
conceptual cognitive process model developed to provide a theoretical explanation. The resultant
Expanded Simulation Model was adapted for use in the current paper from the cognitive process
model detailed in simulation theory (Goldman, 2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). The Expanded
Simulation Model illustrates how, through the mechanism of mental simulation, autobiographical
memory specifically, rather than long-term memory generally, can be used to inform perspective
taking—thus theoretically substantiating perspective taking as a function of autobiographical
memory.
Chapter 1 of the current paper details the “unpacking” of the simulation theory process
model’s superficially defined long-term memory component to show how autobiographical
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memory content is activated, retrieved, and incorporated in simulation for perspective taking.
Also aligned with a recent extension to simulation theory by Shanton and Goldman (2010), the
Expanded Simulation Model can be used to explain how autobiographical memory specifically
informs mental time travel—the mental traveling of oneself through conceptual time (Schacter &
Addis, 2007). As such, the Expanded Simulation Model, in keeping with Shanton and
Goldman’s revised model, can account for the two ensuing forms of simulation: interpersonal
and intrapersonal. That is, because perspective taking is other-directed, it is underlain by
autobiographical memory-informed interpersonal simulation, whereas self-directed nature of
mental time travel is underlain by autobiographical memory-informed intrapersonal simulation.
Two empirical studies were designed to test the claims of Chapter 1. Study 1 (Chapter 2)
validated a newly developed instrument for measuring the frequency with which individuals use
autobiographical memory for perspective taking and two mental time travel functions:
prospection (imagining future scenarios) (Schacter & Addis, 2007) and counterfactual thinking
(reconstructing the past to imagine an details or an outcome that did not actually occur) (Roese &
Olson, 1995).
Results of exploratory principal axis factoring for ordinal data, as well as confirmatory
factor analysis using a structural equation model approach, yielded evidence that the 10-item
Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale reliably measured the
functions of perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking. Study 2 (Chapter 3)
used the validated AMFS scale to evaluate the functions of perspective taking, prospection, and
counterfactual thinking in the presence of, and in comparison to, other known autobiographical
memory functions to glean a better understanding of their viability as independent functions.
Results supported the independence of the AMFS functions. Further, evidence recommended the
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characterization of the AMFS function of Perspective Taking as “simulation-based,” whereas the
AMFJR Perspective Taking function instead reflected rated frequency of functional use of
autobiographical memory for socially situated Perspective Taking. Also discussed were mapping
of the AMFS and AMFJR functions onto the broad functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011),
as well as personality, age, gender, and culture effects.
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